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RÉSUMÉ
Les applications Web sont très courantes, et ont des besoins de sécurité. L’un d’eux est le
contrôle d’accès. Le contrôle d’accès s’assure que la politique de sécurité est respectée. Cette
politique définit l’accès légitime aux données et aux opérations de l’application. Les applica-
tions Web utilisent régulièrement le contrôle d’accès à base de rôles (en anglais, « Role-Based
Access Control » ou RBAC). Les politiques de sécurité RBAC permettent aux développeurs
de définir des rôles et d’assigner des utilisateurs à ces rôles. De plus, l’assignation des privi-
lèges d’accès se fait au niveau des rôles.
Les applications Web évoluent durant leur maintenance et des changements du code source
peuvent affecter leur sécurité de manière inattendue. Pour éviter que ces changements en-
gendrent des régressions et des vulnérabilités, les développeurs doivent revalider l’implémen-
tation RBAC de leur application. Ces revalidations peuvent exiger des ressources considéra-
bles. De plus, la tâche est compliquée par l’éloignement possible entre le changement et son
impact sur la sécurité (e.g. dans des procédures ou fichiers différents).
Pour s’attaquer à cette problématique, nous proposons des analyses statiques de programmes
autour de la protection garantie des privilèges. Nous générons automatiquement des modèles
de protection des privilèges. Pour ce faire, nous utilisons l’analyse de flux par traversement
de patron (en anglais, « Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis » ou PTFA) à partir du code source
de l’application. En comparant les modèles PTFA de différentes versions, nous déterminons
les impacts des changements de code sur la protection des privilèges. Nous appelons ces
impacts de sécurité des différences de protection garantie (en anglais, « Definite Protection
Difference » ou DPD). En plus de trouver les DPD entre deux versions, nous établissons une
classification des différences reposant sur la théorie des ensembles.
De plus, nous calculons des contre-exemples explicatifs. Ces contre-exemples sont des chemins
dans un modèle PTFA démontrant la différence de protection entre deux versions. Pour
faciliter leur compréhension, nous les simplifions à l’aide de transformations de graphes.
Nous calculons également les changements affectant la protection (en anglais, « Protection-
Impacting Changes » ou PIC) à l’aide des différences entre les modèles PTFA et de la re-
joignabilité des graphes. Finalement, nous identifions un sur-ensemble des causes racines des
DPD en renversant ces changements.
À l’aide d’une étude d’ensemble de 147 paires de versions du logiciel WordPress, nous dé-
couvrons que 56% des paires de versions n’ont pas de DPD. Dans les 44% des paires de
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versions restantes, nous trouvons que seulement 0.30% du code source est affecté par les
DPD en moyenne. Dans cette population, nous avons également découvert que les catégories
de DPD les plus présentes sont les gains complets (≈ 41%), les pertes complètes (≈ 18%)
et les substitutions (≈ 20%). De plus, nous découvrons que les contre-exemples sont généra-
lement courts, avec une longueur médiane de 88 états. L’exemple médian est contenu dans
un fichier, et traverse une seule frontière de fonction. Nous avons observé les PIC avec une
étude d’ensemble de deux applications Web. Cette étude couvre respectivement 220 et 192
paires de versions pour les logiciels WordPress et MediaWiki. Les PIC sont présents dans
87/220 (40%) et 42/192 (22%) des paires de versions. Dans ces paires de versions, la médiane
relative des PIC est d’environ 27% et 14% des changements de code, respectivement.
De plus, nous observons que les causes racines de DPD sont toutes identifiées pour 87% à
93% des paires de versions.
L’identification automatique des DPD, leur classification, les caractéristiques de leurs contre-
exemples explicatifs et de leurs PIC peuvent aider les développeurs à revalider l’implémen-
tation RBAC de leurs applications. De plus, ces contributions peuvent faciliter les examens
de sécurité, la vérification et validation d’application, les tests et la réparation des failles.
Notre approche peut être intégrée dans les processus de développement des logiciels. En effet,
elle pourrait servir comme système d’alarme protégeant contre les implémentations RBAC
fautives. De plus, nous envisageons une intégration de nos outils dans les environnements de
développement intégrés. Cette intégration permettrait aux développeurs d’analyser interac-
tivement leurs logiciels au besoin.
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ABSTRACT
Web applications are commonplace, and have security needs. One of these is access control.
Access control enforces a security policy that allows and restricts access to information and
operations. Web applications often use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to restrict oper-
ations and protect security-sensitive information and resources. RBAC allows developers to
assign users to various roles, and assign privileges to the roles.
Web applications undergo maintenance and evolution. Their security may be affected by
source code changes between releases. Because these changes may impact security in unex-
pected ways, developers need to revalidate their RBAC implementation to prevent regressions
and vulnerabilities. This may be resource-intensive. This task is complicated by the fact that
the code change and its security impact may be distant (e.g. in different functions or files).
To address this issue, we propose static program analyses of definite privilege protection.
We automatically generate privilege protection models from the source code using Pattern
Traversal Flow Analysis (PTFA). Using differences between versions and PTFA models, we
determine privilege-level security impacts of code changes using definite protection differ-
ences (DPDs) and apply a set-theoretic classification to them. We also compute explanatory
counter-examples for DPDs in PTFA models. In addition, we shorten them using graph
transformations in order to facilitate their understanding. We define protection-impacting
changes (PICs), changed code during evolution that impact privilege protection. We do so
using graph reachability and differencing of two versions’ PTFA models. We also identify a
superset of source code changes that contain root causes of DPDs by reverting these changes.
We survey the distribution of DPDs and their classification over 147 release pairs of Word-
Press, spanning from 2.0 to 4.5.1. We found that code changes caused no DPDs in 82 (56%)
release pairs. The remaining 65 (44%) release pairs are security-affected. For these release
pairs, only 0.30% of code is affected by DPDs on average. We also found that the most com-
mon change categories are complete gains (≈ 41%), complete losses (≈ 18%) and substitution
(≈ 20%).
We also surveyed the same versions of WordPress for explanatory counter-examples of privi-
lege protection losses. We computed over 14,000 explanatory counter-examples in 31 release
pairs. Our results show that counter-examples are typically short and localized. The median
example spans 88 statements, crosses a single function boundary, and is contained in the
same file.
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We surveyed two PHP web applications for PICs, WordPress and MediaWiki, over 220 and
192 release pairs, respectively. We found PICs in only respectively 87/220 (40%) and 42/192
(22%) release pairs. For these release pairs, median PICs are approximately 27% and 14%
of the code changes.
We also found that all root causes of protection differences for a release pair were conserva-
tively identified in 87% to 93% of examined pairs.
The automated identification and classification of DPDs, the characteristics of explanatory
counter-examples, and PICs may help developers to focus their efforts more efficiently during
security reviews, verification, validation, testing, and repairs.
Our approach could be integrated in secure software development process as an early warning
system against invalid RBAC implementations. In addition, our approach could be used
within Integrated Development Environments (IDE) and allow on-demand analyses.
xTABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
RÉSUMÉ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xix
LIST OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xx
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Definitions and Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Least Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.2 Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.3 Web Application Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.4 Static Program Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.5 Code Changes and Protection Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.1.6 Root Cause Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHAPTER 2 CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 14
2.1 Detection of SQL Injection and Cross-Site Scripting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.1 Taint Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.1.2 String Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Slicing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
xi
2.3 Evolution Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 RBAC Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.1 Analysis of RBAC Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.2 Analysis of RBAC Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.3 Detection of Access Control Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5 Access Control Evolution Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6 Analyses Leveraging Program Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.7 Change Impact Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.8 Root Cause Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH PROJECT AND THESIS ORGANIZATION 24
3.1 Research Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
CHAPTER 4 ARTICLE 1: CLASSIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF RBAC
PRIVILEGE PROTECTION CHANGES IN WORDPRESS EVOLU-
TION 27
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3.1 Privilege Protection Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3.2 Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3.3 Privilege Protection Change Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4.1 Distribution of Privilege Protection in WordPress . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4.2 Distribution of Privilege Protection Changes in WordPress . . . . . . 34
4.4.3 Distribution of Privilege Protection Change Classification . . . . . . . 34
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.6 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.7 Threats to Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.8 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
CHAPTER 5 ARTICLE 2: COMPUTING COUNTER-EXAMPLES FOR PRIVI-
LEGE PROTECTION LOSSES USING SECURITY MODELS 41
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2.1 Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
xii
5.2.2 Privilege Protection Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.2.3 Computing Counter-Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.2.4 Release Pair Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.6 Threats to Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.7 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
CHAPTER 6 ARTICLE 3: DETECTION OF PROTECTION-IMPACTING CHA-
NGES DURING SOFTWARE EVOLUTION 63
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.2.1 Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.2.2 Definite Protection Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.3 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.3.1 Added and Deleted Edges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.3.2 Appropriately Protected Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.3.3 Definition of Protection-Impacting Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.5 Experiment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.5.1 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.5.2 Data Collection and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.5.3 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.6 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.8 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.9 Threats to Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.10 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
CHAPTER 7 ARTICLE 4: RBAC PROTECTION-IMPACTING CHANGES : A CASE
STUDY OF PHP APPLICATION EVOLUTION 85
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.2.1 Access Control Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.2.2 DPD Root Cause Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.2.3 Control Flow Graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
xiii
7.2.4 Definite Privilege Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.2.5 Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.2.6 Definite Protection Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.3 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.3.1 Reachable PTFA Change Detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.3.2 Reachable Edges Finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
7.3.3 Formal Definition of Protection-Impacting Changes . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.4 Experiment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.4.1 RQ1: Reduction of Code Changes to Evaluate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
7.4.2 RQ2 : PICs containing all DPD root causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.5 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.5.1 RQ1 : Reduction of Code Changes to Evaluate . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.5.2 RQ2 : PICs containing all DPD root causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
7.6.1 RQ1: Reduction of Code Changes to Evaluate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7.6.2 RQ2 : PICs containing all DPD root causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.6.3 Further Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.7 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.8 Threats to Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.9 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
CHAPTER 8 GENERAL DISCUSSION 135
8.1 Discussion on the Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
8.2 Vulnerability Oracles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
8.3 Secure Software Development Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
8.4 Limitations of the Proposed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8.4.1 Precision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8.4.2 Program Size and Change Size Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
8.4.3 Privilege Protection and Code Analyzed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
8.4.4 Complex Code Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
8.5 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
8.6 Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.6.1 The PHP Front-End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8.6.2 The ACMA PTFA Analyzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
8.6.3 Line Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
8.7 Language Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
xiv
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 148
9.1 Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
9.2 Advancement to Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
9.3 Recommendations for Developers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
9.4 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
xv
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1 Correspondence Between Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Table 5.1 Privilege Protection Loss Examples Examples Summary Statistics . . 56
Table 5.2 Distribution of Function Boundaries Crossed in Privilege Protection
Loss Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Table 5.3 Distribution of Number of Files in Privilege Protection Loss Example 58
Table 6.1 Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Table 7.1 Survey Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Table 7.2 Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair (WordPress) . . . . . 116
Table 7.2 Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair (WordPress – Cont.) 117
Table 7.2 Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair (WordPress – Cont.) 118
Table 7.3 Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair (MediaWiki) . . . . . 118
Table 7.3 Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair (MediaWiki – Cont.) 119
Table 7.4 Results of Reverting Definite Protection Differences . . . . . . . . . . 124
Table E.1 Rules for Reverting Files with Protection-Impacting Changes . . . . . 182
xvi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Sample Access Control Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 1.2 Sample RBAC Access Control Matrix and Group Memberships . . . 3
Figure 1.3 Sample RBAC use in WordPress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 1.4 Steps Involved in Static Program Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 1.5 Examples Showing the Importance of Analysis Sensitivity . . . . . . 7
Figure 1.6 Reformatted Excerpt of the Patch for CVE-2009-2854 . . . . . . . . . 9
Figure 1.7 Reformatted Patch for CVE-2015-5623 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Figure 2.1 Example of Slicing and Privilege Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Figure 4.1 Classification Categories Illustrated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Figure 4.2 Definitions for the Classification Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Figure 4.3 Total Vertices with Non-Empty Privilege Protection Set vs Program
Size per version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 4.4 Evolution of Definitely Protected Vertices’ Privilege Protection Set
Cardinalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 4.5 Distribution of Total Privilege Protection Changes per Release Pair . 34
Figure 4.6 Violin Plot of Classified Privilege Protection Changes Per Non-Empty
Release Pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Figure 4.7 Classified Vertices for All Release Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 5.1 Simplified PTFA Model for our Running Example . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Figure 5.2 Privilege Protection Loss in Our Running Example . . . . . . . . . . 51
Figure 5.3 Reversed PTFA Model for our Running Example . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Figure 5.4 Reversed PTFA Model for Listing 5.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Figure 5.5 WordPress Release Tree Excerpt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Figure 5.6 Cumulative Distribution of Counter-Examples per Release Pair . . . 55
Figure 5.7 Distribution of Privilege Protection Loss Example Lengths . . . . . . 56
Figure 5.8 Cumulative Distribution of Privilege Protection Loss Example Lengths 57
Figure 5.9 Privilege Protection Loss Example Length vs Program Size . . . . . . 57
Figure 6.1 Example CFG and Corresponding PTFA Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Figure 6.2 Example Code, CFG and PTFA Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Figure 6.3 Distribution of Protection-Impacting Lines of Code per Release Pair
for security-affected Release Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Figure 6.4 Distribution of Protection-Impacting Lines of Code per Release Pair
for security-affected Release Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
xvii
Figure 7.1 Reformatted Vulnerability Correction by Adding Privilege Checks . . 88
Figure 7.2 Excerpt of Vulnerability Correction by Moving Privilege Check . . . 89
Figure 7.3 Example CFG and Corresponding Reachable PTFA Model . . . . . . 95
Figure 7.4 Examples of gain-affected and loss-affected CFG Vertices . . . . . . . 96
Figure 7.5 Code Change That is Gain-Impacting and Loss-Impacting . . . . . . 97
Figure 7.6 Processing Steps to Determine Protection-Impacting Changes . . . . 98
Figure 7.7 Example Paths to definite protection differences . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Figure 7.8 Example Paths to definite protection differences . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Figure 7.9 Reachable PTFA Models Corresponding to Figure 7.8 . . . . . . . . . 104
Figure 7.10 Processing Pipeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Figure 7.11 Release Tree Excerpt for MediaWiki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Figure 7.12 Example Illustrating the Need to Use Heuristics When Projecting Pro-
tection-Impacting-Changes to Lines of Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Figure 7.13 Workflow for Reversing Protection-Impacting Changes . . . . . . . . 113
Figure 7.14 Algorithm for Individual Reversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Figure 7.15 Distribution of Protection-Impacting Lines of Code per Release Pair
for Security-Impacted Release Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Figure 7.16 Distribution of Protection-Impacting Lines of Code per Release Pair
for Security-Impacted Release Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Figure 7.17 Example of definite protection difference Caused by Interprocedural
Edge Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Figure 7.18 Decision Support System for Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Figure 8.1 Example of Privilege Checks Which Do Not Confer Definite Privilege
Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Figure 8.2 Reformatted Patch for CVE-2015-5623 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Figure 8.3 Reformatted Security Patch for CVE-2006-6016 . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Figure 8.4 Reformatted Security Patch for CVE-2007-1893 . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Figure 8.5 Contributed Software Ecosystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Figure A.1 Example of Protection-Impacting Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Figure A.2 Kinds of Changed Edges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Figure A.3 Simplified CFGs of the Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Figure A.4 Simplified PTFA Models of Our Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Figure A.5 Simplified PTFA Models of Our Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Figure C.1 vertexMap Construction Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Figure D.1 Release Tree Construction Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Figure F.1 Backwards Reachability Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
xviii
Figure F.2 Backwards Reachability Algorithm (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Figure F.3 Definitions for bReachable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
xix
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ABAC Attribute-Based Access Control
ACL Access Control List
ACM Access Control Matrix
API Application Programming Interface
ASR Automated Software Repair
AST Abstract Syntax Tree
BDD Binary Decision Diagram
CFG Control Flow Graph
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
CSRF Cross-Site Request Forgery
DPD Definite Protection Difference
IBAC Identity-Based Access Control
IDE Interprocedural Distributed Environment Transformer
IDE Integrated Development Environment
IFDS Interprocedural Finite Distributed Subset
LOC Lines of Code
NBAC Authentication-Based Access Control
NCLOC Non-Comment Lines of Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
PDG Program Dependence Graph
PIC Protection-Impacting Change
PLOC Physical Lines of Code
PDP Policy Decision Point
PEP Policy Enforcement Point
PPC Privilege Protection Change
PTFA Pattern-Traversal Flow Analysis
RBAC Role-Based Access Control
RCA Root Cause Analysis
SOD Separation of Duties
SQLi SQL Injection
V&V Verification and Validation
XSS Cross-Site Scripting
ZBAC authoriZation-Based Access Control
xx
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix A Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Appendix B Obtaining Source Code for the Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Appendix C VertexMap Construction Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Appendix D Release Tree Construction Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Appendix E Revert Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Appendix F Backwards Reachability Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Web applications are commonly used in a wide range of industries. Their many uses include
email, shopping, filing taxes, and interacting with friends and family. Because of the sensitive
nature of the data in these applications, they have high security needs. These needs are
generally grouped along three axes: confidentiality, integrity and availability – this is called
the CIA triad [32].
Access control (also known as authorization) is a method that ensures confidentiality and
integrity. It enforces a policy restricting the operations that users may perform. A widely
used form of access control is Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). RBAC is an approach to
access control that groups the users in groups. Application developers then allow operations
based on group memberships.
Despite their best efforts, developers may implement RBAC improperly. When they do so,
their application may suffer from access control vulnerabilities. According to a recent indus-
try survey, broken access control is the fifth most important security issue in web applications
[146]. The impact of improper access control varies from one application to the next, but it
can be considerable. For instance, a vulnerable application may allow unauthorized informa-
tion disclosure (e.g. unauthenticated users accessing sensitive data, accessing another user’s
account). In another example, a vulnerable application may allow non-administrator users
to perform administrative tasks.
The OWASP Foundation, a leading industry body1, observes that “access control weaknesses
are common due to the lack of automated detection, and lack of effective functional testing
by application developers” [146].To address this issue, we present an automated method to
detect variations in RBAC protection between versions. When variations are detected, our
approach computes additional information to help developers determine if the differences are
harmful, and understand why the difference occurred.
1.1 Definitions and Concepts
1.1.1 Least Privilege
A well-designed web application should use access control to enforce the principle of least
privilege. This principle is intended to lower the risk of accidental or malicious damage. It
1OWASP stands for the Open Web Application Security Project
2states that “every program and every user of the system should operate using the least set
of privileges necessary to complete the job.” [158]. In other words, this principle means that
code should execute with only the privileges specified in the security policy.
1.1.2 Access Control
A way to enforce the principle of least privilege is using access control. An access control
policy defines what operations subjects can perform on which objects. In a web application,
the subjects are all active entities and objects are the entities that need protection. Sub-
jects include users, processes, and remote services. Objects include files, database rows and
sensitive operations. The access control mechanism is responsible for enforcing this policy.
We introduce widely used access control approaches: Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC),
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), and authori-
Zation-Based Access Control (ZBAC). Afterwards, we describe access control implementa-
tions in software systems.
Identity-Based Access Control
Identity-Based Access Control [25, 91] is a form of access control specified using the subjects’
and objects’ identity. The access control policies can be specified using an access control
matrix (ACM) [24]. For every entry in the ACM, the subject has the specified rights over
the object. In Figure 1.1 we give an example ACM, where oi refers to an object and sj refers
to a subject.
o1 o2
. . .
on
s1 read, edit read
s2 read, print
s3 read, print
. . .
sn read read read, print, edit
Figure 1.1 Sample Access Control Matrix
Since maintaining and storing the ACM for large systems may be problematic, it is possible
to project the ACM on either axis.
The projection by column is called access control lists (ACLs) [23]. For each object o in the
system, the object is stored with a set of 2-tuples (s, r), where s is a subject and r is a set of
rights that s has over o. A subject with no such tuple has no rights over o.
3The projection by row is called capabilities [23]. For each subject s in the system, there is a
set of 2-tuples (o, r), where o is an object and r is the set of rights that s has over o. The
use of capabilities requires tamper-proof mechanisms (such as cryptography), since the user
could otherwise alter their capability list.
Role-Based Access Control
In the example above (Figure 1.1), subjects s2 and s3 have the same rights. This kind of
duplication is one of the factors that gave rise to Role-Based Access Control. RBAC users
are assigned to groups and permissions are assigned to groups. Thus, users obtain privileges
indirectly, through their group memberships. [26, 91, 160]. Using RBAC, our example of
Figure 1.1 could thus become as in Figure 1.2. We show the group memberships in Figure
1.2a and the updated ACM in Figure 1.2b. Please note that group membership is an N-to-N
association, meaning that a subject may belong to many groups.
User Groups
s1 g1
s2 g2
s3 g3
. . .
sn gm
(a) Group Memberships
o1 o2
. . .
on
g1 read, edit read
g2 read, print
. . .
gm read read read, print, edit
(b) ACM
Figure 1.2 Sample RBAC Access Control Matrix and Group Memberships
Many variants of RBAC have been proposed over the years, and a US government agency,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), proposed a standard with four
variants of RBAC: flat, hierarchical, constrained, and symmetric [160]. Flat RBAC follows
the textbook definition of RBAC. Symmetric RBAC allows constrained RBAC, but it in-
cludes management tools for reviewing assignments of permissions to roles. We now describe
the remaining two RBAC variants.
Hierarchical RBAC enables the organization of groups using a partial order. In this ordering,
the greater roles have all the privileges of their lesser roles, in addition to their own privileges.
Constrained RBAC enforces separation of duties (SOD). SOD is intended to lower the risk
of fraud and accidents by preventing users from gathering too much power. When SOD is
required to perform an action, multiple users with different roles must perform the action.
For instance, users may not belong to two or more mutually exclusive groups.
4Attribute-Based Access Control
An alternative family of access control is ABAC [75, 91]. In this approach, there are no roles
with statically assigned privileges. Instead, the access control policy specifies allowed access
using the subject’s and object’s attributes as well as environment conditions. In essence,
ABAC policies are first-order logic expressions over attributes and environment conditions.
These attributes are assigned to the subject and the objects by the ABAC engine.
Authorization-Based Access Control
A more recent proposal is authoriZation-Based Access Control (ZBAC) [91]. ZBAC is de-
signed for distributed and service-based systems and is akin to capability-based models. Users
must authenticate with an authentication service. The latter will provide the user with one or
more authorizations. When using a service, the user submits the appropriate authorization
with their request. The service only needs to verify the authorization’s validity to make an
access decision.
Access Control Implementation
Generally speaking, access control mechanisms are built using a Policy Decision Point (PDP)
and multiple Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs) [75]. PEPs act as the gatekeepers of sensitive
operations. A client attempting a privileged operation interacts with a PEP. The PEP then
requests access on behalf of the client to the PDP. Upon receiving this request, the PDP
consults the access control policy and either grants or denies the request. If the request is
granted, the PEP allows the operation to proceed.
Software developers sometimes implement RBAC differently than we described earlier. For
instance, they sometimes allow both users and groups as subjects in the ACM (e.g. Microsoft
Windows ACLs). Also, they sometimes define privileges which apply on all objects.
In software, PEPs are typically conditional statements. They gather the context infor-
mation required by the PDP and execute a call to a stereotypical Application Program-
ming Interface (API). We show an example PEP from WordPress in Figure 1.3. The
call to current_user_can interacts with the PDP, requesting if the current user holds the
edit_posts privilege. This API returns a Boolean indicating if the execution may proceed
or not. In this case, if the policy disallows the action, it stops the execution of the procedure
and returns to the calling context. Please note that, in this example, the privilege is queried
with no relation to objects in the system. However, WordPress also allows to request access
in relation to objects.
5if(! current_user_can( ’edit_posts ’ )){
return;
}
$last_post_id =(int)get_user_option(’dashboard_quick_press_last_post_id ’);
//...
Figure 1.3 Sample RBAC use in WordPress
1.1.3 Web Application Security
As we alluded to earlier, access control is only one dimension of security. Other areas of
web application security include authentication, session management, input handling, data
protection, error handling, logging, use of encryption, server configuration, etc [144].
The OWASP Foundation publishes guidance documents and security tools for web application
developers. One of their flagship project is the OWASP Top Ten, a list of the ten most
prevalent web application security issues [146]. They also publish a comprehensive web
application security verification standard [144] and a testing guide [143].
Some of the most dangerous web application vulnerabilities are Cross-Site Scripting (XSS),
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) and SQL Injection (SQLi). These vulnerabilities occur
when user input is not sufficiently validated. This user input can then inject malicious scripts
into a web page or modify queries to the database.
1.1.4 Static Program Analysis
Static analysis, broadly speaking, is a family of program analyses that do not require the
execution of the program. Program analyses can be used to determine many program prop-
erties, and they are an integral part of compiler operations. They are essential for many
optimizations [6].
Some program analyses are dynamic, meaning that they gather information while running
the program. An example of dynamic analysis is to gather runtime invariants [50]. Some
hybrid program analyses exist, which combine both static and dynamic analyses. An example
of hybrid analysis is recording the uses of reflection during program execution and then using
this information to improve the precision of a static analysis [29].
Static program analyses rely on mathematical representations of the program (trees, graphs),
which we show in Figure 1.4. Each representation can be transformed into the other using
formal rules. Since source code files are character strings, syntactic analysis is initially
required to create an abstract syntax tree (AST). Some analyses only need the AST to
6operate. More powerful analyses will convert the AST into graph form. An important
graph for static analyses is the control flow graph (CFG). Unless stated otherwise, CFGs are
intraprocedural, meaning that each procedure has its own self-contained CFG. More powerful
analyses require an interprocedural CFG, which is an intraprocedural CFG with an explicit
entry point and additional edges for function calls and returns. These additional edges are
determined by the call graph construction algorithm. The level of precision of the call graph
thus has a major impact on interprocedural analyses.
The static analysis used throughout this thesis expands on interprocedural CFGs. It is called
Pattern-Traversal Flow Analysis (PTFA), and we describe it further in Section 1.1.4.
qi,0,0 qi,0,1 qi,1,0 qi,1,1
PTFA ModelAbstract Syntax Tree Control Flow GraphSource Code
Figure 1.4 Steps Involved in Static Program Analysis
Static analyses have different of levels of sensitivity. Higher sensitivity implies more precise
results, but often at the cost of higher analysis time.
Flow sensitivity means that the analysis takes into consideration the statements’ order of
execution. For instance, consider the code in Figure 1.5a. A flow sensitive analysis would
conclude that $a = 1, meaning that the code in the “then” branch of the if statement is
dead code. A flow-insensitive analysis would be unable to determine that this is the case, as
it would conclude that $a can either be zero or one.
Context sensitivity means that an interprocedural analysis distinguishes between calling con-
texts [5]. A context insensitive analysis, on the other hand, merges all calling contexts. We
illustrate the impact of context sensitivity in Figure 1.5b. Function foo has different behavior
whether the product of its parameters is positive or negative. Function foo is called using
both positive and negative values. A context-sensitive analysis would conservatively conclude
that both branches are executable, since it conservatively assumes that the function is called
7with a mix of positive and negative arguments. However, a context-sensitive analysis would
conclude that $c is always positive, and that the else branch in foo is dead code.
$a = 0;
$b = 1;
$a = $b
if ($a == 0){ ... }
(a) Flow Sensitivity
function foo($a, $b){
$c = $a * $c;
if ($c >= 0) //...
else //...
}
foo(2, 4);
foo(-3, -7);
(b) Context Sensitivity
Figure 1.5 Examples Showing the Importance of Analysis Sensitivity
Many frameworks for general interprocedural analysis have been proposed. The traditional
bit vector framework can be extended for interprocedural analyses [92]. It is also possible
to use other representations, such as Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [114]. In addition,
one may translate the interprocedural CFG into Datalog relations and use a Datalog engine
[5]. To simplify this process, one may also use a domain-specific query language [114, 124].
It is also possible to use graph reachability in either the Interprocedural Finite Distributed
Subset (IFDS) [154] or Interprocedural Distributed Environment Transformer (IDE) [157]
frameworks. An IFDS analysis creates an interprocedural graph connecting different program
facts. An IDE analysis is a generalization of IFDS, which allows arbitrary transformations
of the input domain. However, these analyses are limited to analyses with distributive flow
functions. A more general approach uses value contexts [147].
Software Model Checking and PTFA
Model checking, in general terms, is a method used to verify properties over models. These
properties are often expressed in temporal logic [86]. For instance, model checking could
verify that “processing step s1 always leads to step s2”. Whenever the property is violated,
a model checker normally outputs a counter-example, which is a series of steps in the model
that lead to the violation of the property.
Model checking can operate on various kinds of models, including models of programs. In
this case, it is called software model checking. It typically employs static analysis [86].
We use PTFA, a domain-specific Boolean model checking approach. PTFA is designed to
validate simple Boolean properties efficiently, but is not designed to validate complex prop-
8erties. In contrast, traditional model checking approaches are capable of validating arbitrary
properties, at the expense of scalability. PTFA models are built from the CFG using graph
rewriting rules. For each vertex in the CFG, a PTFA model has up to four reachable states.
Each of these states represents a combination of property satisfaction in the local context
and in the calling context. In Figure 1.4, we showed a PTFA model with four columns. All
states in the same column represent the same property satisfaction. Columns of states that
satisfy the property are represented with a padlock icon.
PTFA models can be simplified into reachable PTFA models, where only edges and states
reachable from the start of the program remain.
The analysis of the Boolean property in PTFA models is flow sensitive. In addition, it has a
variant of context sensitivity, which we call predicate context sensitivity. Nonetheless, PTFA
models are identical to those that would be constructed by a fully context sensitive analysis.
PTFA is suited for analyzing RBAC privilege protection. In this case, it validates the property
has privilege p been verified before executing this statement? Using PTFA, we obtain definite
privilege protection, which relates to privilege protection on all execution paths. Specifically,
a statement s is definitely protected by privilege p if and only if it is protected by p on all
program paths leading to s.
1.1.5 Code Changes and Protection Differences
The term code change has a variety of meanings in software engineering. We use this term to
mean any addition, suppression or modification to the source code. It has no relationship to
version control. We are also concerned with security changes, specifically changes in privilege
protection. These are not the same as code changes. To reduce confusion on these terms, we
use protection differences instead.
We see an example of a code change that causes protection differences in Figure 1.6. This is
an excerpt of the patch for a vulnerability affecting WordPress before 2.8.3 and is documented
by CVE-2009-2854. The patch adds privilege checks at the beginning of 12 scripts, making
their computations definitely protected.
We see another example in Figure 1.7. This is the patch to a vulnerability documented by
CVE-2015-5623. In this example, developers added a privilege check for privilege edit_posts
to one file (line 5). They improved the error handling when the user lacks the edit_posts
privilege in another (lines 12–16). Finally, they added application-specific logic in a third
(line 24). Developers re-validating their application may like to easily tell these kinds of
changes apart.
9<?php
/**
* Edit category form for inclusion in administration panels.
*
* @package WordPress
* @subpackage Administration
*/
+ if ( !current_user_can(’manage_categories ’) )
+ wp_die(__(’...’));
Figure 1.6 Reformatted Excerpt of the Patch for CVE-2009-2854. Represented in Unified
Diff Format. This Change Makes the Computations in The File Definitely Protected with
Regards to Privilege manage_categories.
1 // In wp -admin/includes/dashboard.php
2 wp_network_dashboard_right_now () {
3 function wp_dashboard_quick_press( $error_msg = false ) {
4 global $post_ID;
5 + if ( ! current_user_can( ’edit_posts ’ ) ) {
6 + return;
7 + }
8 // ...
9 //In wp -admin/post.php
10 if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $nonce , ’add -post’ ) )
11 $error_msg = __( ’...’ );
12 - if ( ! current_user_can( ’edit_posts ’ ) )
13 - $error_msg = __( ’...’ );
14 + if ( ! current_user_can( ’edit_posts ’ ) ) {
15 + exit;
16 + }
17 //...
18 //In wp -includes/capabilities.php
19 case ’edit_post ’:
20 case ’edit_page ’:
21 $post = get_post( $args [0] );
22 - if ( empty( $post ) )
23 + if ( empty( $post ) ) {
24 + $caps [] = ’do_not_allow ’;
25 break;
26 + }
27 //...
Figure 1.7 Reformatted Patch for CVE-2015-5623. Represented in Unified Diff Format.
Some Changes in The Patch Make Code Definitely Protected With Regards to Privilege
edit_posts. One Change Has No Impact on Definite Protection.
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1.1.6 Root Cause Analysis
A root cause is “the fundamental reason for the occurrence of a problem” [44]. The link
between the root cause and the problem is not always direct, as there may be a causal chain
between them. Identifying the root cause thus requires uncovering every step in the causal
chain. Root cause analysis may be difficult, but it is beneficial, since properly addressing the
root cause of an issue prevents it from reoccurring.
We are interested in the software-level root causes of differences in privilege protection. When
a program implements its RBAC policy as privilege checks throughout the code, differences
in privilege protection are caused by code changes. However, in practice, only some of the
changes affect privilege protection. As we will see, it is possible to identify a set of code
changes which contains the root causes of protection differences.
1.2 Problem Statement
Many web applications implement their RBAC policy directly in the source code. To know
what changed in the RBAC policy between two versions, we must examine code changes.
Code changes occur during an application’s maintenance and evolution. Software mainte-
nance can be corrective, adaptive, perfective and preventive [83]. We do not have estimates
of the maintenance effort dedicated to security in general, nor for RBAC policy maintenance
and validation. However, from industry data, we know that corrective and adaptive main-
tenance represents 30% to 50% of the maintenance effort [46, 109], with security-oriented
maintenance activities belonging to the remaining 50% to 70% [38].
Non-security maintenance activities are both functional and non-functional. They include
bug-fixing, refactoring, and design changes. Such changes may cause intended [34] and unin-
tended security flaws [97]. Because code changes add, remove and modify execution paths,
security flaws can be introduced in different parts of the application than what was modified.
Besides insider threats, RBAC maintenance activities include vulnerability correction, and
updating the code to conform to the RBAC policy. To do so, developers may add, move,
remove and modify privilege checks. These changes may be related to new features, but
sometimes are due to a reorganization of the RBAC policy.
In addition, maintainers abandon, rename, split and merge privileges. An abandoned privi-
lege is a privilege that does not protect any part of the code. A rename means that only the
name of a privilege is changed, while the code it protects is identical. A privilege split means
that the set of code locations is partitioned in two or more sets, with each set protected by
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a different privilege. A privilege merge is the reverse of a split. The code protected by two
or more privileges becomes protected by one privilege.
Because of the risk of vulnerabilities introduced during maintenance, developers should reval-
idate their RBAC implementation regularly [97]. After completing maintenance activities,
developers are likely to ask is the protection different? Answering this question is non-trivial
and time-consuming, since it is difficult to manually determine which security properties hold
at every point in the program. When privilege protection differs, developers are likely to ask
why is it different? Answering this question is also challenging for the same reasons.
1.3 Research Objectives
Our thesis is:



Thesis
Using static program analysis, we can automatically (1) identify differences in def-
inite privilege protection between two versions of an application, (2) classify these
differences in explanatory categories, (3) compute explanatory counter-examples
justifying the differences, (4) determine which code changes are responsible for these
differences and (5) conservatively identify all root causes for these differences in most
cases.
The overarching research objective in this thesis is to facilitate the revalidation of the RBAC
policy’s implementation.
Specifically, we cover the following five specific research objectives.
• RO1: Determine which parts of the program have different definite privilege protection,
compared to the last version.
• RO2: Determine how the protection differs.
• RO3: Given a change in definite protection, justify the outcome.
• RO4: Determine which code changes are responsible for protection differences.
• RO5: Investigate the relationship between the code changes identified in RO4 and root
causes of protection differences.
12
1.4 Contributions
Our major contributions are the following:
• We define Definite Protection Differences (DPDs), which is code common to two ver-
sions that have different definite privilege protection.
• We define a set-theoretic classification of definite protection differences (DPDs).
• We define explanatory counter-examples for definite protection changes, which are ap-
plication paths between the start of the program and the security-affected code.
• We propose graph transformations on PTFA models to make explanatory counter-
examples easier to understand.
• We define protection-impacting changes (PICs), which are code changes responsible for
DPDs.
• We investigate whether PICs contain the root causes of DPDs by reverting them.
• We develop processing steps and implemented programs to compute DPDs, explanatory
counter-examples and PICs.
• We experimentally evaluate these contributions with surveys on popular open source
applications. Our smallest survey consists of 147 release pairs of WordPress. Our largest
survey covers 212 release pairs of WordPress and 192 release pairs of MediaWiki.
Our findings are also telling:
• Most release pairs have no DPDs. When present, less than one percent of the program
is security-affected.
• The most common categories of protection changes are complete gain, complete loss
and substitution.
• Explanatory counter-examples are fairly short and local, with a median length of less
than 100 states.
• Protection-impacting changes are typically less than a third of the code changes.
• Protection-impacting changes contain all root causes nearly 90% of the time
We additionally envision the impact of our approaches on software development processes.
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1.5 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we survey the related literature. In Chapter
3, we describe our research project and how the articles connect together. In Chapters 4 to 7,
we include the articles as they were published or, in the case of one unpublished article, as it
was submitted. In Chapter 8, we discuss our findings at greater length and bring concluding
remarks in Chapter 9. Please note that the article included in Chapter 7 was submitted with
appendices. In accordance with the thesis writing regulations of Polytechnique Montréal,
they have been moved to this thesis’s appendices.
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CHAPTER 2 CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW
We now introduce and discuss the literature related to vulnerability detection in web ap-
plications (taint and string analysis). We then do the same for classifications of software
evolution. Then, we describe methods for the analysis and comparison of RBAC policies and
implementations. Finally, we present RBAC evolution studies and non-security analyses that
rely on program differences.
2.1 Detection of SQL Injection and Cross-Site Scripting
We introduce major contributions to detect XSS, CSRF and SQLi vulnerabilities in web
applications. This introduction is purposefully incomplete. Inquisitive readers may wish to
read recent surveys on vulnerability detection [62, 118].
2.1.1 Taint Analysis
Taint analysis determines if data from a source can reach a sink, which results in an ex-
ploitable vulnerability. The vulnerability is avoided by use of a sanitizer, a function which
transforms the data into a form that will not create any vulnerabilities. Taint analysis re-
quires an a priori knowledge of which APIs constitute sources, sinks, and sanitizers, as well
as which sanitizers are appropriate for which sinks. Furthermore, taint analysis assumes that
sanitizers are perfect, which is not always the case in practice [72]. Taint analysis can be
done using static, dynamic and hybrid approaches.
Static Taint Analysis
Static taint analysis approaches often use classic flow analysis [21, 78, 88, 89], slicing [171, 175]
and IFDS [15, 176] approaches.
It is also possible to find taint violations using a Datalog engine [123, 124], using the Object
Constraint Language (OCL) [12] and information flow type systems [77]. In addition, it is
possible to use symbolic execution to lower false positives [16].
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Dynamic and Hybrid Taint Analysis
Dynamic taint analysis approaches can induce significant overhead. To reduce this over-
head, they rely on various methods and static analyses to determine where to inject their
instrumentation [22, 37, 40, 43, 67, 133].
A family of hybrid approaches embed runtime monitors. For some approaches, this monitor
will halt program execution or execute recovery actions if a tainted flow reaches a sink
[95, 122, 132]. In other approaches, the monitor compares the structure of the executed
query against its expected structure [68, 127]. Other hybrid approaches generate test cases
intended to trigger the monitor [79, 164].
Another group of hybrid taint analyses use symbolic analysis [129, 130]. These approaches
inject instrumentation into the program that records relevant events, which are later analyzed
using symbolic analysis.
Taint analysis is designed to track data flow between arbritary program points. The predi-
cate it handles is “variable v at location l contains data that originates from a taint source”.
There are two major differences between PTFA and taint analysis with regards to privilege
protection. First, PTFA considers predicate satisfaction over execution paths, whereas taint
analysis considers predicate satisfaction over propagation paths. Privilege protection is pre-
dominantly a control flow issue, meaning that PTFA is a more natural choice to analyze
it. Second, PTFA can compute possible and definite predicate satisfaction, whereas taint
analysis only considers possible predicate satisfaction. In other words, taint analysis only
reports that there exists a tainted data propagation path. This is well-suited for finding
some kinds of vulnerabilities, such as XSS, CSRF and SQLi, but not for privilege protection.
In addition, taint analysis operates with a specification of which functions are taint sources
and sinks. In contrast, applications often have no specification of their intended privilege
protection, meaning that taint analysis would benefit little from an evolutionary approach.
Taint analysis bears a few similarities with the contributions in this thesis. Like taint analysis,
explanatory counter-examples provide an interprocedural path of interest. Also taint analysis
also identify the root causes of the vulnerability whenever it identifies all propagation paths
between sources. These similarities are nonetheless superficial, for the reasons mentioned
above. In addition, taint analysis does not take code changes in consideration.
2.1.2 String Analysis
String analysis determines what values a string may contain. It does so by building a formal
model that summarizes value constraints and transformation operations in the program. To
16
determine the presence of a vulnerability, the analysis engines compare these models with
models of acceptable input.
Many string analyses use finite state transducers [128]. Transducers are finite state automata
that also generate strings, a model suitable for string transformation functions. Some string
analysis approaches compute operations on a transducer using SMT solvers [56, 71, 72].
SMT-based approaches have some undecidability constraints. However, the typical string
operations in JavaScript and PHP are in a decidable form, or can be automatically converted
into one [56].
Grammar-based string analysis [41, 181] constructs a context-free grammar from the pro-
gram’s flow graphs. This grammar construction may take advantage of transducers [181].
Recent advances aim at making tree automata and transducers more general and succinct us-
ing symbolic alphabets [45]. In addition, recent advances take into consideration the output
context to analyze legacy applications [170].
Other applications of string analysis include sanitizer generation and placement [121, 161,
189, 190] ; program output verification [159] and the detection of parameter tampering vul-
nerabilities [27]. String analysis also allows the detection of validation inconsistencies between
clients and servers [10] and their repair [11].
String analysis is complementary to PTFA to determine privilege protection. This is because
developers sometimes use string operations (e.g. concatenation) and conditional expressions
to determine the value of the privilege to verify. We describe these practices in section 8.4.4.
String analysis, when used to detect vulnerabilities such as XSS, CSRF and SQLi, operates
with a specification of acceptable input for sensitive functions. As such, it would benefit little
from an evolutionary analysis.
Like to taint analysis, string analysis is somewhat similar to our contributions, as it may
identify the root cause of a vulnerability and indicate the propagation path to it. Nonethe-
less, string analysis is very different from the contributions in this thesis due to its lack of
applicability for privilege protection and the fact that it does not consider code changes.
2.2 Slicing
Program slicing [183, 184] extracts a subset of a program, called program slice, that en-
compasses control and data flow related to a statement of interest (often called seed). The
computed slice preserves the program’s behaviour at the seed’s point with respect to the
slicing criterion. Finding a minimal slice is unsolvable in the general case.
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Backward slicing computes a slice from the start of the program to the seed, whereas for-
ward slicing computes all statements that have a control or data dependency from the seed.
Backward program slices may be executable in some approaches. A slice is executable when
the extracted subprogram could be executed as-is and obtain the same behavior, as far as
the seed is concerned. Not all slicing approaches compute executable slices. This property is
useful for model checking, as slices can be analyzed in lieu of the original program, providing
more scalability [94].
One static interprocedural slicing approach operates on the System Dependence Graph
(SDG), which connects multiple Program Dependence Graphs (PDGs) with additional edges
[73]. The construction of the SDG is quadratic with regards to the number of predicates and
assignments in procedures and the number of procedures. The computation of the slice itself
is linear with regards to the size of the SDG.
Slicing variants have been proposed in order to obtain smaller slices. Thin slicing finds a
subset of a traditional slice by retaining statements of greater interest to the user. These
are producer statements, which “help compute and copy a value to the seed” [169]. Thin
slices are not executable, but they have between 3.3 and 9.4 times fewer statements than
a traditional slice [169]. Fine slicing [1] allows a user to specify non-contiguous seeds. It
also relies on user input to ignore unwanted control and data dependencies. It uses semantic
restoration to ensure that fine slices are executable, which requires oracle-based semantics to
supply missing values. The immediate application of fine slicing is the Extract Computation
refactoring. An issue with thin slicing is that properties held in the program may not hold
on the sliced program. Value slicing addresses this issue [94]. It eliminates statements that
only relate to the seed’s reachability, while keeping statements influencing the values of the
variables in the verified property. This addition over thin slicing ensures that properties
verified on the sliced program hold on the original program and offer scalability gains over
traditional backward slicing.
The original formulation of slicing called for static analysis, but dynamic [2] and hybrid
variants have been proposed [174]. Program slicing has multiple uses, including debugging,
program understanding [169], refactoring [1], and taint analysis [175].
Despite its wide range of applications, slicing, per se, would not be appropriate to determine
privilege protection due to slicing’s limitations and its complexity.
Inherently, slicing does not take property satisfaction in consideration. For instance, consider
the example in Figure 2.1a and imagine a backwards slice of a seed statement in function
foo. The slice in Figure 2.1b includes a privilege verification routine. However, its presence
informs that, at best, there may be a protected path between the start of the program and
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function foo(){
// assumes privilege p1 held
}
foo();
if (! current_user_can(’p1’))
die();
foo();
(a) Example of Possibly Protected Code
 Start
call_begin
foo
if ...
End
Entry
6 - ...
Exit
grant
cb
cb
call
call
return
return
Seed
Vertex in Slice
Legend
call_end
foo
call_begin
foo
call_end
foo
(b) Corresponding Simplified CFG and
Slice
Figure 2.1 Example of Slicing and Privilege Protection
the seed. The slice does not tell us, per se, whether the relationship between the verification
routine is a control or a data dependency. In addition, it cannot offer any guarantees about
the satisfaction of a property on all paths leading to the seed statement. In other words,
backward slicing would provide insufficient information to determine definite protection. This
is consistent with our example, where the code in function foo is protected only on one path.
Nonetheless, slicing would provide a reduced graph on which another privilege protection
analysis could be performed.
The use of forward slicing does not resolve the issue. Suppose that one would compute
forward slices from privilege verification routines. This information, again, would give us
possible privilege protection at best, as we would have no guarantees about unprotected
paths missing from the slice.
19
Finally, slicing on an SDG is a quadratic operation when higher precision is sought, and slices
tend to be large in practice, which prompted thinner slicing variants. Even if slicing would
be adapted to determine privilege protection, multiple slices would need to be computed, as
the slice is dependent on the seed statement.
In comparison, PTFA considers property satisfaction and provides both possible and definite
protection information for all points of the program. PTFA analysis operates in linear time
thanks to the merging of contexts that have the same property satisfaction. Nonetheless, it
does so with no loss of precision in comparison with a fully context sensitive analysis.
2.3 Evolution Classifications
Software evolution classifications provide a common vocabulary and a method to group sim-
ilar program changes together.
However, general software evolution classifications (e.g. [33, 38]) are not suited for the classi-
fication of RBAC evolution [134]. This is because they do not consider security maintenance,
or only do so minimally. Security-related classifications and taxonomies (e.g. [97, 179]) are
also inappropriate for RBAC evolution, since they consider evolution minimally. This is also
the case for classifications related to access control (e.g. [3, 90]).
In comparison, our classification is built for differences in privilege protection. It therefore
integrates the dimension of access control with software evolution.
2.4 RBAC Analysis
Both RBAC policies and implementations can be analyzed. In general, this comparison
requires a specification of what is an inappropriate protection. These specifications are
often lacking. As such, RBAC analyses often rely on inferred policies, inconsistency in
implementation, or contradictory requirements. These analyses, however, do not inform the
user of what changed, but that there are issues in the current form of access control.
2.4.1 Analysis of RBAC Policies
Model checking can validate that an RBAC policy allows users to achieve their objectives.
Model checking also allows to determine how an attacker could violate a formal policy speci-
fied in the RW language [191]. It is also possible to find anomalies and conflicts in eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) policies [74, 151]. General queries over XACML
policies are possible using SMT [177] and Answer Set Programming [153].
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However, these approaches have four limitations. First, they require a semi-formal or formal
policy specification. Second, they do not take in consideration their use in the source code
(e.g. parts of the policy may not be used in practice). Thus, these approaches do not consider
how the policy changes affect the privilege protection in the code. Third, applications may
have hidden logic in conjunction with the RBAC policy [108]. Finally, these approaches are
limited in their ability to compare policies.
2.4.2 Analysis of RBAC Implementations
To address the shortcomings of RBAC policy analysis, one may extract an RBAC policy
from the application. For instance, it is possible to reverse engineer a SecureUML model of
an application [7, 59, 163], which can then be analyzed independently [8].
In a similar vein, Le et al. [106] propose a hybrid analysis to infer the access control policy.
They use dynamic security testing tools and record the application’s behaviour. Using ma-
chine learning, they build access control rules for resources. Some rules are problematic and
require review by the developers.
In general, an issue with reverse-engineering policies is that they should be validated by
developers. This may be a resource-intensive tasks for large applications. Developers reverse-
engineered policies could use the formal verification tools mentioned above. They would suffer
from the same limitations, except for the fact that the policy reflects what is implemented.
Many approaches skip this intermediary step and analyze code-level RBAC implementation
directly. These analyses typically do not determine differences in privilege protection.
RoleCast [167] uses heuristics to detect parts of the program that control security-sensitive
statements in Java programs. RoleCast partially connects the security issue to its cause, by
providing an enriched calling context. However, this calling context contains less information
than an execution path. In addition, RoleCast depends on inferences, whereas PTFA relies
on a priori knowledge of the code patterns used for privilege checks.
Fix Me Up [168] is an extension of RoleCast. It statically finds missing access-control
checks. It does so using automatically-generated access control templates. Fix Me Up relies
on slicing, which has an higher complexity than PTFA.
CanCheck [28] is a hybrid analysis tool that examines the source code for inappropriate
implementations of the RBAC policy. It is designed for applications running on Ruby on
Rails and using a specific authorization library. This approach extracts access control models
dynamically, but verifies authorization properties statically using a first-order logic theorem
prover. As with other dynamic analyses CanCheck depends on the code coverage in the
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analyzed executions. In addition, this approach may not scale to large applications, as the
theorem prover may not terminate. In comparison, PTFA’s complexity is linear with regards
to the number of CFG edges.
Alalfi et al. [9] and Gauthier et al. [58] presented approaches based on clone analysis to identify
similar code that does not have the same privilege protection or patterns in interactions
indicative of security access violations. However, the approaches were used for clones within
the same version.
The approaches mentioned above work within one version of the application. As such, they
would not detect regressions (i.e. DPDs). In addition, they could not identify the code
change that caused a DPD nor guarantee that it conservatively found its root causes.
2.4.3 Detection of Access Control Changes
Various approaches have been proposed to compare policies: multi-terminal BDDs [55, 119],
Description Logic [93], Answer Set Programming [4], first-order temporal logic [48], and
rewrite systems [31, 85]. Many of these contributions have limited policy comparison, focusing
on equivalence [4, 48, 85]. Thus, the tool could only tell the user that the policy changed,
but not how it changed. Most of these approaches operate on XACML policies. In contrast,
PTFA analyzes source code, and the methods we introduce in this thesis tell us how privilege
protection differs, which code change introduced the differences, and if the identified changes
contain all root causes.
2.5 Access Control Evolution Studies
Wei et al. [182] studied how permissions and their use evolved in the Android operating
system. They found that permissions are added and deleted, following new functionalities
offered by the device. They also found that Android apps are becoming increasingly over-
privileged. They also found that there is no tendency towards finer-grained permissions.
Hwang et al. [80] studied the SELinux access control policies for the NCSU Virtual Comput-
ing Lab. They found that growth was linear and that the policies were changing frequently.
Letarte et al. [112] also studied access control evolution using PTFA. Their survey was over
31 phpBB releases, and only handled a binary distinction between administrator and unpriv-
ileged users. This approach was a precursor to the contributions in this thesis. Whereas their
access control model was binary, our approach handles a plurality of privileges. While they
focused on protection for database access in PHP applications, we considered privilege pro-
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tection for all parts of the program. We also introduced classifications of privilege differences,
two ways to explain them, and a method to determine if the root cause was identified.
Han et al. [69] examined the evolution of the default MediaWiki RBAC configuration. They
found that privileges were hierarchically organized using formal concept analysis.
Except for the survey by Letarte et al. [112], these RBAC evolution studies did not find
differences in privilege protection between versions. In addition, none of these contribu-
tions generate explanatory counter-example, identify code changes responsible for DPDs and
guaranteed that root causes have been identified.
2.6 Analyses Leveraging Program Differences
We mention a few of the many approaches that rely on program differences between versions.
Bugginings [166] identifies the cause of a bug in the context of software evolution by
differencing dependence graphs. It computes program dependences from a bug fix version
and the preceding version. Then, it identifies a bug region by comparing these dependences.
Their analysis then examines the dependence graphs of each version in reverse chronological
order until it finds the version in which the bug region appears. Their approach relies on
CFG differencing.
Hydrogen [107] uses multiversion interprocedural CFGs to determine if changes fix bugs,
and if changes break the code of other versions. This CFG variant is built using an initial CFG
and by incrementally adding control flow changes of successive versions. This representation
allows to determine changes of program properties between program versions, as well as
allowing analyses that operate simultaneously on many program versions.
PatchAdvisor [139] infers the impact of a patch on a system. It compares CFGs of an
unpatched and a patched version of the software. Then, PatchAdvisor uses a hybrid anal-
ysis to determine which paths are executed during the program’s execution. PatchAdvisor
then reports whether an execution trace intersects a modified part of the CFG, or if an ex-
ecution path executes near a modified part of the CFG. In addition, traces allow to rank
results based on how often parts of the program are executed.
These approaches have mostly focused on bugs, and, to the best of the author’s knowledge,
none has targeted RBAC implementations. In addition, they rely on a bug database, which
makes them unable to find and fix unknown bugs. In comparison, DPDs allows developers
to identify unknown security bugs. The other analyses support finding the root causes and
is suitable to automated repair.
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2.7 Change Impact Analysis
We briefly describe change impact analysis, which bears similarities with our approach.
Change impact analysis aims at estimating as accurately as possible the impact of a change.
In the context of software systems, the scope of the analysis is often regarding code changes,
but it may encompass documentation [116] and other project files (e.g. graphics or multi-
media files) [84]. Change impact analysis determines an impact set. The starting impact set
[14] is the set of objects that initially appear affected by a change. The estimated impact set
[14] is the set of objects that would be affected by the change. The actual impact set [14] is
the set of objects actually modified as the result of performing the change. The granularity
of these sets varies depending on the approach [116]. Because change impact analyses are
often used for estimation, the impact set normally refers to the estimated impact set. The
size of this impact set is a common metric (e.g. [140]).
Our approach is similar, but works in reverse - given an impact on definite privilege protection,
we determine which paths and code changes explain it. To the best of my knowledge, no
change impact analysis method targeting privilege protection has been proposed.
2.8 Root Cause Analysis
As we mentioned earlier, it is possible to perform root cause analysis on software artifacts.
AutoPaG [120] is a system that automatically identifies bug root causes and automatically
patches them. Its analysis targets buffer overflows and similar out-of-bound vulnerabilities
using data flow analysis.
Thung et al. [173] identify bug root causes. They use a combination of machine learning and
program analysis. Their approach relies on AST differencing, which identifies some changes
as essential. They intersect essential changes with line-level differences. Machine learning
is then used to filter out changes that are unlikely to be part of a root cause. They also
use a static analysis on data dependencies. In comparison, PTFA uses a conservative static
analysis instead of machine learning.
Schneider identifies root causes of failures and defects in Simulink models [162]. Her approach
uses a backwards search to find all paths leading to the defect. This method also determines
weights to determine the probability that each path found contains a root cause.
To the best of my knowledge, no RCA method targeting privilege protection differences was
proposed prior to the article included in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH PROJECT AND THESIS ORGANIZATION
The articles presented in this thesis belong to one research project. We elaborate on their
link to this project and to each other. We also show how the articles are connected to the
research goals we presented in Chapter 1.
3.1 Research Project
The research project in this thesis is intended to facilitate the revalidation of the RBAC
policy’s implementation. The approaches and tools we present revolve around DPDs and
additional information we obtain from formal security models. This information would assist
developers to determine which protection differences are likely to be harmful, and which
code changes are responsible for these differences. The articles in this thesis belong to the
Research Objectives stated in Section 1.3. Please note that this project omits my earlier
work on static taint analysis of web service compositions [99].
In Chapter 4, we include our article titled “Classification and Distribution of RBAC Privilege
Protection Changes in Wordpress Evolution”, which was published in PST 2017 [103].
We address RO1 and define definite protection differences (DPDs). DPDs occur whenever
code that is common to two versions has a different definite privilege protection in each ver-
sion. We also address RO2 and propose a set-theoretic classification of DPDs. In addition,
we survey the occurrence of DPDs in 147 release pairs of WordPress, a content management
system. We also present the distribution of DPD categories in this system. The identification
and classification of DPDs supports our project’s objective for two reasons. First, identifying
which parts of the code have changed protection focuses reviewers’ attention where it mat-
ters. Second, it may help developers determine if the change is problematic or not, since a
statement’s definite protection may change for more than one privilege at time. Determining
DPDs is an essential first step for the other analyses in this thesis.
In Chapter 5, we include our article titled “Computing Counter-Examples for Privilege Pro-
tection Losses Using Security Models,” with minor corrections [101]. It was published in
SANER 2017.
We address RO3 for one kind of DPDs, losses. Definite protection losses occur whenever a
statement shared between two versions was definitely protected for a privilege in the previous
version, but is no longer protected for the same privilege in the newer version. To help
developers understand why the loss occurs, we compute examples. They are unprotected
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paths in the formal model from the start of the program to loss-affected statements. Because
shorter paths are likely to be easier to understand, we use graph transformations to remove
interprocedural subpaths that have no effect on definite privilege protection. We also survey
privilege protection losses in 147 release pairs of WordPress and calculate counter-examples
for them. We also report the length and locality of these counter-examples. Protection loss
counter-examples support our project’s objective by showing why some DPDs occur.
In Chapter 6, we include our article titled “Detection of Protection-Impacting Changes Dur-
ing Software Evolution,” with minor corrections [100]. It was published in SANER 2018.
We address RO4 by defining protection-impacting changes (PICs). PICs are changed code
between versions that may have caused DPDs. PICs are computed using graph differences
and graph reachability in security models. We also survey 210 release pairs of WordPress
for protection-impacting changes and report on their distribution. Calculating protection-
impacting changes helps the revalidation of RBAC policy implementation by focusing review
efforts. Using PICs, developers avoid wasting effort reviewing code changes with no effect on
privilege protection.
In Chapter 7, we present an extension article over Chapter 6, with minor corrections [102].
This article is titled “RBAC Protection-Impacting Changes : a Case Study of PHP Applica-
tion Evolution” and was submitted to IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering.
This extension addresses RO5. We revert PICs and determine that the root causes of DPDs
are contained in the set of protection-impacting changes (PICs). We also report on a survey
of PICs in 210 release pairs of WordPress and 192 release pairs of MediaWiki. MediaWiki is
another content management system. We also survey the reversal of PICs in these systems’
security-affected release pairs. Determining that protection-impacting changes contain the
root causes of DPDs helps the revalidation of RBAC policy implementation by focusing
review efforts. Whenever this is the case, developers are certain that evaluating PICs is
sufficient to understand the reason for all DPDs between two versions.
3.2 Terminology
The terms we used evolved because we felt that they would confuse the reader or did not
convey well our contributions. We provide a correspondence between terms in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 Correspondence Between Terms
Newer Term Equivalent to Found in
Pattern-Traversal Flow Anal-
ysis (PTFA)
Security Pattern Traversal Related work
Definite Privilege Difference
DPD
Privilege Protection Changes Chapters 4 and 5
Security-affected release pair Security-impacted release
pairs
Chapter 4
Loss-affected Privilege protection loss Chapter 5
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CHAPTER 4 ARTICLE 1: CLASSIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
RBAC PRIVILEGE PROTECTION CHANGES IN WORDPRESS
EVOLUTION
Marc-André Laverdière and Ettore Merlo
To appear in the Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Privacy, Security and
Trust (PST 2017), 2017
Abstract
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is commonly used in web applications to protect in-
formation and restrict operations. Their security may be affected by source code changes
between releases in unexpected ways. To prevent regression and vulnerabilities, developers
need to validate them prior to each release, which may be a major undertaking. We au-
tomatically and statically determine privilege-level security impacts of code changes using
privilege protection changes and apply a set-theoretic classification to them. To do so, we
analyze code and determine the security privilege protection models of Web applications
written in PHP using Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis (PTFA). We present the distribution
of both privilege protection changes and their classification over 147 release pairs of Word-
Press, spanning from 2.0 to 4.5.1. We found that code changes had no impact on privilege
protection in the 82 (56%) release pairs. The remaining 65 (44%) release pairs are affected
by privilege protection changes. For the latter release pairs, only 0.30% of code is affected
by privilege protection changes. We also found that the most common change categories
are complete gains (40.81%), complete losses (17.99%) and substitution (20.10%). The au-
tomated identification and classification of privilege protection changes may help developers
to more efficiently focus their effort during security reviews, verification, validation, testing,
and repairs.
Keywords
Security Change Classification, Role Based Access Control, Static Analysis, Software Evolu-
tion, Software Maintenance
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4.1 Introduction
Many web applications require access control, which is ensuring that only the right user(s)
can execute specific code. Access control vulnerabilities present in the OWASP Top 10 2013
include in the Insecure Direct Object References and Missing Function Level Access Control
categories [145].
A statement’s privilege protection set is the set of privileges that are definitely true prior to
its execution. Given a statement s common to two releases (ra and rb), a privilege protection
change [101] occurs when the privilege protection for s differs between ra and rb.
In Listing 4.1, we see an example of a code change causing privilege protection changes for the
statements at line 5 onwards. As a check for privilege edit_posts was added, their privilege
protection set went from ∅ to {edit_posts}. Please note that this information is carried
interprocedurally along that execution path (e.g. for the execution get_user_option).
1 + if(! current_user_can( ’edit_posts ’ )){
2 + return;
3 + }
4 +
5 $last_post_id = (int) get_user_option( ’
dashboard_quick_press_last_post_id ’ );
Listing 4.1 Excerpt of a Security Change in WordPress 4.2.2 vs 4.2.3 – the marker + on
the left hand side refers to added code.
A vulnerability like the one solved by Listing 4.1 stems in part from the challenge of knowing
which privileges have been verified prior to the execution of a statement. Security reviews
are meant to catch these issues, but they are difficult and expensive to perform.
We propose to facilitate reviews by automatically computing and classifying privilege protec-
tion changes from the source code. In this paper, we define a set-theoretic classification of
privilege protection changes and report on a longitudinal case study of privilege protection
and their changes. We studied 147 release pairs (from 2.0 to 4.5.1) of WordPress. WordPress
is a popular PHP web-based content management system that uses RBAC. Measuring only
the PHP code, this application’s size ranges from 35,708 to 301,605 physical lines of code
(PLOC).
4.2 Background
A commonly used access control approach is role-based access control (RBAC), where priv-
ileges are assigned to one or more roles as necessary. RBAC systems are often architected
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with Policy Decision (PDP) and Enforcement (PEP) Points. PEPs request a policy decision
from the PDP and enforce it, whereas the PDP decides to either grant or deny requests by
interpreting the policy.
PEPs are typically scattered across the code base and communicate with the PDP before
allowing execution of sensitive code. The PEP asks the PDP to verify if the user holds a
given privilege, sometimes in relation to an object. The APIs to do so vary, but tend to be
consistent within the same application.
Some maintenance activities will target security. For instance, developers change which
privilege protects a piece of code. They may add a privilege check where none was, or
move privilege checks to cover only some code sections instead of the whole script (or vice-
versa). Developers also add, remove and rename roles and privileges. Some of these changes
may be related to functional changes (e.g. new features added), but sometimes reflect a
reorganization of the application’s security policy at a high level.
Counterintuitively, code changes with no apparent link to security may cause privilege pro-
tection changes. Some of these changes may be due to interprocedural side effects, since code
protected by a privilege check often calls other code and carries its protection along that
execution path.
Code changes during maintenance should only have a planned and desirable impact on secu-
rity. To achieve this, maintainers may leverage techniques such as testing (e.g. penetration
testing [13] and generated security tests [135]), manual verification (e.g. inspections [51, 148])
and validation methods (formal and semi-formal) [152].
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Privilege Protection Changes
Privilege protection is a definite static analysis, determining properties that are true on
all execution paths prior to a statement. This is in contrast with possible analyses, which
determine properties that are true in some execution paths, but not necessarily in all paths
reaching a statement.
Formally, we define privilege protection as a function over an interprocedural control flow
graph (CFG).
Each release r ∈ R has an CFG composed of vertices Vr ⊆ V and edges Er ⊆ E. All releases
share the set of privileges Privs, though not all releases check all privileges.
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Privilege protection is defined by function PrivProt(v) : Vr 7→ P(Privs) (Equation 4.1),
which returns all the privileges that are definitely protecting (DefProt) the vertex v in release
r.
A privilege protection change occurs when the privilege protection for corresponding CFG
vertices differs between two releases (Equation 4.2). The relationship between corresponding
vertices is in the partial bijective function vertexMap : V × R × R 7→ V . When comparing
releases ra with rb, the CFG vertex va belongs to release ra and vb is its corresponding vertex
in rb’s CFG.
PrivProt(v) .= {priv ∈ Privs | DefProt(v, priv)} (4.1)
PrivProtChg(va, ra, rb) .=PrivProt(vertexMap(va, ra, rb)) 6= PrivProt(va) (4.2)
4.3.2 Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis
Pattern-Traversal Flow Analysis (PTFA) [57, 61, 111] is a domain-specific model-checking
approach for privilege protection. A PTFA engine analyzes the application’s source automat-
ically and statically for application-specific code patterns for privilege verification security
checks. It generates security-context-sensitive security models, meaning that the security
context is distinguished in interprocedural analysis.
States in the security model are either protected or unprotected, the latter being the default.
A protected state associated to a vertex v ∈ V represent the existence of a path from the
beginning of the CFG to v, in which the privilege priv has been granted. DefProt(v, priv)
thus holds true when only protected states are reachable for v.
4.3.3 Privilege Protection Change Categories
Our set-theoretic classification distinguishes between the addition and removal of privileges.
For the sake of simplicity, we use the following symbols in the descriptions below. When
comparing releases ra with rb, the vertex va belongs to release ra and vb is its corresponding
vertex in rb such that vb = vertexMap(va, ra, rb). Due to space constraints, we define the
aliases Prota := PrivProt(va) and Protb := PrivProt(vb). We also define the predicate
A 4r B, which is true if and only if the sets A and B are non-empty and have a non-empty
overlap.
We describe each privilege protection category below. We also provide an illustration of all
the categories in Figure 4.1 and formal definitions in Figure 4.2.
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(a) Complete Loss (b) Complete Gain
(c) Monotonic Loss (d) Monotonic Gain
(e) Subsitution (f) Symmetric Overlap
(g) Asymmetric Overlap (h) Disjoint
x1 x1
x1 x2 x1 x2
x1 x2 x3 x1 x2 x3
x4 x5
x1 x2 x3
x4 x2x1
Legend
xi: Privilege Release A Release B
Figure 4.1 Classification Categories Illustrated
A 4r B .= A ∩B 6= ∅ ∧ A 6= ∅ ∧ B 6= ∅
CompleteLoss(va, ra, rb)
.= Prota 6= ∅ ∧ Protb = ∅ CompleteGain(va, ra, rb) .= Prota = ∅ ∧ Protb 6= ∅
MonotonicLoss(va, ra, rb)
.= Prota ∩ Protb = Protb ∧ Protb 6= ∅
MonotonicGain(va, ra, rb)
.= Prota ∩ Protb = Prota ∧ Prota 6= ∅
Substitution(va, ra, rb)
.= |Protb \ Prota| = 1 ∧ |Prota \ Protb| = 1
AsymmOverlap(va, ra, rb)
.= Prota 4r Protb ∧ |Prota \ Protb| 6= |Protb \ Prota|
SymmOverlap(va, ra, rb)
.= Prota 4r Protb ∧ |Prota \ Protb| > 1 ∧ |Prota \ Protb| = |Protb \ Prota|
Disjoint(va, ra, rb)
.= ¬Substitution(va, ra, rb) ∧ Prota ∩ Protb = ∅ ∧ Prota 6= ∅ ∧ Protb 6= ∅
Figure 4.2 Definitions for the Classification Categories
A Complete Loss (Figure 4.1a) may indicate a vulnerability and occurs when Protb is
empty and Prota is not.
A Complete Gain (Figure 4.1b) may indicate a vulnerability correction and occurs when
Prota is empty and Protb is not.
A Monotonic Loss (Figure 4.1c) may indicate a privilege reorganization (e.g. merged
privileges) and occurs when Protb is a strict subset of Prota and both are non-empty.
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A Monotonic Gain (Figure 4.1d) may indicate a privilege reorganization (e.g. split privi-
lege) and occurs when Prota is a strict subset of Protb and both are non-empty.
A Substitution (Figure 4.1e) may indicate an association between the privileges (e.g. re-
naming) and occurs when Prota and Protb each have one privilege in addition of those they
have in common.
An Asymmetric Overlap (Figure 4.1g) might indicate multiple changes happening simul-
taneously. It occurs when Prota and Protb have at least one privilege in common and the
releases’ specific privileges are of different cardinality.
A Symmetric Overlap change (Figure 4.1f) may indicate a non-obvious correspondence
between the changed privileges. It is similar to substitutions, but for greater cardinalities.
A Disjoint (Figure 4.1h) changes may indicate major changes that warrant inspection. It
occurs when Prota and Protb have nothing in common and are not a substitution.
4.4 Results
Our analysis, implemented in Java, typically occurs in less than 7 minutes per release pair
on a system powered by an Intel i7-3770 CPU @ 3.40GHz and using the Oracle Java VM
version 1.8.0_66 configured to use up to 8Gb of RAM. We used GNU diff to determine
vertexMap and the same release pair determination as previously [101].
4.4.1 Distribution of Privilege Protection in WordPress
Our first research question is RQ1: How is the cardinality of privilege protection sets in
WordPress distributed?
In Figure 4.3, we compare the total number of definitely protected statements (i.e. state-
ments which have non-empty privilege protection sets) with the program size measured in
CFG vertices. When compared logarithmically, the curves appear to grow together. Total
definitely protected statements and log program size is correlated at 96.77%.
In Figure 4.4, we represent the number of occurrences of privilege protection sets per ver-
sion, per set cardinality. Singleton sets vastly dominate the other cardinalities. The largest
cardinality is four, and is found in a few versions.
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Figure 4.3 Total Vertices with Non-Empty Privilege Protection Set vs Program Size per
version - definite protection grows logarithmically to program size.
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Figure 4.4 Evolution of Definitely Protected Vertices’ Privilege Protection Set Cardinalities
- singleton sets dominate throughout.
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4.4.2 Distribution of Privilege Protection Changes in WordPress
We now consider RQ2 : What is the distribution of privilege protection changes in Word-
Press? How big are those changes in relation to the program size?
Over all release pairs, we found 33,687 privilege protection changes. We observe, in Figure
4.5, that only 65 (44%) release pairs are security-impacted. The bulk of release pairs have less
than 500 privilege protection changes, with only eight (5%) exhibiting more than a thousand.
We determined the proportion of privilege protection changes by comparing the number of
privilege protection changes over the number of CFG vertices in the whole program.
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Figure 4.5 Distribution of Total Privilege Protection Changes per Release Pair
Globally, privilege protection changes is found in 0.10% of vertices (computed over all CFG
vertices of all releases studied). For security-impacted release pairs, this ratio increases to
0.25%. The median is 182 (0.08%) privilege protection changes per release pair, while the
average and standard deviation is 0.30% ± 0.58%, a small fraction of the program.
4.4.3 Distribution of Privilege Protection Change Classification
We now examineRQ3 : What is the distribution of privilege protection changes’ classification
in WordPress? Which classifications are the most common?
Table 4.7a shows how many releases have which amount of privilege protection changes of
each category. We found no instance of symmetric overlap. We observe that only Complete
Gain and Substitution are present with ≥ 1000 privilege protection changes.
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Figure 4.6 Violin Plot of Classified Privilege Protection Changes Per Non-Empty Release
Pair - Some Categories Are Seldom Seen.
Table 4.7b shows the total number of vertices per category for all release pairs as well as its
average per release pair. Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of classified vertices for security-
impacted release pairs. The distributions are skewed towards zero, and the most common
change category is complete gain, followed by substitution and complete loss.
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Category Privilege Protection Changes0 1-
10
11 -
20
21-
50
51-
100
101-
500
501-
1000
>
1000
Complete Gain 86 7 12 10 8 20 2 2
Complete Loss 119 1 4 3 2 14 4 0
Monotonic Gain 120 10 1 0 6 6 4 0
Monotonic Loss 135 2 1 2 3 4 0 0
Substitution 124 4 2 3 5 4 4 1
Asymmetric 146 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Symmetric 147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Disjoint 143 1 0 0 1 2 0 0
(a) Release Pairs Showing Privilege Protection Change, per Preponderance and Category
Category Average Total %
Complete gain 93.51 13746 40.81%
Complete loss 41.22 6059 17.99%
Monotonic gain 36.57 5376 15.96%
Monotonic loss 9.52 1399 4.15%
Substitution 46.07 6772 20.10%
Asymmetric 0.16 24 0.07%
Symmetric 0 0 0%
Disjoint 2.11 311 0.92%
Total 229.16 33687 100.00%
(b) Summary Statistics
Figure 4.7 Classified Vertices for All Release Pairs – Complete Gain, Complete Loss and
Substitution are the Dominant Categories.
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4.5 Discussion
Our results show that code changes between releases have a small privilege-level security
impact, as there are very few privilege protection changes in proportion to the program size
(0.10%).
Identifying this small change may help focus validation efforts, because most of the program
need not be evaluated for regressions at the privilege level. This is explained by the fact that
an absence of privilege protection changes imply that the privilege protection for that code
is just as valid for rb as they were for ra.
We observed a strong logarithmic correlation (96.77%) between the program size and the total
definitely protected statements. This may indicate that developers purposefully confined
privileged operations in a small part of the application. The logarithmic growth in definitely
protected statements is markedly different from earlier results from Hwang et al. [80], which
found a linear growth in SELinux polices of the NCSU Virtual Computing Lab.
Privilege protection changes classification may prioritize review efforts, as they may indicate
the nature of the changes and their security impacts. For instance, a complete loss of privilege
protection may be much more troublesome than a monotonic increase of privilege protection
and developers may want to investigate the former first.
The additional information provided by our classification might further facilitate validation-
style testing, since the dominant classification categories are very black-and-white – moving
from unprotected to protected (or vice-versa) or entirely from one privilege to another. This
kind of straightforward information may be easier to reason about.
We also reviewed all results for accuracy and violations of security assumptions – which
privileges are required over which parts of the code. Since WordPress does not explicitly
document its security assumptions, we built a plausible mental model of these security as-
sumptions using code patterns (e.g. database and HTML writes), identifier names as well as
file location in the project’s hierarchy (e.g. code reserved for administrators).
During a code review, we used this mental model and the CFG to determine if the privilege
protection change was accurate and if it could affect the system’s security.
We found our classification to be 81.56% accurate and 70.01% of privilege protection changes
are, in our opinion, both security assumption violations and confirmed results.
These results hint that our approach provide useful information for developers, although they
are subject to several limitations, which we will discuss in Section 4.7.
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4.6 Related Work
PTFA was used in evolution studies before. A first study by Letarte et al. studied privilege
protection in a longitudinal study over 31 phpBB releases [112], though only handling a
binary distinction between administrator and unprivileged users. Our earlier study [101]
only considered privilege protection losses. This study is different, as we proposed a set-
theoretic classification encompassing all possible privilege protection change and reported on
their observed frequencies.
Hwang et al. [81] developed a semantic differencing approach of eXtensible Access Control
Markup Language (XACML) policies for test selection. Their approach requires running the
full test suite at least once, it also needs a stand-alone access control policy or pre-recorded
PDP decisions. In comparison, our approach targets RBAC policies, is fully static and works
for policies that are hardcoded and mixed with business logic in the source code.
General classifications of software evolution (e.g. [33, 38]) are not suited for RBAC classifi-
cation evolution [134] as they scantly cover security maintenance.
Classifications and taxonomies for security (e.g. Wang and Wang [179]), vulnerabilities (e.g.
Landwehr et al. [97]) and access control (e.g. Kane and Browne [90]) do not (or only
minimally) integrate the dimension of evolution.
4.7 Threats to Validity
Threats to internal validity refer to confounding variables that may influence our results.
Our results depend on the accuracy of the PTFA engine we used. Because PHP applications
like WordPress rely on many dynamic features, the engine relies on sound but conserva-
tive approximations that may lead to spurious paths and thus spurious privilege protection
changes.
Our results also depend on the differencing method used. We extracted line-level differences
between releases. Since there may be many CFG vertices on the same line of code, we under-
estimate the unchanged CFG vertices. Thus, the rate of privilege protection changes may be
higher than we report. However, we expect change categories to be distributed similarly as
we found.
As our validation was done by non-experts, the accuracy of our results and the real rate of
privilege protection changes that are violations of security assumptions may be very different
than we found. Thus, it would be desirable to conduct a formal review of our results with
experts.
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Threats to external validity relate to the generalizability of our results. We did not have
a vulnerability oracle for our study, though our approach may use one. Consequently, we
cannot establish a relationship between vulnerabilities and the privilege protection change
categories. To counter this issue, studies using a vulnerability oracle should be performed.
Another threat to generalizability is that our study is on a single open source content man-
agement system implemented in PHP. We may obtain different results when studying other
systems written in PHP or other languages. While the PTFA engine we used only handles
PHP at the moment, our approach itself is language-independent. To counter this issue,
studies that include other systems should be performed.
Another threat to generalizability is that our study is on a single type of access control.
While the PTFA engine we used only handles RBAC at the moment, it could be extended
to handle a wide range of access control models, such as attribute-based access control and
authorization-based access control [91]. It could also be extended to analyze applications that
use technologies separating access control decisions from the business logic, such as XACML.
4.8 Conclusion and Future Work
We studied privilege protection impact of code changes using privilege protection changes
and their classification. We examined their demography over 147 release pairs of WordPress.
Our automated implementation need only a few minutes per release pair and has detected
33,687 privilege protection changes – 0.10% of the cumulative program size. Only 44% of
the releases had any privilege protection changes. For security-impacted release pairs, only
0.30% of code is affected by security changes. We also saw that complete gain, complete loss
and substitution were the most common change categories.
We manually verified our results for false positives and violations of our understanding of the
developers’ security assumptions and we estimate that 70.01% of privilege protection changes
represent possible security violations.
We find that proportionally few privilege protection changes, if any, occur between releases.
These changes mostly belong to simple categories, which are likely to be simple to reason
about and prioritize. These factors are likely to significantly lower the effort required for
security reviews.
In our future research, we would like to investigate of the distribution of privilege protec-
tion change categories corresponding to vulnerabilities, whenever a vulnerability oracle is
available.
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Further research may also include the assessment of the real impact of the proposed techniques
to application security verification and validation in collaboration with developers. Such
studies would measure the accuracy of our results, developers’ validation efforts during an
application evolution and assess the advantages of the proposed approach.
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Abstract
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is commonly used in web applications to protect infor-
mation and restrict operations. Code changes may affect the security of the application and
need to be validated, in order to avoid security vulnerabilities, which is a major undertaking.
A statement suffers from privilege protection loss in a release pair when it was definitely
protected on all execution paths in the previous release and is now reachable by some execu-
tion paths with an inferior privilege protection. Because the code change and the resulting
privilege protection loss may be distant (e.g. in different functions or files), developers may
find it difficult to diagnose and correct the issue. We use Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis
(PTFA) to statically analyze code-derived formal models. Our analysis automatically com-
putes counter-examples of definite protection properties and privilege protection losses. We
computed privilege protections and their changes for 147 release pairs of WordPress. We
computed counter-examples for a total of 14,116 privilege protection losses we found spread
in 31 release pairs. We present the distribution of counter-examples’ lengths, as well as their
spread across function and file boundaries. Our results show that counter-examples are typi-
cally short and localized. The median example spans 88 statements, crosses a single function
boundary, and is contained in the same file. The 90th centile example measures 174 state-
ments and spans 3 function boundaries over 3 files. We believe that the privilege protection
counter-examples’ characteristics would be helpful to focus developers’ attention for security
reviews. These counter-examples are also a first step toward explanations.
Index Terms
Software Maintenance, Access Control, Evolution, Static Analysis, Model Checking
42
5.1 Introduction
Many web applications require access control, which is ensuring that only the right user(s)
can execute specific code. Sadly, they commonly suffer from various vulnerabilities, which
are defined as “a flaw or weakness in a system’s design, implementation, or operation and
management that could be exploited to violate the system’s security policy.” (RFC 4949
[165]). Access control vulnerabilities include forced browsing, privilege escalation and unau-
thorized access. Forced browsing [131, 142] typically happens when a page is unreachable by
normal browsing unless the user has the necessary privileges (e.g. admin) and doesn’t verify
that the user has these privileges. An unauthenticated user browsing directly to the URL of
the page can then perform privileged operations. Privilege escalation [142] and unauthorized
access refer to existing privilege checks in the application that do not validate for the right
privilege(s). The presence of such vulnerabilities show how difficult it is for developers to
reason about which security properties have been verified at any given point in the program.
A commonly used access control approach is role-based access control (RBAC), with develop-
ers and/or administrators assigning privileges to one or more roles as necessary. Developers
often implement RBAC systems with privilege checks scattered across the code base according
to the application’s security needs. These checks typically verify if a given privilege has been
granted to the authenticated user. The NBAC (authenticatioN-Based Access Control) family
of access control includes RBAC, Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) and identity-based
access control (IBAC). A different paradigm is authoriZation-Based Access Control (ZBAC)
[91]. In ABAC, an authenticated user is granted a set of read-only attributes, often expressed
as key-value pairs. The policy decision point (PDP) verifies if the attribute set contains a
specific attribute and value combination. In IBAC, the user’s identity is used by the PDP
to determine access via an access control matrix. In ZBAC, a user is given authorizations
upon authentication. The PDP checks if the user provided the required authorization and
that this authorization is valid.
Software maintenance refers to modifications to a product after release. The types of mainte-
nance are Corrective, Adaptive, Perfective and Preventive [83]. Many maintenance activities
in all categories will be functional in nature - meaning that they affect the functionality of
the application. This implies adding, removing or changing execution paths in the program.
On the other hand, some maintenance activities will be oriented towards security.
As an example, developers change the privilege checks protecting a piece of code. They may
add a privilege check where none was, or they may move privilege checks to cover only some
code sections instead of the whole script (or vice-versa). Also, developers add, remove and
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rename roles and privileges. Some of these decisions may be linked to new features added,
but sometimes reflect a reorganization of the application’s high-level security policy.
Non-security changes in the source code may change privilege protection. Some of these
changes may be due to interprocedural side effects, since code protected by a privilege check
often calls other code, and carries its protection to the called functions, which may be located
in other files.
Whether or not code changes for security, privilege protection changes may have negligible,
beneficial or harmful effects. Negligible privilege protection changes would, for instance,
affect a code section that only accesses unrestricted resources for unrestricted operations.
Beneficial privilege protection changes are synonymous with security improvements, often as
a fix for a security vulnerability. Harmful privilege protection changes, on the other hand,
may represent vulnerabilities in the application.
Maintainers’ objective is that their changes comply with the security policies. In other
words, code changes should only have a planned and desirable impact on security. To ensure
this is the case, developers may resort to regression security testing, penetration testing and
inspection. Regression security testing is a form of regression testing whereby tests are
validating some security properties (e.g. non logged-in users should receive an error message
when trying to view a given page). These tests look for previous application behavior and
states that are no longer secure. Penetration testing is a dynamic evaluation often performed
by an hired third party. Penetration testers use both automated scanning tools and manual
interaction with the system to find vulnerabilities [13]. Inspections, on the other hand, are
static formal investigation processes meant to verify that requirements are met, and security
goals have been added to their scope [148]. They greatly reduce the defect rate, but they
typically amount to 15% of the project cost [51].
Such validation efforts may be difficult and costly for many reasons, such as complexity
between software and security, lack of security architecture documentation, lack of speci-
fications, contradictory implementation, configurability, and testing complexity. First, the
interactions between functionality and security is often complex, and maintainers’ choices
may have unintended and sometimes catastrophic security consequences (e.g. the Debian
OpenSSL vulnerability1). Second, the security architecture of an application is not always
documented. It may rely on “common sense”, or be a mental model shared by the security
architect and the developers. Third, few applications are developed using formal security
specifications. This is especially the case for Free, Libre and Open Source Software (FLOSS)
1Debian maintainers caused CVE-2008-0166 by silencing a Valgrind warning about uninitialized memory
access. Consequently, generated keys tended to be predictable.
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web applications. Fourth, even when informal security policies are used, the implementation
may deviate from them, and developers may not have useful tools to detect deviations. Fur-
thermore, automated tests may not cover many security issues, as they are typically focused
on functionality testing. Considering the constraints above, validation-style testing is very
desirable. It is, however, a time consuming activity.
To illustrate these challenges, we introduce our first running example in Listing 5.1. a.php
contains a check for privilege p1 and its call to foo is in a protected context. The code
change occurs in b.php, with an additional call to foo, which we underlined below. Since
b.php has no privilege checks, it calls foo from an unprotected context. Previously, the user
always had privilege p1 when executing foo in c.php, but we are no longer sure.
/* in a.php */
if (! current_user_can(’p1’)) die();
foo();
/* new code in b.php */
foo();
/* in c.php */
function foo(){/* assumes privilege p1 held */}
Listing 5.1 Running Example - Adding an Unprotected Path
The privilege protection set for a statement is the set of privileges that are definitely true prior
to its execution. This means that the privilege is positively verified on all paths leading to
the statement’s execution. For a statement s common to two releases (ra and rb), a privilege
protection change occurs when the privilege protection of s differs between ra and rb.
In our running example, the privilege protection for statements in function foo, prior to the
change, was {p1}. After the code change, it became ∅. In other words, the code change in
b.php caused a privilege protection change in c.php. Specifically, it was a privilege protection
loss.
A privilege protection loss for privilege p is a case of privilege protection change whereby the
privilege protection for a statement s in ra included p, but excludes it in rb. In other words,
the application positively verifies privilege p on all paths leading to s in ra, but there is at least
one path to s lacking positive verification in rb. These paths are definite privilege protection
counter-examples. This is derived from First Order Logic, as the negation of a universally
quantified property (e.g., not definitely protected), is equivalent to the existentially quantified
negated property (e.g., there exist a path that is not protected).
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We call our approach privilege protection loss examples because we only generate definite
privilege protection counter-examples for privilege protection losses. Statements that present
privilege protection losses in rb are statements that are no longer definitely protected for the
same privilege. Therefore, examples of protection losses identify paths that are counter-
examples of a definite protection property. Throughout this paper, we’ll use both protection
loss examples and definite protection counter-examples interchangeably to refer to these ex-
istentially quantified paths.
For code performing sensitive operations or accessing sensitive resources, a privilege pro-
tection loss may represent a vulnerability. Considering the validation challenges mentioned
above, developers are likely to find privilege protection loss examples useful to determine if
any code change violates the application’s security policy. The reason for this is because
privilege protection loss examples connect the cause and effect, something that may not be
obvious for developers, especially when they occur in different functions or files. Since ex-
amples represent execution traces that violate security properties, they should be easy to
analyze and act upon.
As with other static analysis tools, we must minimize the amount of information to review
[137] in order to facilitate analysis. We do so via brevity and locality. For brevity, we generate
short counter-examples, as done with many other model checking approaches [66, 98]. For
locality, we provide counter-examples that spread in as few functions or files as possible, since
local information is easier for developers to reason about [64, 113].
Our approach is warranted because generating definite protection counter-examples for every
unprotected statement would result in too much data to analyze. And this data would not be
useful for many parts of the applications consisting of code free of security assumptions and
concerns. By computing privilege protection loss examples, we aim at generating reasonable
amount of relevant data.
We also minimize the information to analyze via graph transformations. We transform Pat-
tern Traversal Flow Analysis (PTFA) model checking automata, which are automatically
generated from the application’s source code.
To the authors’ best knowledge, this is the first study of privilege protection loss examples,
as well as the first longitudinal study of their characteristics. We examined the evolution
of WordPress, a popular web-based content management system implemented in PHP. The
study spanned 147 release pairs, from 2.0 to 4.5.1. This application’s size ranges from 35708
physical lines of PHP code (PLOC) in release 2.0 to 301605 PLOC in release 4.5.1.
In this paper, we include the following contributions:
46
• We define privilege protection loss examples
• We provide an algorithm to compute definite privilege protection counter-examples that
leverage graph transformations of PTFA automata
• We report on a longitudinal case study of privilege protection loss examples over 147
release pairs of WordPress.
This paper is organized as follows. We describe our methodology in Section 5.2. We examine
the results of our research question in Section 5.3. We discuss our results and the previous
literature in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. We consider threats to our results’ validity in
Section 5.6 and bring concluding remarks in Section 5.7.
5.2 Methodology
Developers are likely to understand shorter and more local traces better than long traces
spread across the code base. As such, we study the distribution of privilege protection loss
examples length in terms of states traversed, as well as the number of files and function
boundaries they span.
We summarize PTFA in Section 5.2.1 and show how to determine privilege protection losses
in PTFA models in Section 5.2.2. Then, we elaborate on our algorithm to calculate counter-
examples in Section 5.2.3. Afterwards, we explain how we selected the release pairs for our
study in Section 5.2.4.
5.2.1 Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis
We use Pattern-Traversal Flow Analysis (PTFA) [57, 61, 111], a domain-specific model-
checking approach to determine privilege protection. PTFA models are generated automati-
cally and statically from the application’s source code. To help the reader better understand
how we compute privilege protection loss examples, we now summarize essential details of
PTFA.
PTFA considers privilege check satisfaction as Boolean properties interprocedurally propa-
gated across a Control Flow Graph (CFG). Accordingly, our engine creates model checking
automata from the CFG and computes the graph reachability from the starting state. PTFA
automata are security-context-sensitive, meaning that the security context is distinguished
in interprocedural analysis. Since PTFA automata track a single Boolean property at a time,
we compute one automaton per privilege in the system.
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A PTFA model checking automaton is a tupleA = (QA, TA, q0, VA, GA, AA). QA is a finite set
of states. TA ⊆ QA×QA is the set of transitions. q0 ∈ QA is the initial state. VA is the finite
set of variables used in guards and assignments. The guards GA annotate the transitions TA
with logical propositions over VA. These propositions must be satisfied for the edge to be
traversed. The assignments AA also annotate the transitions TA with modifications to the
variables.
The states QA are represented as qi,j,k, where i is the corresponding CFG node identifier and
j and k are protectedness flags set to either 0 or 1. j and k refer to the calling context’s
and the intra-procedural protectedness, respectively. The value 0 for j or k applies for states
both with unknown privilege protection as well as those that are in code regions reachable
only though an explicit negative check (e.g. if (!current_user_ can(’p’)...)).
Call sites in the CFG are converted to two states cb and ce, which respectively stand for
call_begin and call_end. The relationship between them is recorded in the cb2ce function.
Edges of type call_target connect a call_begin state to the start of the function or method.
Edges of type call_return connect a state representing a return statement, or the end of a
function or method to a call_end state.
In Figure 5.1, we see a simplified PTFA automaton for our running example. Please note
that we kept the assignments, guards and unreachable edges away from the figure for the
sake of simplicity; we also greyed out unreachable states.
5.2.2 Privilege Protection Loss
Because we compute reachability on the automata from state q0 and prune unreachable
edges and states, Boolean property satisfaction becomes privilege protection information
straightforwardly. If the privilege pi is verified on all execution paths leading to CFG vertex
vi, then at least one state qvi,j,1 and no state qvi,j,0 are reachable in the automaton for pi. If
a state qvi,j,0 is reachable in the automaton for pi, then pi is not verified in at least one path
to vi.
In order to determine privilege protection changes, we compare the reachable PTFA states
for corresponding CFG vertices. We define a partial function between the CFG vertices of
releases ra and rb named vertexMap. For vertex va in ra, its corresponding vertex in rb is
vb = vertexMap(va, ra, rb). A privilege protection loss occurs when the privilege pi is verified
on all paths leading to va, but not for vb.
In Figure 5.2, we show how we detect privilege protection losses from PTFA automata. The
graphs are simplified as for Figure 5.1. We see how different states for function foo are
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reachable for each release. For Release A, only qi,1,1 is reachable from q0, but both qi,1,1 and
qi,0,0 are reachable in Release B.
5.2.3 Computing Counter-Examples
Using PTFA, we verify the following property: that the privilege pi is verified on all execution
paths leading to vi. As counter-examples look for the opposite property, we find one path
where pi is not verified prior to vi.
This is straightforward with PTFA. Given that qi,j,0 is reachable from q0, and that shorter
counter-examples are desirable, we compute the shortest path between q0 and qi,j,0. Such
counter-examples still risk to be very long, due to the fact that we would traverse all functions
called along the path. This is problematic when the same j, k states are reachable before and
after the call. In this case, the subpath corresponding to the call does not provide any useful
information to understand the root cause of the privilege protection loss.
As such, we reverse and modify the PTFA automaton and calculate the shortest path be-
tween qi,j,0 and q0. We keep only call_return edges when the call_end state(s) and their
corresponding call_begin state(s) have different j, k values. Whenever a call_return edge
is disconnected, we add a cecb edge between the call_end state(s) and their corresponding
call_begin state(s). This transformation maintains soundness because the cecb edge is a sum-
mary of the interprocedural subgraph between the call_begin and call_end states. Because
the protection is the same between them, the entire subgraph has no effect on privilege pro-
tection and does not need to be part of the counter-example. Since many interprocedural
edges are removed, we also remove guards and assignments from the automaton. We handle
interprocedural edge selection using a stack in the traversal.
In Figure 5.3, we show how the PTFA automaton from Figure 5.1 is modified for calculating
counter-examples, with the same simplifications as before.
The special treatment for call_return edges is due to privilege protection checks done in
functions, and the privilege protection acquired there is propagated to the relevant call_end
state. We show an example in Listing 5.2, along with its simplified and reversed PTFA
automata in Figure 5.4.
5.2.4 Release Pair Selection
Because many open source projects, such as WordPress, maintain and apply security fixes to
multiple releases in parallel, we must take in consideration these subtleties to choose which
releases to compare. As such, we cannot consider releases sequentially. A useful tool to tell
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function f(){
if (! current_user_can(’p1’)) die();
}
f();
/* ... */
/* This code is protected by privilege p1 */
Listing 5.2 Example of Privilege Check in Called Function
the development activities apart is semantic versioning [149]. In semantic versioning, releases
are numbered with the form X.Y.Z, whereby X is the major release number, Y is the minor
release number, and Z is the bugfix release number.
Because many releases are maintained and developed at the same time, a security fix may
need to be applied to all these releases. If the code to be fixed has evolved between the
releases, maintainers often resort to backporting, which refers to the practice of writing a
patch on the latest release, and then adapting it to the earlier release(s). We must take this
behavior in consideration when choosing the release pairs to compare. Otherwise, we would
observe privilege protection changes reversed and later reinstated.
If we were to build a graph of the evolution, with each release being a vertex, and the evolution
activities being edges between the releases, we would obtain a directed acyclic graph. An
evolution analysis should thus consider each pair of releases connected by an edge.
Because it would be very difficult to create this graph, we approximate it using a tree based on
the releases’ semantic version numbers and their release dates. We first connect the vertices
in each minor release in increasing bugfix release order. Then, we add edges to major and
minor releases (i.e. ending by .0) from the latest prior bugfix release that was released earlier
than the release we are trying to connect.
We show an excerpt of this tree in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.1 Simplified PTFA Model for our Running Example - Unreachable states are greyed
out
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Figure 5.2 Privilege Protection Loss in Our Running Example. The dashed region represents
the loss in Release B.
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call_return edge.
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Figure 5.5 WordPress Release Tree Excerpt.
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5.3 Results
We have implemented our analysis using a JavaCC grammar for handling PHP code, and our
analyser and classifier are implemented in Java. Our analysis requires less than 13 minutes
on a system powered by an Intel i7-3770 CPU @ 3.40GHz and configured the Oracle Java
VM version 1.8.0_66 to use up to 8Gb of RAM. To determine the mapping between different
releases’ CFG vertices (vertexMap), we rely on line differences computed by GNU Diff. We
compute physical lines of code (PLOC) reported below using the wc utility.
We compared privilege protections over 147 release pairs of WordPress. Protection changes
may be classified as gains or losses. We found 14116 protection losses spread over 31 release
pairs, for which we computed counter-examples. The results below only refer to these release
pairs.
In Figure 5.6, we show the cumulative distribution of the number of counter-examples per
release pair. We have a median of 211 and a mean of 455.4 counter-examples.
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Figure 5.6 Cumulative Distribution of Counter-Examples per Release Pair. Its median is 211
counter-examples, and only 3 release pairs have more than 1000 counter-examples.
In Table 5.1, we see summary statistics for their length, the number of states visited before
finding the example, function boundaries crossed, and files present. The median privilege
protection loss example length is 88 states long, contained in one file, and across one function
boundary.
Looking at the distribution of privilege protection loss example lengths in Figure 5.7, we
observe a skew towards the left, and what appears to be a long tail of examples greater than
200 states long. We see the same situation in the cumulative density curve (Figure 5.8).
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Table 5.1 Privilege Protection Loss Examples Examples Summary Statistics
Measure Mean 1st quart Median 3rd quart Max
Length 97.64 56.00 88.00 127.00 364.00
States Visited 227.40 87.00 162.00 250.00 3187.00
Functions 1.06 0.00 1.00 2.00 5.00
Files 1.67 1.00 1.00 2.00 6.00
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Figure 5.7 Distribution of Privilege Protection Loss Example Lengths. It is skewed towards
the left.
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Figure 5.8 Cumulative Distribution of Privilege Protection Loss Example Lengths - The
Median Length is 88.
In Figure 5.9, we represent the spread of privilege protection loss example lengths in relation
to the program size. We use vertical bars to encompass the largest to smallest lengths, and a
dot to represent the median. We see that privilege protection loss example lengths are across
the spectrum and do not appear related to the program size.
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Figure 5.9 Privilege Protection Loss Example Length vs Program Size - The dots stand for
the median, and the line represents the range. There is no apparent relationship between the
length of privilege protection loss examples and the program size
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In Table 5.2, we see that over a third of privilege protection loss examples occur within the
same function scope, and that nearly another third of examples cross one function boundary.
Table 5.2 Distribution of Function Boundaries Crossed in Privilege Protection Loss Examples
- More than one third of examples are within the same function.
Function Boundaries Observations Proportion
0 5525 39.14%
1 4539 32.16%
2 2384 16.89%
3 1150 8.15%
4 407 2.88%
5 111 0.79%
Total 14116 100.00%
In Table 5.3, we see that the majority of privilege protection loss examples fit within the
same file, and that less than 2% of examples span four or more files.
Table 5.3 Distribution of Number of Files in Privilege Protection Loss Example - Most
examples are all within the same file.
File Count Observations Proportion
1 7038 49.86%
2 4647 32.92%
3 2126 15.06%
4 229 1.62%
5 45 0.32%
6 31 0.22%
Total 14116 100.00%
5.4 Discussion
Most privilege protection loss examples are less than 100 states long and could be considered
short. However, the far end of the distribution is ≥ 200 states long. We also note that most
examples are contained in the same file, but are not contained in the same function.
Static analysis is powerful because it considers all program paths. However, it relies on
approximations which may introduce spurious paths. To have an idea about the rate of
spurious paths, we randomly selected and manually verified 378 counter-examples. The
estimated spurious path rate of 10.96 ± 3.18% (95% confidence level) seems promising.
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We expect that privilege protection loss examples will help developers to determine which
code changes caused privilege protection losses, assess their security impact, and correct
them if necessary. However, we expect that the examples in the tail end of the distribution
represent examples long enough to discourage developers.
In that case, future research in generating explanations is likely to bridge the gap and present
information that is even more useful for developers.
It is important to note that not all privilege protection losses amount to vulnerabilities.
A cornerstone of our approach is to restrict the number of counter-examples to generate.
We do this by calculating them only privilege protection losses. This kind of targeting using
privilege protection changes may be useful for generating counter-examples for other security
properties in the future.
5.5 Related Work
Previous work underpinning our research was performed by Letarte, Gauthier and Merlo by
defining the Pattern-Traversal Flow Analysis we are using [57, 61, 111, 112]. These include a
single longitudinal study of privilege protection over 31 phpBB releases [112]. Their approach
only handled a binary distinction between administrator and unprivileged users. Our study
is markedly different, even though we also use PTFA and determine additions and deletions
in the source code using textual differencing, since we handle a richer protection scheme,
computed counter-examples and performed a larger case study.
Han et al. [69] also examined the evolution of privilege-based access control systems, but on
the topic of their configuration. Their study leveraged Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) and
found that privileges were hierarchically organized in the default Mediawiki configuration. In
our study, we examine how these privileges used in the source code, with no hierarchization
of any kind.
Montrieux et al. [134] presented a position paper showing that general software evolution
approaches, aimed at consistency checking, were not sufficient for the evolution of RBAC.
They do not address code-level RBAC implementation like we do, but show that RBAC
evolution is an open research topic.
Hwang et al. [80] performed one of the first evolution studies of access control systems.
They studied the evolution of access control policies in SELinux and for the NCSU Virtual
Computing Lab. They aimed at creating a predictive model. They found that growth was
linear and that the policies were changing frequently.
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Letovsky and Soloway [113] demonstrated that purely local program understanding may lead
to incorrect or inefficient modifications. Their study was based on programming plans involv-
ing source code scattered across the program named delocalized programming plans. While
their study was focused on functionality rather than security, their results may plausibly be
generalizable to security. Their study showed that programmers make incorrect (yet plau-
sible) assumptions based on local information. They suggested to use automatic program
analysis tools to make correct facts available to programmers.
Gordon [64] proposed a program clarity measure. He mentioned that locality of operation is
a factor that influences the clarity of a program, alongside other factors related to program
structure, such as the number of statements, the complexity of the control flow, the depth of
statement nesting and the clustering of data references.
Groce and Kroening [66] minimize Bounded Model Checking (BMC) counter-examples on the
length and semantic axes. They express counter-example generation as a minimization prob-
lem. They also show how to leverage the set of changes to determine causal dependence based
on distance metrics. Their study was focused on verifying potentially complex properties in
C programs, whereas we study relatively simple properties using a dedicated model-checking
approach. Consequently, we would need to suitably redefine causal dependency.
Chaki et al. [35] perform error explanation by providing informative error explanation for
property violations in C programs using an abstract state-space. They also express counter-
example generation as optimization problem, but with a distance metric. They move from
specific values in the counter-example to predicates over the variables (e.g. x < y in the
counter-example, but x ≥ y in the successful execution). They also use a scoring function
for evaluating fault localization techniques that minimizes how much of the program an ideal
user would have to read. While the idea of error explanation is attractive, their approach
would also need to be redefined to apply on PTFA automata.
Son et al. introduced RoleCast [167], which automatically detects privilege protection
checks in PHP and JSP applications. Their static approach identifies critical variables con-
trolling the reachability of security sensitive statements. Through inferences, it partitions the
application into roles and determines if checks are performed consistently. When reporting
a potential vulnerability in a non-singleton context, RoleCast mentions the security sen-
sitive statement, its calling context, which security variables are erroneously verified, or if a
check is missing in the first place. As we do, they connect the security issue to its cause, but
the calling context provides less information than an execution path. Their analysis is very
different as well, since they rely on inferences and do not perform an evolutionary analysis.
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5.6 Threats to Validity
1. Construction validity: Our PTFA analysis tool has some limitations. First, it supports
PHP’s constructs up to release 5.6. Also, it relies on approximations that may lead
to spurious paths, it supports disjunctive privilege checks partially and performs only
limited string analysis.
Consequences: Newer constructs from PHP 7 that might have affected the control
flow would not be taken in consideration, and spurious paths mean false positives.
Disjunctive privilege are not included in definitive privilege protection, and limited
string analysis means that some privileges checks refer to (partially or fully) unknown
privilege names. We expect that these limitations would not significantly affect our
results: few applications have made the switch to PHP 7, few privilege checks use a
disjunctive form, we keep track of unknown privileges, and the high level of confirmed
results indicate few spurious paths.
Counter-measures: We could add support for newer versions of PHP, track disjunctive
checks as separate privileges (p1 || p2), and improve the string analysis.
2. Construction validity: the implementation of our vertex mapping between revisions is
line-based.
Consequences: some unchanged vertices on changed lines are missing from the vertex-
Map function.
Counter-measures: Using a better differencing algorithm, such as a tree-based differ-
encing approach (e.g. GumTree [52]) or clone analysis.
3. Internal validity (experimenter bias) : the estimated spurious path rate depends on our
judgment and may be subject to experimenter bias. Other experimenters may find a
slightly different spurious path rate.
Counter-measures: It would be desirable to conduct formal studies involving multiple
external experimenters.
4. Internal validity (selection bias) : we selected one system based on the availability of
its source code and history of security changes.
Consequences: Our conclusions depend on the change history of this single system.
Counter-measures: In further research, we plan to include other systems in our analysis.
5. External validity (Generalizability): our study is on a single open source content man-
agement system implemented in PHP and may not be reproducible on other systems.
Though our PTFA-based approach is language-independent, we require a front-end in
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order to handle projects in languages other than PHP.
Consequences: Our conclusions depend on the change history of this single system
Counter-measures: In further research, we plan to include other systems in our analysis.
5.7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this study, we showed how to automatically leverage PTFA model checking automaton ex-
tracted from source code to determine privilege protection losses and calculate examples. We
determined privilege protection losses by comparing PTFA state reachability for statements
shared in release pairs. We calculated short examples by reversing, removing and adding
edges to PTFA automata.
Over 147 release pairs, we found 14,116 privilege protection loss examples. They were
spread over 31 release pairs. In these, the median is 211 and the mean of 455.4 examples
per release pair. We found that the median privilege protection loss example is ≤ 88 states
long, in a single file, and crosses one function boundary. However, our results show a long
tail, with examples reaching up to 364 states long, spread across six files, and crossing five
function boundaries.
In our future research, we would investigate the performance of our analysis on a simulated
set of security changes. To do so, we would create a test bench by mutating, injecting and
suppressing privilege checks in programs like WordPress.
We also intend to develop visualizations showing how a given privilege protection change
came to be. We would especially like to show which path(s) were added or removed and its
impact on the privilege protection.
As mentioned earlier, validation of the presented approach should be performed by conducting
reviews with external experts – preferably WordPress developers. We would examine our
results’ accuracy, determine if privilege protection losses violated security assumptions and
if privilege protection loss examples were helpful in determining so.
Finally, we would also like to extend our analysis to other systems, written in PHP or other
programming languages.
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Abstract
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is often used in web applications to restrict operations
and protect security sensitive information and resources. Web applications regularly undergo
maintenance and evolution and their security may be affected by source code changes be-
tween releases. To prevent security regression and vulnerabilities, developers have to take re-
validation actions before deploying new releases. This may become a significant undertaking,
especially when quick and repeated releases are sought.
We define protection-impacting changes as those changed statements during evolution
that alter privilege protection of some code. We propose an automated method that identi-
fies protection-impacting changes within all changed statements between two versions. The
proposed approach compares statically computed security protection models and repository
information corresponding to different releases of a system to identify protection-impacting
changes.
Results of experiments present the occurrence of protection-impacting changes over 210
release pairs of WordPress, a PHP content management web application. First, we show that
only 41% of the release pairs present protection-impacting changes. Second, for these affected
release pairs, protection-impacting changes can be identified and represent a median of 47.00
lines of code, that is 27.41% of the total changed lines of code. Over all investigated releases
in WordPress, protection-impacting changes amounted to 10.89% of changed lines of code.
Conversely, an average of about 89% of changed source code have no impact on RBAC security
and thus need no re-validation nor investigation.
The proposed method reduces the amount of candidate causes of protection changes
that developers need to investigate. This information could help developers re-validate ap-
plication security, identify causes of negative security changes, and perform repairs in a more
effective way.
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6.1 Introduction
Web applications are now entrusted with sensitive data and operations. Thus, they must
comply with legal and organizational security requirements. Web applications are expected
to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
These security expectations are summarized in industry standards, such as the OWASP
Application Security Verification Standard, whose purpose is “to define what a secure ap-
plication is.” (OWASP [144, p.5]). This standard covers access control and other security
topics. Access control ensures that only the right users execute some specific code.
Web applications may suffer from vulnerabilities, which are defined as “a flaw or weakness in
a system’s design, implementation, or operation and management that could be exploited to
violate the system’s security policy.” (RFC 4949 [165]). An access control vulnerability allows
the violation of a resource’s security policy (e.g. an unauthorized data access or performing
unauthorized operations) [131, 143].
Role-based access control (RBAC) is commonly used for access control. RBAC belongs to
a family of access control called authentication-based access control family (NBAC) [91]. In
RBAC, developers assign privileges to one or more roles as necessary and insert privilege
checks across the code base according to the application’s security needs.
Developers need quality assurance processes to prevent such issues from occurring and ensur-
ing that their code changes only have a planned and desirable impact on security. They need
quality assurance processes that encompass verification and validation. These often leverage
testing [13, 53, 125], reviews [125, 148] and formal methods [152]. All these verification and
validation approaches require developers’ effort and are typically time consuming. They also
have limitations and thus they should be combined for better results [18, 49].
Like other kinds of software, web applications undergo maintenance and evolution. Software
maintenance can be corrective, adaptive, perfective, and preventive [83]. Corrective and
adaptive maintenance require an effort of about 30-50% [46, 109]. Maintenance activities
oriented towards security [38] are included in the remaining 50-70% of effort. They include
vulnerability correction, modifying security checks to accommodate RBAC policy changes
and malicious changes from insiders [34]. RBAC policy changes involve adding, removing and
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renaming roles and privileges. These activities intentionally change the security protection
of different parts of a system.
Many maintenance activities are not specifically meant to modify the security of the appli-
cation. These include bug-fixing, refactoring, design changes, and changing the functionality
of the application. These changes may unintentionally introduce security flaws [97]. Thus,
code changes may impact the security protection in the application in different and seem-
ingly unrelated parts of the application. This occurs because of added, removed or modified
execution paths.
Because RBAC security issues are hard to reason about, developers should ideally verify and
validate that each change is free from security regressions throughout the project’s evolution.
This would enable rapid correction, as well as avoiding complex regressions due to the com-
bined effect of many changes. However, a constant re-verification of the whole application
would be very effort-intensive. Even if individual changes alter a small part of the appli-
cation, “software modified during maintenance should be subjected to the same review as
newly developed software” (Landwehr et al. [97]). As developers increasingly adopt frequent
and quick release cycles, this overhead represents a major hurdle.
Static analysis tools are known to support security reviews. For instance, a study of three
industrial C++ projects estimated cost reduction of 17% for reported security bugs [19].
We propose an automated static analysis over privilege protection that automatically clas-
sifies changed lines of code as protection-impacting or non-protection-impacting. This is
intended to safely reduce the amount of changes that developers must assess before a release.
Our analysis finds protection-impacting changes (PIC), the subset of the code changes which
contains the root causes of security changes related to privilege protection. This analysis
relies on the automated detection of definite protection differences (DPD), which are changes
in statements’ definite privilege protection (i.e. privilege protection changes [101, 103]).
We show that protection-impacting changes can be identified and are globally a small propor-
tion of the total number of changes in a release. Our method reduces the pool of candidate
causes of security changes that need to be investigated. Thus, our approach could help devel-
opers eliminate root causes of negative security changes effectively. Our main contributions
are: (i) a method to automatically identify protection-impacting changes during software
evolution; and (ii) a longitudinal survey of the prevalence of protection-impacting changes
over 210 release pairs of WordPress, a popular PHP web-based content management system.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we cover the background necessary to
understand our contributions. Then, in Section 6.3, we define protection-impacting changes.
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Afterwards, we show an example in Section 6.4 and describe our experiments in Section
6.5. Then, we share and discuss our results in Section 6.6 and 6.7, respectively. We describe
related work in Section 6.8 and consider threats to validity in Section 6.9. We bring concluding
remarks in Section 6.10.
6.2 Background
6.2.1 Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis
Our research objectives revolve around privilege protection, especially definite privilege pro-
tection. Pattern-Traversal Flow Analysis (PTFA) [57, 61, 111], is a domain-specific model-
checking approach to determine privilege protection. PTFA verifies the property satisfaction
that a specific code pattern was definitely executed on all paths reaching a statement s.
Patterns are privilege verification checks for some privilege priv ∈ Privileges.
Protected PTFA states associated to a vertex w in the control flow graph (CFG) represent
the existence of a path from v0 to w in which the privilege priv has been granted. PTFA
states are represented as qi,j,k, where i is the corresponding CFG vertex identifier. The flags
j and k refer to the calling context’s and the intra-procedural protectedness, respectively.
PTFA models are generated automatically and statically from the application’s source code.
This generation is based on graph rewriting rules applied on the application’s CFG [111].
We illustrate the CFG into a PTFA model in Figure 6.1. Please note that, by convention,
the i index of PTFA states qi,j,k refers to the CFG vertex number. In this example, we show
the effect of grant and interprocedural edges in the CFG. Please note that we represented
unreachable states in grey in this figure to facilitate comprehension.
Definite privilege protection DefProt(w) refers to privileges verified on all interprocedural
paths prior to the execution of a statement (Equation 6.1). Without PTFA, it is difficult to
determine the definite privilege protection over large systems with a complex interprocedural
call graph. The predicate Prot(v, p, priv) represents the protectedness of v for privilege priv
on a path p from the initial vertex v0.
DefProt(w, priv) = ∀p (v0, . . . , w) | Prot(w, p, priv) ≡
6∃p′ (v0, . . . , w) | ¬Prot(w, p′, priv)
(6.1)
In contrast, PTFA indicates definite privilege protection thanks to state reachability. All
states present in the model are reachable from q0. For CFG vertex w, a protected state qw,j,1
exists only when there exists a protected path between v0 and w. And an unprotected qw,j,0
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0 – start
1 – if
2 3
4 – call begin
5 – call end
6 – end
7 – entry
8 – . . .
9 – exit
cb
grant
call
return
(a) Example CFG
q0
q1,0,0 q1,0,1 q1,1,0 q1,1,1
q2,0,0 q2,0,1 q2,1,0 q2,1,1
q3,0,0 q3,0,1 q3,1,0 q3,1,1
q4,0,0 q4,0,1 q4,1,0 q4,1,1
q5,0,0 q5,0,1 q5,1,0 q5,1,1
q6,0,0 q6,0,1 q6,1,0 q6,1,1
q7,0,0 q7,0,1 q7,1,0 q7,1,1
q8,0,0 q8,0,1 q8,1,0 q8,1,1
q9,0,0 q9,0,1 q9,1,0 q9,1,1
cb cb
grant
call
return
call
return
(b) Corresponding PTFA Model
Figure 6.1 Example CFG and Corresponding PTFA Model – Unreachable States Greyed Out
exists only when there exists an unprotected path between v0 and w. Thus, definite privilege
protection for w is determined by the existence of protected states corresponding to w and
the absence of unprotected states corresponding to w (Equation 6.2).
DefProt(w, priv) = ∃qw,j1,k1 ∈ QA | k1 = 1 ∧ @qw,j2,k2 ∈ QA | k2 = 0 (6.2)
6.2.2 Definite Protection Differences
A Definite Protection Difference (DPD) occurs when the definite privilege protection for a
statement s (which is common to versions Vera and Verb) differs between versions.
We consider that statement s is loss-affected for privilege priv, if it was priv protected in
Vera and is no longer priv protected in Verb (c.f. lossAffected in Equation 6.3). A similar
definition applies for gain-affected statements, whenever statement s was granted a priv
protection in Verb that was not there in Vera (c.f. gainAffected in Equation 6.4). Please note
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that statement s may be loss-affected with regards to privilege p1, but gain-affected with
regards to privilege p2.
lossAffected(priv) =
vb
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (va, vb) ∈ vertexMap ∧DefProt(va, priv) ∧ ¬DefProt(vb, priv)
 (6.3)
gainAffected(priv) =
vb
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (va, vb) ∈ vertexMap ∧¬DefProt(va, priv) ∧ DefProt(vb, priv)
 (6.4)
6.3 Method
Our long-term research objective is the identification of root causes for definite protection
differences, a non-trivial problem. Thus, we compute a superset of the root causes, which we
call protection-impacting changes. Gain-impacting changes are protection-impacting changes
that caused at least one statement to be gain-affected, while loss-impacting changes are
conversely defined (c.f. Section 6.2.2). These labels are not mutually exclusive, since some
code changes may belong to both kinds of definite protection differences (e.g. changing a
security check from privilege p1 to privilege p2.)
We define two criteria for protection-impacting changes in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. We then
define protection-impacting changes in Section 6.3.3 based on these two criteria.
6.3.1 Added and Deleted Edges
The first criterion for protection-impacting changes is that they correspond to added and
deleted edges in PTFA graphs.
We follow these steps to obtain added and deleted PTFA edges. First, we use line-level source
code differencing and heuristics to create vertexMap, a mapping between the CFG vertices of
the two versions. Using this mapping, we determine graph differences between PTFA models.
Graph differences include changed edges, which are important because definite protection is
a predicate over program paths, and thus over sequences of edges.
From this heuristic mapping at the CFG level, we compute the changes between PTFA
models as follows. Qa and Ta respectively are the set of states and the set of transitions
in the PTFA model for version Vera. Qb and Tb are similarly defined for the PTFA model
for Ver b. The predicate deletedState(qi,j,k) (Equation 6.5) is true whenever qi,j,k ∈ Vera has
no corresponding state in Ver b. Its converse, addedState (Equation 6.6), is true whenever
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qi,j,k ∈ Ver b has no corresponding state in Vera. The symbols dom and image correspond to
the function’s domain and image, respectively.
deletedEdges is the set of deleted edges in the PTFA model for Vera (Equation 6.7). It con-
tains all edges which either connect one or more deleted states or for which no corresponding
edge is present in the PTFA model for Ver b. Conversely, addedEdges is the set of added
edges in to PTFA model for Ver b (Equation 6.8). The function bMap is the reverse-function
of vertexMap.
deletedState(qi,j,k) .= i /∈ dom(vertexMap) ∨ qvertexMap(i),j,k /∈ Qb (6.5)
addedState(qi,j,k) .= i /∈ image(vertexMap) ∨ qvertexMap−1(i),j,k /∈ Qa (6.6)
deletedEdges
.=(qi1,j1,k1 , qi2,j2,k2) ∈ Ta
∣∣∣∣∣∣ deletedState(qi1,j1,k1) ∨ deletedState(qi2,j2,k2) ∨(qvertexMap(i1),j1,k1 , qvertexMap(i2),j2,k2) /∈ Tb
 (6.7)
addedEdges
.=( qi1,j1,k1 , qi2,j2,k2 ) ∈ Tb
∣∣∣∣∣∣ addedState(qi1,j1,k1) ∨ addedState(qi2,j2,k2) ∨( qbMap(i1),j1,k1 , qbMap(i2),j2,k2 ) /∈ Ta
 (6.8)
6.3.2 Appropriately Protected Paths
The second criterion for protection-impacting changes is that they belong to appropriately
protected paths to a definite protection difference. This means that the path connects to a
definite protection difference and that the path has the appropriate protection.
First, protection-impacting changes are related to a) changes in paths leading to security
sensitive operations and b) their traversal of security granting patterns, as computed by
PTFA.
Let us consider a definite protection difference affecting va and vb, where vb = vertexMap(va).
Protection-impacting changes must belong to paths having changed privilege protection
for va and vb and precede the execution of va and vb on these paths. In other words, a
protection-impacting change vPIC must belong to a path (v0, . . . , vPIC , . . . , va) in Vera or
(v0, . . . , vPIC , . . . , vb) in Ver b.
These paths may be entirely new paths in Ver b, entirely deleted paths in Vera or paths
modified between Vera and Ver b such that their protectedness differs.
Secondly, protection-impacting changes belong to appropriately protected paths to a definite
protection difference. This means that the protection-impacting changes will either belong
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to unprotected or protected paths in Vera and unprotected or protected paths in Ver b,
depending on whether the code is gain-affected or loss-affected.
Given CFG vertices va and vb, where vb = vertexMap(va), the following properties hold true
when they are loss-affected for privilege priv, based on the definition of definite protection.
First, va is definitely protected for priv, which means that all paths to va are priv-protected.
Second, vb is not definitely protected for priv, which means that either it is unreachable
(dead code) or there is at least one unprotected path for priv leading to it (Equation 6.9).
∀p (v0, . . . , va) | Prot(va, p, priv) ∧
(∃p′ (v0, . . . , vb) ,¬Prot(vb, p′, priv) ∨ @p′′ (v0, . . . , vb))
(6.9)
As we saw in Section 6.2.1, these universally and existentially quantified predicates correspond
to safety and liveness property verification in PTFA models. Equation 6.9 thus translates
to Equation 6.10. Please note that Reach is a predicate refers to forward-reachability in
the PTFA model. We define the posProtStateExists and negProtStateExists predicates in
Equation 6.11. For Equation 6.10 to hold true, we only need to consider the protected paths
to qa,j,1 and (if any) the unprotected paths to qb,j′,0. Thus, protection-impacting changes
must belong to these paths.
posProtStateExists(a) ∧ ¬negProtStateExists(a) ∧
(negProtStateExists(b) ∨ @j, k | ¬Reach(qb,j,k)) (6.10)
posProtStateExists(i) .= Reach(qi,0,1) ∨Reach(qi,1,1)
negProtStateExists(i) .= Reach(qi,0,0) ∨Reach(qi,1,0)
(6.11)
The situation is similar when dealing with gain-affected CFG vertices. First, va is not defi-
nitely protected for priv, which means that either it is unreachable (dead code) or there is at
least one unprotected path for priv leading to it. Second, vb is definitely protected for priv,
which means that all paths to vb are priv-protected (Equation 6.12).
∀p (v0, . . . , vb) | Prot(vb, p, priv) ∧
(∃p′ (v0, . . . , va) | ¬Prot(va, priv) ∨ @p′′ (v0, . . . , va))
(6.12)
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Equation 6.12 thus translates to Equation 6.13. For Equation 6.13 to hold true, we only need
to consider the protected paths to qb,j,1 and (if any) the unprotected paths to qa,j′,0. Thus,
protection-impacting changes must belong to these paths.
posProtStateExists(b) ∧ ¬negProtStateExists(b) ∧
(negProtStateExists(a) ∨ @j, k | ¬Reach(qa,j,k))
(6.13)
6.3.3 Definition of Protection-Impacting Changes
As we mentioned earlier, protection-impacting changes are code changes which belong to an
appropriately protected path leading to a definite protection difference. Thus, the definition
of protection-impacting changes varies between gain-affected and loss-affected code.
For loss-affected code, the protection-impacting changes PICloss are the deleted edges belong-
ing to positively-protected paths to va and the added edges belonging to negatively-protected
paths to vb (Equation 6.16). This definition depends on posProtEdges (Equation 6.14) and
negProtEdges (Equation 6.15), which return the set of edges belonging to paths between q0
and, respectively, protected and unprotected states. Please note that ReachEdges(qi,j,k) is a
function returning all edges between the initial state q0 and qi,j,k.
posProtEdges(i) .= ⋃
j∈{0,1}
ReachEdges(qi,j,1) (6.14)
negProtEdges(i) .= ⋃
j∈{0,1}
ReachEdges(qi,j,0) (6.15)
posProtDel
.= deletedEdges ∩ posProtEdges(va)
negProtAdd
.= addedEdges ∩ negProtEdges(vb)
PICloss
.= (posProtDel , negProtAdd)
(6.16)
Similarly, for gain-affected code, protection-impacting changes PICgain are the deleted edges
belonging to negatively-protected paths to va (negProtDel) and the added edges belonging
to positively-protected paths to vb (posProtAdd) (Equation 6.17).
negProtDel
.= deletedEdges ∩ negProtEdges(va)
posProtAdd
.= addedEdges ∩ posProtEdges(vb)
PICgain
.= (negProtDel , posProtAdd)
(6.17)
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6.4 Example
We now provide a ficticious example of definite protection differences caused by a code change
in Figure 6.2. Please note that we combined the CFGs of Vera and Verb, as well as their
PTFA models, due to space constraints.
The code change (Figure 6.2a) adds a call to function foo() from an unsecured context.
Previously, foo() was exclusively called from protected contexts. Following that change, the
code in foo() (vertices 5 to 7) becomes loss-affected.
The CFGs (Figure 6.2b) are combined and we show differences using colour and dashed edges.
In order to avoid confusion, and contrary to the representation in Figure 6.1, we represented
all other edges solid. The blue dashed edge is a deleted edge from Vera. We use green for
added vertices and edges Verb. Counterintuively, adding code caused a deleted edge, since
the control flow no longer flows directly from vertex 0 to 1.
The PTFA models (Figure 6.2c) are similarly combined and coloured. We greyed out un-
reachable states. We also marked all protection-impacting edges with “PIC”.
Please note that not all added and deleted edges in our example are protection-impacting.
For instance, the added edge (q9,0,0 , q1,0,0) is not protection-impacting, since it does not
belong to an appropriately protected path to vertices 5 to 7.
1 + foo();
2 if (! current_user_can(’p’))
3 die();
4 foo()
(a) Code Change. Added Code Shown with
‘+’.
0 - Start
8 - CB
9 - CE
1 - if
2 - CB
3 - CE
4 - End
5 - Entry
6 - ...
7 - Exit
grant
cb
cb
call
call
return
return
(b) Corresponding
CFGs. Added Ver-
tices and Edges in
Green. Deleted
Edge in Blue.
q0
q 8,0,0
q 9,0,0
q 1,0,0
q 2,0,0
q 3,0,0
q 4,0,0
q 8,0,1
q 9,0,1
q 1,0,1
q 2,0,1
q 3,0,1
q 4,0,1
q 8,1,0
q 9,1,0
q 1,1,0
q 2,1,0
q 3,1,0
q 4,1,0
q 8,1,1
q 9,0,1
q 1,1,1
q 2,1,1
q 3,1,1
q 4,1,1
cb
cb
q 5,0,0
q 6,0,0
q 7,0,0
q 5,0,1
q 6,0,1
q 7,0,1
q 5,1,0
q 6,1,0
q 7,1,0
q 5,1,1
q 6,1,1
q 7,1,1
call
return
call
return
PIC
PICPIC
PIC
PIC
(c) Corresponding PTFA
Models. Added Vertices and
Edges in Green. Deleted
Edge in Blue.
Figure 6.2 Example Code, CFG and PTFA Model
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6.5 Experiment Design
Having defined protection-impacting changes, we now describe our research question and
experiments.
Our research question is the following:
  RQ Is the size of protection-impacting changes smaller than the set of code changes?
Our goal is to quantify the amount and proportion of code changes that are protection-
impacting in real systems.
This research question relates to our research goal to focus developers’ attention during re-
validation. This is achieved when the set of protection-impacting changes is a proper subset
of code changes.
6.5.1 Approach
To determine if protection-impacting changes are smaller than code changes in real software
projects, we conduct a survey [156] of one open source project, WordPress. In this survey,
we determine code changes and protection-impacting changes between major releases, as
detailed in Subsection 6.5.2.
We chose this application because it is a widely-used software system which uses RBAC and
has a long release history. WordPress is a popular web-based content management system
implemented in PHP. Our study encompasses all releases of WordPress available as of March
2017 and which used RBAC – 2.0 to 4.7.3. This application’s PHP code, in physical lines of
code (LOC), ranges from roughly 35 KLOC in release 2.0 to 340 KLOC in release 4.7.3. For
the same releases, the combined HTML, JavaScript and CSS code amounted to roughly 13
KLOC and 179 KLOC, respectively.
Our process consists of a PHP front-end, a PTFA engine, a DPD classifier and a protection-
impacting change analyzer. The PHP front-end feeds CFGs to the PTFA engine, which then
generates PTFA models. The DPD classifier determines definite protection differences using
code differences and definite privilege protection. Finally, the protection-impacting change
analyzer uses the DPD data, code differences and PTFA models to determine protection-
impacting changes.
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6.5.2 Data Collection and Processing
Our approach relies on comparing pairs of versions, and we must choose which versions. As
an initial experiment, we choose to analyze official final releases (i.e. non-alpha, non-beta,
non-release candidate versions). A finer-grained (e.g. commit-level) analysis is possible,
which we discuss in Section 6.7. Since these are the versions that end-users normally deploy,
we analyze the official release archives [188]. These archives are bundled with files that are
not present in the repository. Additionally, we expect that these releases will be better tested
and reviewed than intermediary versions.
Because WordPress developers maintain and apply security fixes to multiple releases in par-
allel, we cannot consider releases sequentially. We compared release pairs according to their
semantic versioning [149] and release date information. We organize release pairs in a tree.
The edges of that tree are release pairs, which are the releases we compare. This is the same
approach we used in our earlier studies [101, 103].
6.5.3 Measures
In our survey, we record release pairs affected by definite protection differences. For those
that are, we measure protection-impacting changes.
In the presented experiments, the independent variables are the program we analyze, which
of its versions we analyze, and the software running the experiment. The dependent variables
are code differences and protection-impacting changes.
Please note that we have no access to an oracle that classifies definite protection differences
(e.g. classifying as beneficial, harmful or irrelevant.) Consequently, we report protection-
impacting change metrics for all definite protection differences. We discuss oracles in more
detail in Section 6.7.
We chose to report our metrics at line granularity, because measures in terms of lines of
code are the de-facto standard in the industry. This is evidenced by popular differencing and
version control tools (e.g. diff and git), which report code changes at a line granularity
by default. In the experiments, we project the PTFA edges to lines of code while taking line
change information in consideration.
Respectively, PICloss,lines and PICgain,lines are the projection of PICloss and PICgain to a set
of lines. We define PIC (Equation 6.18) as the union of both these projections. Additionally,
we combined the PIC’s elements into the metric allPIC (Equation 6.19). To simplify the
75
equations below, we use the projection function pii to extract the ith element of the pair
x = (Vera,Verb).
PIC =
(
pi1(PICloss,lines) ∪ pi1(PICgain,lines) , pi2(PICloss,lines) ∪ pi2(PICgain,lines)
)
(6.18)
allPIC = |pi1(PIC)| + |pi2(PIC)| (6.19)
The relative size of protection-impacting changes per release pair is the ratio between the
total protection-impacting lines and the total modified lines of code (Equation 6.20). In the
equations below, delLines and addLines, respectively are the number of lines deleted from
Vera and added to Verb.
We define security-affected, loss-affected and gain-affected release pairs. Release pairs with
definite protection differences are security-affected. Gain-affected and loss-affected release
pairs have gain-affected and loss-affected code, respectively.
relPICloss =
( |pi1(PICloss,lines)|
delLines
,
|pi2(PICloss,lines)|
addLines
)
relPICgain =
( |pi1(PICgain,lines)|
delLines
,
|pi2(PICgain,lines)|
addLines
)
relPIC =
( |pi1(PIC)|
delLines
, |pi2(PIC)|
addLines
)
relAllPIC = |pi1(PIC)| + |pi2(PIC)|
delLines + addLines
(6.20)
6.6 Experimental Results
We implemented our processing workflow using Java. We used a system powered by an
i7950@3.07GHz CPU. We configured the Oracle Java VM version 1.8.0_66 to use up to 8Gb
of RAM. To compute delLines and addLines, we used diff from GNU diffutils 3.3 and
diffstat 1.61.
In order to answer “RQ Is the size of protection-impacting changes smaller than the set of code
changes?”, we computed protection-impacting changes for 210 release pairs of WordPress.
For all release pairs of WordPress, our analysis completed in 27.5 hours, an average of 7.80
minutes per release pair. We have 85 gain-affected release pairs and 46 loss-affected release
pairs. Combined, this represents 87 release pairs affected by definite protection differences.
We found 258997 protection-impacting LOC (allPIC) globally.
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We present summary statistics of protection-impacting changes per release pair in Table 6.1.
We report the measures that we detailed in Section 6.5.3. We report two distributions: the
distribution for all security-affected release pairs and the distribution for all release pairs.
We present the latter distribution, because it gives a picture of protection-impacting changes
over the lifetime of the project.
We turn our attention to the statistics of allPIC and relAllPIC for security-affected pairs in
Table 6.1. On average, security-affected release pairs had 2976.98 LOC (26.28%) protection-
impacting lines of code. The median value is different from the mean, with 47.00 LOC
(27.41%) protection-impacting changes. This difference is due to outliers, which we discuss
below.
If we separate the PIC results according to code deleted (Vera) and added (Verb), we ob-
tain the respective medians 14.00 and 34.00 LOC. In relative terms (relPIC), these terms
represent 31.58% and 24.00% of their respective code changes. The mean code changes are
974.41 LOC (30.76%) and 2002.56 LOC (25.07%) for Vera and Verb, respectively. In other
words, deleted code is more likely to be protection-impacting than added code.
Over all release pairs in our survey, protection-impacting changes are an even smaller per-
centage of code changes. The median is not significant, since most release pairs have no
definite protection differences, and therefore no protection-impacting changes. However, the
mean protection-impacting changes represents 10.89% of code changes.
We show the histogram of protection-impacting changes per release pair for security-affected
release pairs in Figure 6.3. In this histogram, we report protection-impacting changes for
gains (PICgain), losses (PICloss), their combined measure (PIC) and the combined metric
allPIC. Please note that protection-impacting changes may be both gain-impacting and
loss-impacting. We used a non-linear X axis, with bins of different widths, in order to better
represent the distribution.
In Figure 6.3, we observe that, among security-affected release pairs, 50/87 (57%) release pairs
have less than 100 lines of code classified as protection-impacting changes. We also observe
that 61/87 (70%) security-affected release pairs have less than 500 protection-impacting lines
of code. Only 26/87 (30%) release pairs have 500 or more lines of protection-impacting
changes. The distribution is long-tailed in reality. We observe outliers on the right-hand side
of the distribution. We found 8/87 (9%) release pairs for which allPIC > 10, 000. All these
release pairs have a minor or major release number (i.e. a .0 release) for Verb. The volume
of code changes for these releases is very high, with a mean of over 31 KLOC and 16 KLOC
added and deleted lines, respectively. Thus, the relative proportion of protection-impacting
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Table 6.1 Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair
Measure 1st quarter Median Mean 3rd quarter
Security-Affected Release Pairs (87 / 210)
PICloss,lines (Vera) (LOC) 0.00 2.00 773.20 1065.50
relPICloss (Vera) 0.00% 4.66% 10.86% 15.56%
PICloss,lines (Verb) (LOC) 0.00 2.00 1624.29 1820.50
relPICloss (Verb) 0.00% 3.24% 10.46% 17.64%
PICgain,lines (Vera) (LOC) 6.00 14.00 744.53 677.50
relPICgain (Vera) 9.09% 20.32% 27.48% 37.50%
PICgain,lines (Verb) (LOC) 14.50 34.00 1662.40 1492.50
relPICgain (Verb) 10.66% 22.19% 22.88% 31.73%
PIC (Vera) (LOC) 6.00 14.00 974.41 1188.50
relPIC (Vera) 10.82% 31.58% 30.76% 42.12%
PIC (Verb) (LOC) 14.50 34.00 2002.56 2447.50
relPIC (Verb) 11.95% 24.00% 25.07% 34.49%
allPIC (LOC) 23.00 47.00 2976.98 4026.50
relAllPIC 12.74% 27.41% 26.28% 36.07%
deleted (LOC) 24.00 109.00 3060.62 4117.50
added (LOC) 75.00 341.00 6446.60 9770.00
Measure 1st quarter Median Mean 3rd quarter
All Release Pairs (210)
PICloss,lines (Vera) (LOC) 0.00 0.00 320.32 0.00
relPICloss (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 4.50% 0.00%
PICloss,lines (Verb) (LOC) 0.00 0.00 672.92 0.00
relPICloss (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 4.33% 0.00%
PICgain,lines (Vera) (LOC) 0.00 0.00 308.45 9.00
relPICgain (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 11.38% 16.40%
PICgain,lines (Verb) (LOC) 0.00 0.00 688.71 24.00
relPICgain (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 9.48% 16.54%
PIC (Vera) (LOC) 0.00 0.00 403.69 10.50
relPIC (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 12.74% 18.41%
PIC (Verb) (LOC) 0.00 0.00 829.63 24.00
relPIC (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 10.39% 19.51%
allPIC (LOC) 0.00 0.00 1233.32 38.00
relAllPIC 0.00% 0.00% 10.89% 22.57%
deleted (LOC) 15.00 42.00 1338.00 182.50
added (LOC) 38.00 117.50 2841.61 482.25
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change in these release pairs is not very high, with a mean relAllPIC = 38.75%. This
situation explains the gap between the medians and means in Table 6.1.
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Figure 6.3 Distribution of Protection-Impacting Lines of Code per Release Pair for security-
affected Release Pairs
In Figure 6.4, we present an histogram of the relative distributions relPICloss, relPICgain,
relPIC and relAllPIC. We first observe the large spike at zero in the distribution of
relPICloss. In part, this is because 46 release pairs have no loss-affected code in the first
place The relative combined measure (relAllPIC) is somewhat skewed towards the left.
Among security-affected release pairs, 16/87 (18%) release pairs, have less than 10% of
changed lines of code classified as protection-impacting changes. Additionally, 42/87 (48%)
security-affected release pairs have less than 25% of changed lines of code considered as
protection-impacting. We also see that the distribution has 8/87 (9%) security-affected re-
lease pairs above 50%. Thus, protection-impacting changes are generally very small compared
to the total number of code changes between versions. Two distributions appear long tailed,
relPICgain and relPIC for Vera. These occur for release pairs with a small number of
changes (<100 LOC) and appear to be very targeted.
As we mentioned earlier, the difference in shape between Figures 6.3 and 6.4 is explained
by the large volume of changes. For instance, the releases which have over 5000 protection-
impacting changes (allPIC > 5000) show a large amount of code changes. In these release
pairs, the largest measure of relAllPIC is 54%.
The median of relAllPIC is very encouraging. We further discuss this result in Section 6.7.
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Figure 6.4 Distribution of Protection-Impacting Lines of Code per Release Pair for security-
affected Release Pairs
6.7 Discussion
When definite protection differences are detected, developers can focus their review efforts
on protection-impacting changes. Since, on average, in security-affected release pairs, only
about 26% of code changes are protection-impacting. Our approach gives an opportunity to
reduce review efforts, though further research is needed to investigate and confirm this.
Asking our research question “Is the size of protection-impacting changes smaller than the
set of code changes?”, we found that 10.89% of code changes were protection-impacting.
Static analysis tools should reduce the amount of information to review [137]. For security-
affected releases, although the mean is large (2002.56 LOC), the median of protection-
impacting changes appear small (34.00 LOC).
While our approach does not require one, it may benefit from an oracle that classifies def-
inite protection differences. Using an oracle that classifies differences as beneficial, harmful
or irrelevant, our approach could compute protection-impacting changes only for harmful
security changes. Otherwise, we could report on how many code changes affected security,
and on the distribution of protection-impacting changes populations.
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Suitable oracles include formal security specifications, a classification of security-affected
lines by developers, or a vulnerability oracle. Thus, when used alongside formal methods,
our method pinpoints which code changes are likely to have caused policy violations.
To review our results, we randomly sampled 108 definite protection difference from our survey
results. We considered all 97 privileges and 210 release pairs. Manual assessment of these
sampled definite protection differences revealed that 81/108 of them were real code changes
(75%). The remaining 27/108 (25%) cases are due to infeasible paths.
Our approach could be used as an early warning system for security issues, since it can be
used between any two versions of the application. For instance, developers could use it after
each commit. Or they could integrate our approach in automated build systems and treat
definite protection differences as regressions.
Furthermore, we envision adding our approach to integrated development environments
(IDE), which would allow developers to determine definite protection differences and protec-
tion-impacting changes interactively. On-demand analysis may also accelerate the assessment
of vulnerability reports and the creation of security patches. For instance, a developer receiv-
ing a vulnerability report may quickly obtain protection-impacting changes for the vulnerable
code segment. Then, she may determine which code changes are responsible for the vulner-
ability and which correction is needed.
Our approach may be suited for test selection. Ideally, when testing the RBAC implementa-
tion for regressions, one would only run the tests executing protection-impacting changes.
Although our results are promising, further research towards identifying root causes is desir-
able. Fine-grained (e.g. commit-level) surveys of protection-impacting changes should also
be performed. Human studies are also needed to confirm the psychological acceptability of
our results.
6.8 Related Work
Other researchers used PTFA for evolution studies of RBAC systems. Letarte et al. [112]
surveyed privilege protection over 31 phpBB releases, which only handled a binary distinction
between administrator and unprivileged users. In our study, we detect protection-impacting
changes, handle a richer protection scheme and performed a larger survey.
We previously performed surveys of definite protection difference over WordPress. We defined
definite protection differences in a first study [101], and produced counter-examples for loss-
affected code. In this article, we defined and detected protection-impacting changes. We
also proposed a classification of definite protection differences [103]. In contrast, this paper
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focuses on the identification of a superset of the root causes of definite protection differences
and is not aimed at the classification and distribution of these differences.
Other researchers used formal methods and static analysis tools to analyze RBAC in ap-
plications. Margrave [55] is a tool leveraging formal methods to support access control
evolution. It translates XACML to decision diagrams and differences the policies. However,
Margrave does not take the implementation of the RBAC policy in consideration.
Other approaches use formal static analysis methods for RBAC systems. One system, Role-
Cast [167], automatically detects privilege protection checks in PHP and JSP applications.
RoleCast uses inferences to identify critical variables controlling the reachability of security
sensitive statements, infers roles and determines if checks are performed consistently. When
reporting a potential vulnerability, RoleCast mentions many details, including the security
sensitive statement, its calling context, which security variables are erroneously verified. Our
contribution is very different as we rely on graph reachability and code differences to connect
definite protection differences to their potential causes.
An extension tool, Fix Me Up [168], statically finds access-control errors of omission and
proposes candidate repairs. The approach generates an access control template, detects
deviations from this template and changes them to conform. Their algorithm relies on slicing,
a more complex algorithm than ours, and does not detect definite protection differences.
RBAC policy evolution is also useful to perform test selection [81]. This approach relies
on semantic differencing of XACML policies and requires running the full test suite at least
once. Another study [108] used testing to detect hidden and implicit security mechanisms. In
comparison, our approach is static and identifies potential root causes for protection changes.
Model checking is also useful to identify candidate causes of errors. Ball et al. [20] proposed
an method which identifies transitions in an error trace that are in no correct trace and in-
jects halt statements to produce additional error traces. Groce et al. [66] expressed counter-
example generation as a minimization problem whose distance metric considers causal de-
pendence. While we have in common the use of model checking, these approaches do not
address privilege protection.
Bugginings [166] identifies the cause of a bug in the context of software evolution by
differencing dependence graphs. In contrast, our approach targets only definite protection
differences. We also determine differences at the PTFA level and rely on reachability in
PTFA models.
82
6.9 Threats to Validity
Threats to internal validity refer to confounding variables that may influence our results.
Our results depend on the accuracy of the PTFA engine we used. Because PHP applications
like WordPress rely on many dynamic features, the engine relies on sound but conservative
approximations, especially for dynamic calls in the call graph, that may lead to spurious
paths. In turn, spurious paths may lead to the identification of spurious protection-impacting
changes. Consequently, the real set of protection-impacting changes may be smaller than
reported. We did not calculate the spurious path rate in this study, but we previously
reported a spurious path rate for PTFA on WordPress of 10.96 ± 3.18% (95% confidence
level) [101].
Our results also depend on the differencing algorithm we used. We extracted line-level
differences between releases using GNU diff. Since there may be many CFG vertices on
the same line of code, we over-estimate the changed CFG vertices. However, this should
only affect our results minimally, since we present our results at a line granularity. Other
differencing algorithm such as those supplied by versioning systems could also be used and
may produce slightly different results.
Because we are lacking a formal oracle, the precision and recall of our experiments is unknown.
Although our informal evaluation of 108 samples is promising, a formal statistical analysis
should be performed on a larger sample to assess its significance. Future research should also
include a robust evaluation to determine the precision and recall of our approach. This may
be achieved with a test bench containing known protection-impacting changes – for instance
by mutating privilege checks in representative applications.
Threats to external validity relate to the generalizability of our results. We did not have
a vulnerability oracle for our study, though our approach may use one. Consequently, we
cannot determine a specific distribution of protection-impacting changes for vulnerabilities.
To counter this issue, studies using a vulnerability oracle (e.g. a testbench with known
vulnerabilities) should be performed.
Another threat to generalizability is that our study surveys a single open source content
management system implemented in PHP. We may obtain different results when studying
other systems, whether they are written in PHP or other languages. In the experiments, we
used a PHP front-end for WordPress. However, approach itself is reproducible and language-
independent. To avoid that our conclusions depend on the change history of this single
system, studies that include other systems should be performed.
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6.10 Conclusion and Future Work
In order to focus developers’ efforts during re-evaluation of RBAC-enabled applications ap-
plications, we proposed a method to detect privilege-protection changes.
We presented a novel language-independent algorithm to automatically identify protection-
impacting changes. This algorithm relies on identifying added and deleted edges between
two PTFA models. This information is combined with interprocedural graph reachability
information to obtain protection-impacting changes.
We also reported a survey on the prevalence of protection-impacting changes during the
evolution of a Web application. We examined 210 release pairs of WordPress and determined
that only 87/210 (41%) of them contained protection-impacting changes, while the other
releases contain changes that do not affect privilege protection.
For security-affected release pairs, RBAC protection-impacting changes that may have caused
the observed definite protection differences represent a median of 47.00 lines of code (27.41%
of total changes). Over all releases, this represents an average of 1233.32 lines of code
per release pair (10.89% of changed code). In other words, over WordPress’ evolution, the
proposed method reduces the number of changed source code lines to review by about 89%.




RQ Is the size of protection-impacting changes smaller than the set of code changes?
Using protection-impacting changes, developers would only validate a median of
27.41% and a mean of 26.28% of code changes in security-affected release pairs.
Our research question was “Is the size of protection-impacting changes smaller than the set
of code changes?” Results allow to answer affirmatively. The identification of protection-
impacting changes reduces lines of code to review by 89% on average for all release pairs, or
74% for security-affected release pairs.
According to our manual evaluation of 108 results, these protection-impacting changes are
true positives and really affect privilege protection in 75% of cases. The remaining cases
represent infeasible paths.
Our promising results hint that our approach is well poised to save considerable effort during
security re-validation. Since more than a half of the release pairs have no protection-impacting
changes, developers may focus their security verification towards security impacted releases.
Developers would need to review security-affected releases. While definite privilege protection
information may help in this task, a reduction of candidate root causes is likely to reduce the
required effort. In these releases, the median protection-impacting changes represent about
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27% of total changes. Thus, when re-validating the RBAC security of their applications,
developers need not investigate 73% of code changes, because these changes have no impact
on protection differences.
Future research includes the investigation of the distribution of protection-impacting changes
corresponding to vulnerabilities, whenever a security oracle is available. This evaluation
would allow us to quantify how many protection-impacting changes caused or fixed vulnera-
bilities.
Further research could also be devoted to investigating the interaction with developers and the
visualization of protection-impacting changes. An approach about determining explanatory
counter-examples [101] could also be used, combined with visualization techniques to supply
information to developers.
As mentioned earlier, further research may include the assessment of the real impact of the
proposed techniques to application security verification and validation in collaboration with
real human developers. Such studies would measure the developers validation effort during
an application evolution and assess the advantages of the proposed approach.
Finally, we would also like to extend the proposed analysis to other systems and to other
programming languages.
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CHAPTER 7 ARTICLE 4: RBAC PROTECTION-IMPACTING CHANGES
: A CASE STUDY OF PHP APPLICATION EVOLUTION
Marc-André Laverdière and Ettore Merlo
Submitted to IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering. Minor corrections added.
Abstract
Web applications often use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to restrict operations and
protect security sensitive information and resources. Web applications’ RBAC security may
be affected by source code changes between releases. Developers should re-validate their
application prior to release, which may become resource-intensive. We define protection-
impacting changes (PIC), changed statements during evolution that potentially alter privilege
protection. Our automated and static PIC identification relies on graph reachability and
differencing of two versions’ protection models. We surveyed two PHP web applications,
WordPress and MediaWiki. We found PICs in only respectively 87/210 (41%) and 42/192
(22%) release pairs. For these release pairs, median PICs are 27.41% and 13.85% of the code
changes. Over all release pairs, these applications respectively have 90.89% and 97.38% of
source code changes are not protection-impacting. We also propose a method identifying
source code changes containing root causes of definite protection differences. By reverting
these changes, we found that all root causes of protection differences for a release pair were
conservatively identified in 87% to 93% of examined pairs. This method reduces the amount of
candidate causes of protection differences that developers need to investigate. PICs could help
developers re-validate application security, identify causes of security changes, and perform
repairs.
Index Terms
F.3.2.f Program analysis, D.4.6 Security and Privacy Protection, D.4.6.a Access controls,
D.4.6.g Verification, K.4.4.f Security, K.4.4.g Internet security policies
7.1 Introduction
We routinely interact with web applications. They are now entrusted with sensitive data
and operations and must comply with legal and organizational security requirements. Web
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applications are expected to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability. These security
expectations are summarized in industry standards, such as the OWASP Application Security
Verification Standard 3.0, whose purpose is “to define what a secure application is.” [144].
This standard covers access control among other security topics.
“Access control is the mechanism by which services know whether to honor or deny requests.”
[91] In other words, access control enforces the web application’s access control policy. This
policy specifies which users may execute specific operations and access resources. Resources
are defined in an application-specific manner. By implication, access control determines
which users may execute specific code. We illustrate these concepts with an example
Let us consider an imaginary e-commerce application’s access control policy. The user cat-
egories are customers, customer service representatives and order fulfillment staff. The re-
sources are customer orders and the information on these orders (e.g. order number, shipping
information, billing information, items and prices). Customers are allowed to view their own
orders. They may also cancel and modify unshipped orders. Customer service representatives
are allowed to view any order. They can also cancel and modify any unshipped orders. The
policy also states that order fulfillment staff are allowed to view a subset of the order (order
number, shipping information and items) and update the shipping information.
Web applications may suffer from vulnerabilities, which are defined as “a flaw or weakness in
a system’s design, implementation, or operation and management that could be exploited to
violate the system’s security policy” [165]. Therefore, an access control vulnerability allows
the violation of the access control policy.
Let us consider three access control vulnerabilities in our example. First, the application is
vulnerable if a customer service agent updates the shipping status. Second, the application
is vulnerable if a customer is able to view other users’ orders. Finally, the application is
vulnerable if an order fulfillment employee views a customer’s billing information.
Role-based access control (RBAC) is commonly used for access control. RBAC is an authenti-
cation-based access control [91]. In RBAC, developers assign privileges to one or more roles as
necessary. In the systems we analyzed, developers insert privilege checks across the code base
according to the application’s security needs. In order to prevent RBAC vulnerabilities,
software development processes need to integrate RBAC implementation Verification and
Validation (V&V) to their quality assurance practices. To ensure that their code changes only
have a planned and desirable impact on security, maintainers may use testing [13, 53, 126],
reviews [126, 148] and formal methods [152].
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Notable security testing techniques are security regression testing [53] and penetration testing
[13, 126] techniques. In general, security testing is known to be hard because vulnerabilities
are typically hard to expect side-effect behavior [172]. Because it may be difficult to create
RBAC policy tests, developers may consider generating them from functional tests [135].
Security reviews [126] and inspections [148] typically include code reviews and architectural
analysis. Inspections additionally investigate that requirements and security goals are met.
Reviews are resource intensive and do not find all vulnerabilities. For instance, a study by
Edmunston et al. found that 15 developers have about a 95% chance of finding all known
vulnerabilities in a PHP web application [49].
The goal of formal and semi-formal validation methods is to ensure that changes comply
with the security policy [152]. Because specifying access control policies is time-consuming,
developers may consider inferring or extracting policies from code. For instance, it is possible
to generate Secure UML policy models from PHP source code [7, 59].
All these verification and validation approaches require developers’ effort and are typically
time consuming. Additionally, developers should use multiple V&V approaches for better
results [18].
Like other kinds of software, web applications undergo maintenance and evolution. Software
maintenance can be corrective, adaptive, perfective and preventive [83]. Corrective and
adaptive maintenance require an effort of about 30-50% [46, 109]. Maintenance activities
oriented towards security [38] are included in the remaining 50-70% of effort.
Non-security maintenance activities include bug-fixing, refactoring, design changes, and chang-
ing the functionality of the application. They may unintentionally introduce security flaws
[97]. These unintended security impacts may be in different and seemingly unrelated parts
of the application. This occurs because of added, removed or modified execution paths.
Security maintenance activities include vulnerability correction, malicious changes from insid-
ers [34] and modifying security checks to conform to the RBAC policy. To do so, developers
may add, move and remove privilege checks. Security-oriented maintenance also includes
RBAC policy changes, involving adding, removing and renaming roles and privileges. These
changes may be linked to new features added, but sometimes reflect a reorganization of the
application’s high-level security policy. These activities intentionally change the security
protection of different parts of a system.
Vulnerability correction may occur proactively or reactively. Proactive vulnerability fixing
occurs when developers and security experts purposefully examine the application to find
vulnerabilities and then fix them. This activity should ideally occur before releases. Reactive
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vulnerability fixing happens in response to an external (i.e. third-party) discovery of a
vulnerability. This often occurs after release and often warrants an emergency fix.
We show a vulnerability patch for WordPress in Figure 7.1. This patch is represented in the
Unified Diff format, which is the default differencing output format in git. In this format, a
line added is shown with ‘+’ in the left margin. This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2008-0664
by adding one security check and error handling. That correction, in lines 3 to 5, ensures
that the user has the edit_page privilege in order to edit a page.
1 //...
2 if (! empty($content_struct["post_type"]) && ($content_struct["
post_type"] == "page")){
3 + if( !current_user_can( ’edit_page ’, $post_ID ) ) {
4 + return(new IXR_Error (401, __("Sorry , you do not have the right
to edit this page.")));
5 + }
6 +
7 $post_type = "page";
8 }
9 //...
Figure 7.1 Reformatted Vulnerability Correction by Adding Privilege Checks. ’+’ Represents
Added Code (CVE-2008-0664).
Another form of security maintenance is modifying the set of statements protected by a
privilege. For instance, a piece of code checks for the right privilege, but this check is
improperly located. We show an example in Figure 7.2, which is an excerpt of the fix for
vulnerability CVE-2008-0664. We also represent the patch in Unified Diff format, with lines
added annotated with ‘+’ in the left margin, and lines removed similarly annotated with ‘-’.
Maintainers sometimes abandon, rename, split and merge privileges. An abandoned privilege
is a privilege that still exists for backwards compatibility, but which does nothing1. A privilege
rename is an operation whereby the name of a privilege is changed to another name, but
the parts of the code it protects is identical2. A privilege split is an operation whereby the
code protected by a privilege is divided in two or more sets, which are protected by two or
more privileges 3. A privilege merge is the reverse of a split. The code protected by two or
1Examples of abandoned privileges are edit_files in WordPress [187] and emailconfirmed in MediaWiki
[185].
2An example of privilege rename in MediaWiki is the renaming of hiderevision to suppressrevision
[185].
3An example of privilege split in Mediawiki is the split of editusercssjs into editusercss and
edituserjs in [185].
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1 + $publish = ! ( isset( $entry ->draft ) && ’yes’ == trim( $entry ->
draft ) );
2 + $cap = ($publish) ? ’publish_posts ’ : ’edit_posts ’;
3 + if ( !current_user_can($cap) )
4 + $this ->auth_required(__(’Sorry , you do not have the right to edit
/publish new posts.’));
5 $catnames = array ();
6 if ( !empty( $entry ->categories ) ) {
7 foreach ( $entry ->categories as $cat ) {
8 //...
9 array_push($post_category , $cat ->term_id);
10 }
11
12 - $publish = ! ( isset( $entry ->draft ) && ’yes’ == trim( $entry ->
draft ) );
13 - $cap = ($publish) ? ’publish_posts ’ : ’edit_posts ’;
14 - if ( !current_user_can($cap) )
15 - $this ->auth_required(__(’Sorry , you do not have the right to edit
/publish new posts.’));
Figure 7.2 Excerpt of Vulnerability Correction by Moving Privilege Check. ’+’ and ’-’ Rep-
resents Added and Deleted Code, Respectively (CVE-2012-4421)
more privileges become protected by a single privilege. This latter privilege may be one of
the merged privileges or a new one4.
Because RBAC security issues are hard to reason about, developers should ideally verify and
validate that each change is free from security regressions throughout the project’s evolution
(e.g. after each commit). This would enable rapid correction, as well as avoiding complicated
regressions due to the combined effect of many changes.
A frequent re-verification of the whole application would be very effort-intensive. Even if in-
dividual changes alter a small part of the application, “software modified during maintenance
should be subjected to the same review as newly developed software.” [97]. However, it is
possible to identify parts of the program which do not require a full review based on security
property analyses (e.g. RBAC test selection [76, 81]). Such analyses should be conservative
– meaning that they may incorrectly identify security issues, but they are guaranteed to find
all security issues they were designed for.
As developers more and more opt for frequent and quick release cycles, the overhead of
regular reviews may become a major hurdle.
The potential overhead of regular security reviews warrants additional tool support for se-
curity properties. Thus, we propose an automated static analysis over privilege protection.
4An example of privilege merge in WordPress is the merge of edit_files into import [30].
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This analysis automatically partitions changed lines of code as protection-impacting or non-
protection-impacting. This is intended to soundly reduce the amount of changes that de-
velopers must assess before a release. Our approach is motivated by the successes of static
analysis tools in lowering effort for securing software (e.g. MOPS [39], PQL [124], Bek [72]).
For instance, a study of three industrial C++ projects estimated cost reduction of 17% for
reported security bugs using the Coverity Prevent static analysis tool [19].
Our analysis automatically detects Definite Protection Differences (DPD) and Protection-
Impacting Changes (PIC). DPDs are changes to CFG vertices’ definite privilege protection.
PICs are the set of those code changes that are responsible for DPDs and that contain some
root causes of definite protection differences.
Our main contributions are: (i) a method to automatically identify protection-impacting
changes during software evolution; (ii) a longitudinal survey of the prevalence of protection-
impacting changes over 210 release pairs of WordPress, and 192 release pairs of Mediawiki,
two popular PHP web-based content management systems; (iii) a longitudinal survey of DPD
root causes whose code changes belong to paths in WordPress and MediaWiki.
We show that protection-impacting changes can be identified and are a small proportion of
the total number of changes in a release. Our method reduces the pool of candidate causes of
security changes that need to be investigated. We show that PICs conservatively represented
all root causes of protection differences for 87% to 93% of release pairs. Thus, we think
that our approach could help developers eliminate root causes of negative security changes
effectively.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we cover the background necessary to
understand our contributions. Then, in Section 7.3, we define protection-impacting changes.
Afterwards, we describe our experiments in Section 7.4. Then, we share and discuss our
results in Section 7.5 and 7.6, respectively. We describe related work in Section 7.7 and
consider threats to validity in Section 7.8. We bring concluding remarks in Section 7.9.
Additionally, we show an example in Appendix A and provide additional methodological
details in Appendix B. Finally, we describe our algorithms in appendixes C to F.
7.2 Background
7.2.1 Access Control Methods
A commonly used access control approach is role-based access control (RBAC), with develop-
ers and/or administrators assigning privileges to one or more roles as necessary. Please note
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that some RBAC implementations use the terms capability and group instead of privilege
and role.
RBAC systems typically rely on an architecture that decouples policy enforcement and de-
cision. The Policy Decision Point (PDP) is responsible to interpret the policy and either
grant or deny requests. The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) communicates with the PDP
and enforces the policy decision regarding a privileged action. Developers often put PEPs
across their code based in the form of privilege checks. The location of these checks and the
privilege they verify depends on the access control policy.
The NBAC (authenticatioN-Based Access Control) family of access control includes RBAC,
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) and identity-based access control (IBAC). A differ-
ent paradigm is authoriZation-Based Access Control (ZBAC) [91]. In RBAC, access control
decisions are based on the user’s group memberships. In ABAC, access control decisions
are based on whether the user’s granted attribute set contains a specific attribute and value
combination. In IBAC, access control decisions are based on the user’s identity and an access
control matrix. In ZBAC, access control decisions depend on the validity of authorizations
granted to the user.
7.2.2 DPD Root Cause Analysis
A root cause is “the fundamental reason for the occurrence of a problem” [44]. When the
link between the root cause and the problem is not direct, one may use Root Cause Analysis
(RCA) to identify the root cause. This identification often relies on finding the causal chain
between the problem and its root cause.
Properly addressing the root cause of an issue prevents it from re-occurring.
The ultimate root cause behind definite protection differences may be unknowable, as it likely
originates from the developers’ minds. As such, for software systems, one may perform RCA
over the software artifacts, especially the source code. For instance, RCA can identify the
cause of failures and defects [162] and automatically patch bugs [120]. In the same vein,
to find the root causes of definite protection differences (DPD root causes), we restrict our
analysis to code changes between versions.
In programs where the RBAC policy is implemented as privilege checks throughout the code,
definite protection differences are caused by code changes between versions Vera and Verb.
In the worst case, when all changes are related to RBAC, the set of DPD root causes is equal
the set of code changes. However, the root causes are often a subset of the code changes in
practice.
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Protection-impacting changes contain a subset of root causes of protection differences. If the
experimental reversal of PICs made the DPD disappear, we assumed that PICs contained all
root causes of DPD.
Please note that it is possible to make DPD root causes disappear by performing different
source code modifications than those that actually occurred in the repository.
7.2.3 Control Flow Graphs
The Control Flow Graph (CFG) is a directed graph represented as CFG = (V,E), where V
is the set of vertices, and E is the set of edges. Its initial vertex, which connects to the entry
points, is v0. Paths between v0 and v ∈ V are represented by p (v0, . . . , v). Our CFG model
is an extension over the typical interprocedural CFG, whereby we add grant edges.
Nonetheless, we elaborate on the vertex and edge types to facilitate reader comprehension.
Our CFG vertices may be of the following types. Entry and exit vertices respectively represent
the start and end of a function. Call begin and call end vertices represent the start and the
end of a call site. The start and end vertices respectively represent an entry point and the
end of the program’s execution. Finally, a default type of vertex exists for other cases.
CFG edges can be of various types. Normal edges are for intraprocedural control flow with
no impact on the property satisfaction. Call edges connect call begin and function entry
vertices. Return edges connect exit and call end vertices. Grant edges are intraprocedural
edges which affect the property satisfaction. They can be either positive or negative. Finally,
we mention the cb function, which connects the call end with its corresponding call begin
vertex.
7.2.4 Definite Privilege Protection
Our research objective relates to privilege protection, especially definite privilege protection.
Definite privilege protection refers to privileges verified on all interprocedural paths prior to
the execution of a statement. A weaker form of protection is possible privilege protection.
Possible privilege protection refers to privileges verified on some, but not all, paths prior to
the execution of the statement. Since our approach focuses on definite privilege protection,
we will only refer to definite privilege protection in the remainder of this article.
In the context of CFGs, the predicate DefProt(v, priv) is true if and only if all paths between
v0 and v are protected by priv (Equation 7.1). Consequently, DefProt is always false whenever
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an unprotected path exists between v0 and v. The predicate Prot(v, p, priv) represents the
protectedness of v for privilege priv on a path p from the initial node v0.
DefProt(v, priv) = ∀p (v0, . . . , v) | Prot(v, p, priv) ≡
@p′ (v0, . . . , v) | ¬Prot(v, p′, priv)
(7.1)
7.2.5 Pattern Traversal Flow Analysis
We determine definite privilege protection using Pattern-Traversal Flow Analysis (PTFA)
[57, 61, 111], a domain-specific model-checking approach for Boolean properties.
PTFA verifies the property satisfaction that a specific predicate is true on all paths reaching
a statement s. In our case, we verify predicates about the granting of privileges. These
predicates are determined by automatically detecting code patterns of privilege verification
checks for some privilege priv ∈ Privileges.
A PTFA model checking automaton is a tuple A = (QA, TA, q0, VA, GA, AA). QA is a finite
set of states. TA ⊆ QA × QA is the set of transitions. q0 ∈ QA is the initial state. VA
is the finite set of variables used in guards and assignments. The guards GA annotate the
transitions TA with logical predicates over VA, which must all be satisfied for the transition
to occur. The assignments AA also annotate the transitions TA with modifications to the
variables VA.
The model states associated to a node w in the CFG represent the existence of a path from
the entry points to node w, in which the checked property is satisfied. Specifically, states in
QA are represented as qi,j,k, where i is the corresponding CFG node identifier and j and k
are property satisfaction flags set to either 0 or 1. j and k holds the calling context’s and the
intra-procedural property satisfaction, respectively. The value 0 for j or k applies whenever
property satisfaction is unknown and whenever the predicate is not satisfied.
In the context of privilege protection, the property to satisfy is that privilege p has been
verified prior to the execution of CFG vertex v. Therefore, j and k respectively refer to the
calling context’s and the intraprocedural protectedness. A value of zero for j or k either
means that the privilege was not verified yet, or that the privilege was verified and found
to be lacking. An example of the latter case is with an explicit negative check (e.g. if
(!current_user_can(’p’))).
PTFA models are automatically and statically created. They are generated by rewriting the
application’s CFG [111]. The CFG’s vertex and edge types are carried over to PTFA states
94
and transitions. In other words, the type of state qi,j,k ∈ QA is the same type as vertex i ∈ V ,
and the type of transition (qv,b,c , qw,j,k) ∈ TA is the same as for the edge (v, w) ∈ E.
After generating the PTFA model from the application’s CFG, we simplify the former into
the reachable PTFA model. The reachable PTFA model ReachA = (Q, q0, T ) only retains
reachable states and transitions from the original PTFA model (Equation 7.2). The guards
and assignments are implicit in the transitions and are otherwise removed from the model.
Q
.= {qi,j,k ∈ QA | reachable(qi,j,k)}
T
.= {(qa,b,c , qi,j,k) ∈ TA | qa,b,c ∈ Q ∧ qi,j,k ∈ Q}
(7.2)
We illustrate the conversion of a CFG into a reachable PTFA model in Figure 7.3. The i
index of PTFA states qi,j,k refers to the CFG vertex number, which we included in Figure
A.2. In this example, we show the effect of grant and interprocedural edges in the CFG. A
reachable PTFA model indicates definite protection by the states belonging to the model.
For a CFG vertex v, a protected state qv,j,1 belongs to the model if and only if there exists a
protected path between v0 and v. And an unprotected state qv,j,0 exists in the model if and
only if there exists an unprotected path between v0 and v. Therefore, definite protection for
v is determined by which states corresponding to v are present in the model (Equation 7.3).
DefProt(v, priv) = (qv,0,1 ∈ Q ∨ qv,1,1 ∈ Q) ∧ qv,0,0 /∈ Q ∧ qv,1,0 /∈ Q (7.3)
PTFA models are identical to those that would be constructed by a fully context sensitive
analysis. This is because PTFA models rely on predicate context sensitivity. Predicate
context sensitivity is a merging of contexts that are equivalent, as far as the satisfaction
of the security property is concerned. This form of context sensitivity embeds the caller’s
predicate satisfaction in the PTFA models, using the j flag. This flag is taken in consideration
in the graph rewriting rules.
In the context of privilege protection, predicate context sensitivity means that the protected-
ness of the calling context is propagated to the callee. For instance, calling from a protected
context results in the callee being also protected. We show an example in Figure 7.3. The
CFG vertices 7 to 9 are called in both protected and unprotected contexts.
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0 – start
1 – if
2 3
4 – call begin
5 – call end
6 – end
7 – entry
8 – . . .
9 – exit
cb
grant
call
return
(a) Example CFG
q0
q1,0,0
q2,0,0
q3,0,1
q4,0,0 q4,0,1
q5,0,0 q5,0,1
q6,0,0 q6,0,1
q7,0,0 q7,1,1
q8,0,0 q8,1,1
q9,0,0 q9,1,1
cb cb
grant
call
return
call
return
(b) Corresponding Reachable PTFA Model
Figure 7.3 Example CFG and Corresponding Reachable PTFA Model. Local Protection is
Propagated to Called Code.
7.2.6 Definite Protection Differences
A Definite Protection Difference (DPD) occurs when the definite protection DefProt for a
statement s (which is common to versions Vera and Ver b) changes between versions [101].
We consider that statement s is loss-affected for privilege priv, if it was definitely protected
for priv in Vera and is not definitely protected for priv in Verb (c.f. lossAffected in Equation
7.4). A similar definition applies for gain-affected statements, whenever statement s was
granted a priv protection in Verb that was not there in Vera (c.f. gainAffected in Equation
7.5). Please note that statement s may be loss-affected with regards to privilege p1, but
gain-affected with regards to privilege p2.
We illustrate DPDs in Figure 7.4 using the Unified Diff format. A ‘+’ or ‘-’ on the left
margin respectively represents an added or deleted line. We underline gain-affected and loss-
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affected statements. Figure 7.4a shows a local loss-affected statement caused by removing
a protection check. Figure 7.4b shows an interprocedural loss-affected statement caused by
adding an unprotected path. Figure 7.4c shows a local gain-affected statement caused by
adding a protection check. Finally, Figure 7.4d shows an interprocedural gain-protected
statement caused by adding a protection in the calling context.
- if (! current_user_can(’p’)) die();
print "loss -affected statement";
(a) Local Loss Impact
function foo(){
print "loss -affected statement ";
}
+ foo();
if (! current_user_can(’p’)) die();
foo();
(b) Interprocedural Loss Impact
+ if (! current_user_can(’p’)) die();
print "gain -affected statement";
(c) Local Gain Impact
function foo(){
print "gain -affected statement ";
}
+ if (! current_user_can(’p’)) die();
foo();
(d) Interprocedural Gain Impact
Figure 7.4 Examples of gain-affected and loss-affected CFG Vertices. Code Changes Indicated
in the Left Margin. Added lines are shown with ‘+’. Deleted lines are shown with ‘-’.
We define the gainAffected and lossAffected predicates in Equations 7.4 and 7.5. These pred-
icates are true if a CFG vertex vb in Verb is respectively gain and loss-affected. The function
vertexMap is an invertible injective function that associates comparable CFG vertices from
Vera to Verb. Its inverse is bMap. We use the symbol range to refer to range of a function.
97
lossAffected(vb, priv) .=
DefProt(bMap(vb), priv) ∧ ¬DefProt(vb, priv) ∧ vb ∈ range(vertexMap) (7.4)
gainAffected(vb, priv) .=
¬DefProt(bMap(vb), priv) ∧ DefProt(vb, priv) ∧ vb ∈ range(vertexMap) (7.5)
7.3 Method
We introduce protection-impacting changes to determine which code changes on execution
paths potentially impact definite privilege protection. Our analysis rely on graph reachability
in reachable PTFA models.
Protection-impacting changes contains DPD root causes whose code changes belong to paths.
This is category of DPD root causes that occur when the code changes belongs to paths.
Consequently, whenever definite protection differences are entirely caused by DPD root
causes whose code changes belong to paths, developers only need to focus their attention
on protection-impacting changes.
Gain-impacting changes are protection-impacting changes that caused one or more state-
ments to be gain-affected, while loss-impacting changes are conversely defined (c.f. Section
7.2.6). These labels are not mutually exclusive. Some code changes may belong to both
kinds of definite protection differences. For instance, consider Figure 7.5, where a security
check is inverted. This change will cause the first print statement to become loss-impacted,
and the second print statement to become gain-impacted. We show the processing steps to
- if ( current_user_can(’p1’))
+ if (! current_user_can(’p1’))
print ’Loss -affected ’
else
print ’Gain -affected ’
Figure 7.5 Code Change That is Gain-Impacting and Loss-Impacting
determine protection-impacting changes in Figure 7.6. The reachable PTFA change detec-
tor (c.f. Section 7.3.1) determines which edges have been deleted and added between two
reachable PTFA models. The reachable edges finder (c.f. Section 7.3.2 determines which
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edges in reachable PTFA models connect to definite protection differences. Finally, the PIC
finder (c.f. Section 7.3.3) combines the reachable edges, and the added and deleted edges to
determine the protection-impacting changes.
Reachable Edges
Finder
Reachable PTFA
Change Detector
Code
Differences
Definite
Protection
Differences
Added and 
Deleted
Edges
Reachable
PTFA
Models
Protection
Impacting
Changes
PIC
Finder
Reachable
Edges
Intermediary
Data
Intermediary
Processing
Final
ProcessingInput
Figure 7.6 Processing Steps to Determine Protection-Impacting Changes
7.3.1 Reachable PTFA Change Detector
Our approach relies on detecting added and deleted edges in reachable PTFA graphs. Definite
protection is a predicate over program paths, and paths are composed of edges. Therefore,
we must determine edge-level differences to determine protection-impacting changes. The
code change detector uses the reachable PTFA models and code difference information to do
so.
When comparing two versions, Vera and Ver b typically have some parts in common, and
some different parts. Thus, for the parts in common, we can build a one-to-one correspon-
dence between a subset of their reachable PTFA models (PTFAa and PTFAb, respectively).
From this subset, we add states and transitions to form PTFAb. Given vertexMap, the
construction of PTFAb from PTFAa is possible using Equation 7.6. Qa and Ta respectively
are the set of states and the set of transitions in the reachable PTFA model for version Vera.
Qb and Tb are similarly defined for the reachable PTFA model for Ver b. Please note that
deletedStates and addedStates are respectively the set of deleted and added PTFA states,
and that deletedEdges and addedEdges are respectively the deleted and added edges.
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PTFAa .= (Qa, q0, Ta)
PTFAb .= (Qb, q0, Tb)
Qb = addedStates ∪
{
qi′,j,k
∣∣∣ qi,j,k ∈ Qa \ deletedStates ∧ i′ = vertexMap(i) }
Tb = addedEdges ∪

(
qa′,b,c , qd′,e,f
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(qa,b,c , qd,e,f ) ∈ Ta \ deletedEdges
∧ a′ = vertexMap(a) ∧
d′ = vertexMap(d)

(7.6)
We determine addedStates, deletedStates, addedEdges and deletedEdges as follows. The set
deletedStates contains all states (qi,j,k) ∈ Qa with no corresponding state in Verb (Equation
7.7). This occurs when code is deleted, changed or when the code remains unchanged while
its privilege protection of the state is modified. Similarly, addedStates contains all states
qi,j,k ∈ Qb with no corresponding state in Vera (Equation 7.8). This occurs when code is
added, changed, or for unchanged code whose privilege protection is modified. The symbols
dom and range correspond to the function’s domain and range, respectively.
deletedEdges is the set of deleted edges in the PTFA model for Vera (Equation 7.9). It
corresponds to the set of all edges which either connect one or more deleted states or for
which no corresponding edge is present in the PTFA model for Ver b. Finally, addedEdges is
the set of added edges in to PTFA model for Ver b (Equation 7.10). It is defined in a similar
manner of deletedEdges.
deletedStates
.=
{
(qi,j,k) ∈ Qa
∣∣∣ i /∈ dom(vertexMap) ∨ qvertexMap(i),j,k /∈ Qb} (7.7)
addedStates
.=
{
(qi,j,k) ∈ Qb
∣∣∣ i /∈ range(vertexMap) ∨ qbMap(i),j,k /∈ Qa} (7.8)
deletedEdges
.=( qi1,j1,k1 , qi2,j2,k2) ∈ Ta
∣∣∣∣∣∣ qi1,j1,k1 ∈ deletedStates ∨ qi2,j2,k2 ∈ deletedStates ∨( qvertexMap(i1),j1,k1 , qvertexMap(i2),j2,k2 ) /∈ Tb
 (7.9)
addedEdges
.=( qi1,j1,k1 , qi2,j2,k2 ) ∈ Tb
∣∣∣∣∣∣ qi1,j1,k1 ∈ addedStates ∨ qi2,j2,k2 ∈ addedStates ∨( qbMap(i1),j1,k1 , qbMap(i2),j2,k2 ) /∈ Ta

(7.10)
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7.3.2 Reachable Edges Finder
The reachable edges finder is responsible to find edges that belong to appropriately protected
paths to a definite protection difference. We explain and show how to determine edges
that belong to paths to a definite protection difference in Section 7.3.2. We then define
appropriately protected paths in Section 7.3.2.
Paths to Definite Protection Differences
The first criterion, that the path connects to a definite protection difference, is because
protection-impacting changes are related to a) changes in paths leading to security sensitive
operations and b) their traversal of security granting patterns, as computed by PTFA.
Let us consider a definite protection difference. Vertex va belongs to version Vera. It has a
corresponding vertex in Verb, vb (i.e. vb = vertexMap(va)).
Protection-impacting changes belong to paths having changed privilege protection for va and
vb. They also precede the execution of va and vb on these paths. In other words, there exists
edges ePICa in Vera or ePICb in Ver b, such that Equation 7.11 is satisfied.
∃p ( (v0, v1), . . . , ePICa, . . . , (vn, va) ) ∨ ∃p ( (v0, v1), . . . , ePICb, . . . , (vn, vb) )
(7.11)
The paths containing ePICb may be entirely new paths in Ver b. The paths containing ePICa
may be entirely deleted paths in Vera. Or they can be paths modified between Vera and
Ver b such that their definite protection differs.
To illustrate, please consider the example in Figure 7.7. Figures 7.7a and 7.7b respectively
show the CFGs for Vera and Ver b. Please note that vertexMap, in this case, is the identity
function. Between Vera and Ver b, vertex v3 is gain-affected. The only edge in Vera that
belong to a path from v0 to v3 in Vera is (v0, v3). The edges in Ver b that belong to a path
from v0 to v3 are { (v0, v1), (v1, v3) }. The other edges connecting code changes in Ver b (i.e.
{ (v1, v2), (v2, v4), (v3, v4), (v4, v5) }) cannot affect the definite privilege protection of v3 in any
way.
We show an example of paths to a definite protection difference in Figure 7.8. We show the
CFG Vera (Figure 7.8a) and Ver b (Figure 7.8b). In this case, vertexMap is the identity
function. One vertex, v3, is loss-affected between The only edges in Vera that belong to a
path from v0 to v3 are { (v0, v1), (v1, v2), (v2, v3) }. The only edges in Ver b that belong to a
path from v0 to v3 are { (v0, v1), (v1, v2), (v2, v3), (v1, v3) }. The other edges cannot affect the
definite privilege protection of v3 in any way.
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0 – start
3
5 – end
(a) CFG of Vera
0 – start
1 – if
2 3
4
5 – end
grant
(b) CFG of Verb
Legend
Added vertices
Definite Protection Difference
Edge in a path to
Definite Protection
Difference
Figure 7.7 Example Paths to definite protection differences
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0 – start
1 – if
2
3
4
5 – end
grant
(a) CFG of Vera
0 – start
1 – if
2
3
4
5 – end
grant
(b) CFG of Verb
Legend
Definite Protection Difference
Edge in a path to
Definite Protection
Difference
Figure 7.8 Example Paths to definite protection differences
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Appropriately Protected Path
The reachable edges finder does not look for all edges in all paths to definite protection
differences. Protection-impacting changes belong to appropriately protected paths to a def-
inite protection difference. By appropriately protected, we mean that protection-impacting
changes belong to either unprotected or protected paths, depending on whether the code is
gain-affected or loss-affected.
The consideration of appropriately protected paths is a refinement over Section 7.3.2.
Given CFG vertices va in Vera and vb in Verb, such that vb = vertexMap(va), the following
properties hold when they are loss-affected for privilege priv, based on the definition of
definite protection.
First, va is definitely protected for priv, which means that all paths to va are protected by
priv. Second, vb is not definitely protected for priv. By inversion of the universally quantified
property, there exists at least one unprotected path for priv leading to vb. Alternatively, vb
may be unreachable (Equation 7.12).
As we saw before, these universally and existentially quantified predicates correspond to the
existence of states in reachable PTFA models. In Equation 7.12, Qa and Qb respectively refer
to the set of states in the reachable PTFA models for Vera and Verb. For Equation 7.12 to
hold true, we only need to consider the protected paths to qa,j,1 and (if any) the unprotected
paths to qb,j,0. Thus, protection-impacting changes must belong to these paths.
∀p (v0, . . . , va) | Prot(va, p, priv) ∧
(∃p′ (v0, . . . , vb) ,¬Prot(vb, p′, priv) ∨ @p′′ (v0, . . . , vb))
≡
(qa,0,1 ∈ Qa ∨ qa,1,1 ∈ Qa) ∧ qa,0,0 /∈ Qa ∧
qa,1,0 /∈ Qa ∧
(
qb,0,0 ∈ Qb ∨ qb,1,0 ∈ Qb ∨ @j, k ∈ {0, 1} | qb,j,k ∈ Qb
)
(7.12)
The situation is similar when dealing with gain-affected CFG vertices. Vertex va is not
definitely protected and vb is definitely protected for priv. Thus, the relation in Equation
7.12 only needs to be adapted by exchanging the versions (Equation 7.13). For Equation
7.13 to hold true, we only need to consider the protected paths to qb,j,1 and (if any) the
unprotected paths to qa,j,0. Thus, protection-impacting changes must belong to these paths.
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∀p (v0, . . . , vb) | Prot(vb, p, priv) ∧
(∃p′ (v0, . . . , va) | ¬Prot(va, priv) ∨ @p′′ (v0, . . . , va))
≡
(qb,0,1 ∈ Qb ∨ qb,1,1 ∈ Qb) ∧ qb,0,0 /∈ Qb ∧
qb,1,0 /∈ Qb ∧
(
qa,0,0 ∈ Qa ∨ qa,1,0 ∈ Qa ∨ @j, k ∈ {0, 1} | qa,j,k ∈ Qa
)
(7.13)
Taking appropriately protected paths to definite protection differences in consideration is
a refinement over considering all paths to definite protection differences. We illustrate this
refinement with the same example as in Figure 7.8. We convert the CFGs to reachable PTFA
models and highlight the appropriately protected paths (Figure 7.9).
In Vera, there is only one path (i.e. (q0, q1,0,0, q2,0,1, q3,0,1)) leading to a protected state for
CFG vertex v3 (Figure 7.9a). In Ver b, there are two paths leading to states corresponding
to CFG vertex v3 (Figure 7.9b). However, there is only one path leading to an unprotected
state (i.e. (q0, q1,0,0, q3,0,0)), which contributes to protection-impacting changes.
q0
q1,0,0
q2,0,1
q3,0,1
q4,0,0 q4,0,1
q5,0,0 q5,0,1
(a) Reachable PTFA Model for Vera
q0
q1,0,0
q2,0,1
q3,0,0 q3,0,1
q4,0,0 q4,0,1
q5,0,0 q5,0,1
(b) Reachable PTFA Model for Verb
Legend
Definite Protection Difference
Edge in a path to
Definite Protection
Difference
Figure 7.9 Reachable PTFA Models Corresponding to Figure 7.8
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7.3.3 Formal Definition of Protection-Impacting Changes
Protection-impacting changes are code changes which belong to an appropriately protected
path leading to a definite protection difference. Thus, the definition of protection-impacting
changes varies between gain-affected and loss-affected code.
For loss-affected code, the protection-impacting changes PICloss are the deleted edges be-
longing to positively-protected paths to va and the added edges belonging to negatively-
protected paths to vb (Equation 7.14). For gain-affected code, the protection-impacting
changes PICgain are similarly defined, with the protectedness reversed (Equation 7.15).
Please note that ReachachableEdges(qi,j,k) is a function returning all edges between the ini-
tial state q0 and qi,j,k in the reachable PTFA model. To simplify the definitions, we introduce
the partialPIC function, which combines changed edges (i.e. addedEdges or deletedEdges)
with reachable edges for either Vera or Verb.
partialPIC(changes, i, k) .= changes ∩
(ReachableEdges(qi,0,k) ∪ReachableEdges(qi,1,k))
PICloss
.=
(
partialPIC(deletedEdges, va, 1) , partialPIC(addedEdges, vb, 0)
)
(7.14)
PICgain
.=
(
partialPIC(deletedEdges, va, 0) , partialPIC(addedEdges, vb, 1)
)
(7.15)
7.4 Experiment Design
In this study, we answer two research questions, which we detail in Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2
7.4.1 RQ1: Reduction of Code Changes to Evaluate
Our first research question is the following:




Research Question
RQ1 Is the size of protection-impacting changes smaller than the set of code
changes?
Our goal is to quantify the amount and proportion of code changes that are protection-
impacting in real systems.
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Approach
We conduct a survey [156] of two representative open source projects implemented in PHP,
WordPress and MediaWiki. A survey is a descriptive quantitative study of a phenomenon
[156]. In this survey, we determine code changes and protection-impacting changes between
major releases, as detailed in Subsection 7.4.1.
We chose these two applications because they are large, RBAC-using, widely-used software
systems with a long release history.
WordPress is a popular web-based content management system implemented in PHP. Its
RBAC implementation and configuration is relatively simple. At the time of writing, Word-
Press’ access control policy is designed with offers six roles and 63 capabilities (i.e. privileges).
The specified role hierarchy is strictly linear, meaning that each role has a superset of the
capabilities of the previous role in the hierarchy [187]. Our study encompasses all releases of
WordPress available as of March 2017 and which used RBAC – 2.0 to 4.7.3. This applica-
tion’s PHP code, in physical lines of code (LOC), ranges from roughly 35 KLOC in release
2.0 to 340 KLOC in release 4.7.3. For the same releases, the combined HTML, JavaScript
and CSS code amounted to roughly 13 KLOC and 179 KLOC, respectively.
MediaWiki is another content management system. It is well-known thanks to its flagship
user, Wikipedia. Our study encompasses all releases of MediaWiki available as of November
2017 and which used RBAC – 1.5 to 1.29.1 [185]. At the time of writing, MediaWiki’s
access control policy has 7 groups (i.e. roles), and 75 permissions (i.e. privileges) [185]. This
application’s PHP code ranges from roughly 149 KLOC in release 1.5 to 149 KLOC in release
1.29.1. For the same releases, the combined HTML, JavaScript and CSS code amounted to
roughly 4.5 KLOC and 188 KLOC, respectively. The peak PHP code size is roughly 1.35
MLOC in release 1.22.3.
Our processing pipeline (Figure 7.10) consists of a PHP Front-End which provides CFGs to
the PTFA Analyzer. The PTFA Analyzer generates PTFA models and definite protection
data, which are used by the protection-impacting changes analyzer and DPD Classifier. The
code differencing component computes line differences for the source code, which it stores
in intermediary files. The code differences and definite protection summaries are used to
compute definite protection difference. The vertexMap function is computed internally in
these components using the algorithm in Appendix C. Finally, the Protection-Impacting
Change Analyzer uses the DPD data, code differences and PTFA models and determines
protection-impacting changes. It implements the ReachableEdges function using backwards
reachability, which we describe in Appendix F.
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Figure 7.10 Processing Pipeline
Dependent and Independent Variables
In this survey, the independent variables are which programs, which versions we analyze,
and the software running the experiment (including the source code differencing tool, the
language front-end and the PTFA analyzer). The dependent variables are code differences
and protection-impacting changes.
Data Collection and Processing
Our approach relies on comparing versions. We must therefore choose which versions we
consider, and which ones to compare against each other.
As a preliminary study, we conduct our survey by comparing official final releases (i.e. non-
alpha, non-beta, non-release candidate versions). We thus omit releases such as MediaWiki’s
1.5.0 Beta 2, and 1.9.0 RC1.
We select these versions since these are the versions that end-users normally deploy. Addi-
tionally, we expect that these releases will be better tested and reviewed than intermediary
versions. The impact of this decision is twofold. Since there may be a large number of code
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changes between two releases, the number of protection-impacting changes is likely to be
large in absolute terms. However, pre-release security reviews may lower the relative amount
of protection-impacting changes. Please note that we analyzed official release archives (for
more details, please consult Appendix B). A finer-grained (e.g. commit-level) analysis is
possible, which we discuss in Section 7.6.
To calculate protection-impacting changes, we compare versions Vera with Verb. In our
survey, we call the 2-tuple (Vera,Verb) a release pair. It would be tempting to arrange
the releases in a line, sorted by their release number, and compare them pairwise. How-
ever, WordPress and MediaWiki developers maintain and apply security fixes to multiple
releases in parallel. Considering releases sequentially would artificially inflate the number of
definite protection differences and protection-impacting changes we observe. For instance,
consider vulnerability CVE-2016-6331, which was simultaneously corrected in MediaWiki re-
leases 1.23.15, 1.26.4, and 1.27.1. If one were to compare releases linearly, they would observe
a gain-affected code in 1.23.15 which would become loss-affected in 1.24.0, only to become
gain-affected again in 1.26.4 and so on until 1.27.1.
We avoid this issue by organizing releases in a tree. To do so, we rely on two properties
of each version: its release number and release date. The release numbers in MediaWiki
and WordPress are organized using the semantic versioning convention [149]. Each release
is also tagged with a release date, which is the day where the the release is made available
to the public. For each edge (Vera,Verb) in the tree, we ensure that the release date of Vera
precedes or equals the release date of Verb. We also ensure that the release number of Vera is
the highest-numbered release that is lower-numbered than Verb. We describe our algorithm
in more detail in Appendix D. We show an excerpt of the MediaWiki release tree built using
our algorithm in Figure 7.11. Please consider the effect of our algorithm for release 1.9.0.
The edge (1.8.2, 1.9.0) is explained by the fact that releases 1.8.3 onwards were released after
1.9.0.
...
... 1.6.7
1.6.8
1.7.0
1.6.9 1.6.10 1.6.11 1.6.12
1.7.1 1.7.2
1.8.0
1.7.3
1.8.1 1.8.2
1.8.3
1.9.0
1.8.4 1.8.5
1.9.1 1.9.2
Figure 7.11 Release Tree Excerpt for MediaWiki
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We compute vertexMap (and its inverse, bMap) using an heuristic mapping based on line-
level differences (c.f. Appendix C).
Measures
In our survey, we record security-affected release pairs, which are release pairs in which
at least one definite protection difference. For all security-affected release pairs, we measure
protection-impacting changes and code changes. Our measures are at two levels. We measure
at the level of PTFA edges and lines of source code.
We measure at line granularity because measures in terms of lines of code are the de-facto
standard in the industry. This is evidenced by popular differencing and version control tools
(e.g. diff and git) that report code changes at a line granularity by default.
We have no access to an oracle which classifies definite protection differences either as ben-
eficial, harmful or irrelevant. Therefore, we report protection-impacting change metrics for
all definite protection differences. We discuss oracles in Section 7.6.
Release pairs with gain-affected vertices are also called gain-affected and release pairs with
loss-affected vertices are also called loss-affected.
Protection-impacting changes (PICloss and PICgain) are a 2-tuple of reachable PTFA edge
sets. We measure the set size of each component of the tuple. We also process these PICloss
and PICgain into additional measures likewise expressed as 2-tuples. These measures may
be harder to interpret. As such, we also define measures that combine the components of the
2-tuple. To do so, we use the projection function pii(x) to extract the ith component of x.
In other words, pi1(x) extracts the component related to Vera in x and pi2(x) does likewise
for Verb.
First, we combine PICloss and PICgain as PIC (Equation 7.16). We do so by performing the
union of corresponding components of PICloss and PICgain. We also add the set cardinalities
of each component of PIC to obtain the combined metric allPIC (Equation 7.17).
PIC =
(
|pi1(PICloss) ∪ pi1(PICgain)| , |pi2(PICloss) ∪ pi2(PICgain)|
)
(7.16)
allPIC = pi1(PIC) + pi2(PIC) (7.17)
We also define relative protection-impacting changes measures. The rationale for these mea-
sures is that protection-impacting changes should be interpreted in the context of all changed
lines of code. The measures relPICloss, relPICgain and relPIC are 2-tuples containing the
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ratios between protection-impacting edges and the added and deleted edges (Equation 7.18).
We also define a combined relative measure relAllPIC similarly.
relPICloss =
( |pi1(PICloss)|
|deletedEdges| ,
|pi2(PICloss)|
|addedEdges|
)
relPICgain =
( |pi1(PICgain)|
|deletedEdges| ,
|pi2(PICgain)|
|addedEdges|
)
relPIC =
(
pi1(PIC)
|deletedEdges| ,
pi2(PIC)
|addedEdges|
)
relAllPIC = allPIC|deletedEdges|+|addedEdges|
(7.18)
We project the PTFA edges to lines of code using heuristics that take line change information
in consideration. We do so because some vertices in addedEdges and deletedEdges may
belong to unchanged lines of code, and reporting them as protection-impacting is likely to
confuse the users.
Please consider the example in Figure 7.12a. We show the corresponding reachable PTFA
graph for Verb in Figure 7.12b. We represent added edges in grey, and protection-impacting
changes with larger arrows. If we map all states belonging to edges in the set of protection-
impacting changes to their line of code, lines {1, 2, 3} appear protection-impacting. Since the
only code change is the addition of line 2, we only report that line 2 is protection-impacting.
These mapped metrics are PICloss,lines and PICgain,lines. Similarly, the combined measure
allPIC lines is defined in Equation 7.20.
PIClines
.=
(
|pi1(PICloss,lines) ∪ pi1(PICgain,lines)| , |pi2(PICloss,lines) ∪ pi2(PICgain,lines)|
)
(7.19)
allPIClines
.= pi1(PIClines) + pi2(PIClines) (7.20)
We also determine the relative size of protection-impacting changes per release pair as the ra-
tio between the total protection-impacting lines and the total modified lines of code (Equation
7.21). In the equations below, delLines and addLines, which respectively are the number of
lines deleted from Vera and added to Verb.
relPICloss,lines =
(|pi1(PICloss,lines)|
delLines
,
|pi2(PICloss,lines)|
addLines
)
relPICgain,lines =
(|pi1(PICgain,lines)|
delLines
,
|pi2(PICgain,lines)|
addLines
)
relPIClines =
(|pi1(PIClines)|
delLines
, |pi2(PIClines)|
addLines
)
relAllPIC lines = allPIClinesdelLines + addLines
(7.21)
111
1 foo();
2 + if (! current_user_can(’p’)) die();
3 bar();
4 //...
(a) Example Code Change
q0
foo() q1,0,0
q2,0,0
if q3,0,0
die() q4,0,0
bar() q5,0,1
q6,0,1
. . .
cb
cb
Legend
qi,j,k Definite Protection Difference
Added or deleted edge
Protection-Impacting Change
(b) Reachable PTFA Model for Verb
Figure 7.12 Example Illustrating the Need to Use Heuristics When Projecting Protection-
Impacting-Changes to Lines of Code. A Naive Projection Would Inaccurately Report Lines
2 and 3 as Protection-Impacting.
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Implementation
We implemented the workflow in Figure 7.10 using Java. To compute delLines and addLines,
we used diff from GNU diffutils 3.3 and diffstat 1.61.
7.4.2 RQ2 : PICs containing all DPD root causes
Our second research question is the following:

 

Research Question
RQ2 How often PICs contain all DPD root causes in a release pair?
The goal of this research question is to determine the relevance of DPD root causes whose code
changes belong to paths. In other words, the goal of this research question is to determine
how often do protection-impacting changes contain all DPD root causes. To do so, we use two
different strategies to revert protection-impacting changes and observe if definite protection
differences disappear (Section 7.4.2).
Approach
We perform reversals at two different granularities. The first strategy is complete reversal
(Section 7.4.2). For a complete reversal, we revert all protection-impacting changes in each
security-affected release pairs. Our second strategy is individual reversal (Section 7.4.2). For
individual reversals, we revert protection-impacting changes related to each definite protec-
tion difference in one release pair of each system.
Reverting a set of code changes produces a new version, the reverted version. As we covered
in Section 7.2.2, the reverted version is free of definite protection differences if all DPD root
causes have been reverted.
We measure, for both strategies, the number of successfully reverted versions. Each strategy
has a different definition of what a successful reversal is, which we detail in the following
Sections.
To do so, we leverage many of the processing steps from RQ1. To these, we add the
protection-impacting change reverter, which creates a reverted version based on protection-
impacting changes as well as the source code of versions Vera and Verb. We show the steps in
Figure 7.13. We represent the new component and its output in bold, whereas components
from Figure 7.10 are show in normal font. We describe the protection-impacting change
reverter in Section 7.4.2.
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PHP Front End
PTFA Analyzer
Code
Differencing
Source
Code
(Verb)
Code
Differences
DPD
Classifier
Definite
Protection
Differences
Protection
Impacting
Changes
PIC Reverter
Reverted
Version
(Verrev)
Source
Code
(Vera)
CFGs
Definite
Protection
Input Output
Figure 7.13Workflow for Reversing Protection-Impacting Changes. New Components bolded.
Dependent and Independent Variables
In these strategies, we inherit the independent variables from our survey, which we will not
repeat here. Additional independent variables are which protection-impacting changes we
revert and the reversal method. The dependent variable is definite protection differences.
Data Collection and Processing (General)
For these two strategies, we use the source code, line differences, PTFA models and protec-
tion-impacting changes from our survey of WordPress and MediaWiki (c.f. Section 7.4.1).
The following general approach is shared by the two strategies: we create a reverted version
Ver rev and compare definite protection between Vera and Ver rev. As illustrated in Figure
7.13, Ver rev is a function of the source code of Vera and Verb, as well as protection-impacting
changes. The protection-impacting change reverter creates Ver rev by copying contains all
source code files of Vera, except for files of Ver b which have no protection-impacting changes
(c.f. our decision chart in Appendix E).
Data Collection and Processing (Complete Reversal)
In our first strategy, we create V errev for all protection-impacting changes we found between
Vera and Verb. We consider that the reversal is successful if there are no of definite protection
differences between Vera and V errev.
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Data Collection and Processing (Individual Reversal)
A definite protection difference may also depend on synchronous multiple changes. In this
evaluation strategy, we separate the problems of individual DPD reversal from the multiple
DPD reversal. We create a reverted release pair for each definite protection difference and
examine if that definite protection difference disappeared.
We describe the high-level algorithm in Figure 7.14. We do the following for each definite
protection difference. First, we compute the protection-impacting changes for this definite
protection difference, PICDPD. Then, we create a reverted version Verrev for PICDPD. Af-
terwards, we calculate vertexMaprev, which is vertexMap between Vera and Verrev. Finally,
we compare the definite protection of the vertex in Vera with the appropriate vertex in
Verrev. In this algorithm, DPD is a set of 2-tuples (vb, priv), where vb belongs to Verb, and
vb is a definite protection difference for privilege priv. The function calculatePIC deter-
mines protection-impacting changes. The function revert creates a reverted version, and
BuildV ertexMap calculates a vertex map between two versions (defined in Appendix C).
for all (vb, priv) ∈ DPD
va ← bMap(vb)
PICDPD ← calculatePIC(va, vb, priv)
Verrev ← revert(Vera,Verb, P ICDPD)
vertexMaprev ← BuildV ertexMap(Vera,Verrev)
vrev ← vertexMaprev(va)
if DefProt(va, priv) = DefProt(vrev, priv)
print SUCCESS
else
print FAILURE
Figure 7.14 Algorithm for Individual Reversal
We do so for all DPD in the latest security-affected release pair of each system. These release
pairs are large (333 KLOC for WordPress and 197 KLOC for MediaWiki) and contain a mix-
ture of functional and RBAC security changes and appear representative of the code changes
in other release pairs. For WordPress the release pair is 4.7.1 vs 4.7.2. This release pair has 87
definite protection differences and its allPIC = 84. For MediaWiki, the release pair is 1.28.2
vs 1.29.0. This release pair has 46 definite protection differences and its allPIC =37,532.
As indicated in Figure 7.14, the reversal of PICDPD is successful if vrev has the same definite
privilege protection for priv as va.
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Implementation
We have implemented the protection-impacting change reverter in Java.
7.5 Experimental Results
We ran our experiments on a system powered by an i7950@3.07GHz CPU. We configured
the OpenJDK Java VM version 1.8.0_131 to use up to 8Gb of RAM for WordPress and 12
Gb of RAM for MediaWiki.
7.5.1 RQ1 : Reduction of Code Changes to Evaluate
In order to answer RQ1 Is the size of protection-impacting changes smaller than the set of
code changes?, we computed protection-impacting changes for 210 release pairs of WordPress
and 192 release pairs of MediaWiki. We summarize the release pairs, execution time, security-
affected release pairs and total protection-impacting changes in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1 Survey Summary
WordPress MediaWiki
Release Pairs 210 192
Total Execution Time
(hours)
34 58
Average Execution
Time (minutes)
9.72 17.42
Gain-Affected Release
Pairs
85 30
Loss-Affected Release
Pairs
46 30
Security-Affected Re-
lease Pairs
87 42
Total allPIC 13,307,209 87,263,613
Total allPIClines 258,997 881,767
In Tables 7.2 and 7.3, we present summary statistics of the measures we defined in Section
7.4.1. We report two distributions: the distribution for all security-impacted release pairs
and the distribution for all release pairs. We present the latter distribution because it gives
a picture of protection-impacting changes over the lifetime of the project. We turn our
attention to the statistics for allPIClines and relAllPIClines in Tables 7.2 and 7.3. We found
that, on average, security-impacted release pairs had 2976.98 (26.28%) protection-impacting
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lines of code for WordPress and 20,994.45 (15.45%) for MediaWiki. The median is different,
with 47.00 (27.41%) and 13,540.00 (13.85%) protection-impacting lines of code, respectively.
This difference is due to outliers in the distribution, which we discuss below.
We also observe that some metrics’ distributions have a mean greater than their 3rd quartile.
This is notably the case for PIC for both Vera and Verb. This situation is due to a few very
large outliers, which we discuss below.
In MediaWiki (Table 7.3), there is a large difference between the relative measures at the
PTFA level and at the line level. This is explained by the fact that a large proportion of
code changes belonged to tests and language support folders. Test code was bundled in the
releases up to the 1.15 series. Release archives from 1.16 onwards (except for the 1.20 series)
have no test code. Language support folders have many PHP files that mostly consist of
string definitions in a dictionary data structure. This represents very few added and deleted
edges. Therefore, language support changes affect relative line measures more than relative
edge measures.
If we separate the PIC results according to code deleted (Vera) and added (Verb), we obtain
the respective medians of 14.00 and 7391.00 LOC. In relative terms (relPIC), these terms
represent 31.58% and 12.86% of their respective code changes. The mean code changes are
974.41 LOC (30.76%) and 12,709.67 LOC (16.16%) for Vera and Verb, respectively. While
it appears that deleted code is more likely to be protection-impacting than added code, this
difference is not statistically significant (t-test p = 0.065 for WordPress and p = 0.601 for
MediaWiki).
Over all release pairs in our survey, protection-impacting changes are an even smaller per-
centage of code changes. For both systems, the median protection-impacting changes is not
significant, since most release pairs have no definite protection differences, and therefore no
protection-impacting changes. However, the mean protection-impacting changes respectively
represents 10.89% and 3.38% of code changes for WordPress and MediaWiki.
Table 7.2 – Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair (WordPress)
Measure 1st quartile Median Mean Standard Dev 3rd quartile
PIC Release Pairs (87 / 210)
PICloss (Vera) 0.00 25.00 34,505.40 124,328.33 14,400.00
relPICloss (Vera) 0.00% 5.22% 16.76% 26.51% 20.11%
PICloss (Verb) 0.00 60.00 10,343.75 20,491.79 11,044.00
relPICloss (Verb) 0.00% 0.71% 5.40% 8.48% 8.80%
PICloss,lines (Vera) 0.00 2.00 773.20 1728.18 1065.50
relPICloss,lines (Vera) 0.00% 4.66% 10.86% 15.28% 15.56%
PICloss,lines (Verb) 0.00 2.00 1624.29 3257.90 1820.50
relPICloss,lines (Verb) 0.00% 3.24% 10.46% 14.39% 17.64%
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Table 7.2 – Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair (WordPress – Continued)
Measure 1st quartile Median Mean Standard Dev 3rd quartile
PICgain (Vera) 119.00 302.00 6017.15 15,015.23 5179.00
relPICgain (Vera) 8.01% 16.86% 24.64% 20.58% 37.12%
PICgain (Verb) 307.00 869.00 113,270.61 282,525.43 62,417.00
relPICgain (Verb) 20.36% 36.64% 41.30% 25.09% 54.94%
PICgain,lines (Vera) 6.00 14.00 744.53 1784.40 677.50
relPICgain,lines (Vera) 9.09% 20.32% 27.48% 23.44% 37.50%
PICgain,lines (Verb) 14.50 34.00 1662.40 3440.55 1492.50
relPICgain,lines (Verb) 10.66% 22.19% 22.88% 15.64% 31.73%
PIC (Vera) 138.50 364.00 36,927.74 125,242.10 15,398.50
relPIC (Vera) 16.97% 33.15% 38.18% 25.49% 51.72%
PIC (Verb) 307.00 869.00 116,028.69 282,644.22 66,650.50
relPIC (Verb) 24.30% 43.35% 43.77% 24.17% 57.18%
PIClines (Vera) 6.00 14.00 974.41 2169.55 1188.50
relPIClines (Vera) 10.82% 31.58% 30.76% 23.69% 42.12%
PIClines (Verb) 14.50 34.00 2002.56 3912.68 2447.50
relPIClines (Verb) 11.95% 24.00% 25.07% 15.97% 34.49%
allPIC 473.00 1171.00 152,956.43 379,643.71 93,863.50
relAllP ic 27.58% 37.45% 42.15% 22.10% 56.52%
allPIClines 23.00 47.00 2976.98 5754.48 4026.50
relAllPIClines 12.74% 27.41% 26.28% 16.50% 36.07%
deletedEdges 423.00 1314.00 64,239.03 171,739.81 48,458.00
addedEdges 753.50 3279.00 167,956.75 338,315.67 112,930.00
deleted (LOC) 24.00 109.00 3060.62 5686.95 4117.50
added (LOC) 75.00 341.00 6446.60 11,006.58 9770.00
All Release Pairs (210)
PICloss (Vera) 0.00 0.00 14,295.10 81,552.48 0.00
relPICloss (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 6.94% 18.91% 0.00%
PICloss (Verb) 0.00 0.00 4285.27 14,102.26 0.00
relPICloss (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 2.24% 6.05% 0.00%
PICloss,lines (Vera) 0.00 0.00 320.32 1172.48 0.00
relPICloss,lines (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 4.50% 11.17% 0.00%
PICloss,lines (Verb) 0.00 0.00 672.92 2238.46 0.00
relPICloss,lines (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 4.33% 10.58% 0.00%
PICgain (Vera) 0.00 0.00 2492.82 10,079.65 193.00
relPICgain (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 10.21% 17.95% 11.65%
PICgain (Verb) 0.00 0.00 46,926.40 189,665.60 378.00
relPICgain (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 17.11% 25.98% 27.87%
PICgain,lines (Vera) 0.00 0.00 308.45 1202.23 9.00
relPICgain,lines (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 11.38% 20.26% 16.40%
PICgain,lines (Verb) 0.00 0.00 688.71 2354.71 24.00
relPICgain,lines (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 9.48% 15.11% 16.54%
PIC (Vera) 0.00 0.00 15,298.63 82,382.24 193.00
relPIC (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 15.82% 24.95% 30.00%
PIC (Verb) 0.00 0.00 48,069.03 190,144.31 380.00
relPIC (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 18.13% 26.60% 32.47%
PIClines (Vera) 0.00 0.00 403.69 1472.53 10.50
relPIClines (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 12.74% 21.48% 18.41%
PIClines (Verb) 0.00 0.00 829.63 2697.62 24.00
relPIClines (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 10.39% 16.07% 19.51%
allPIC 0.00 0.00 63,367.66 254,972.56 573.00
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Table 7.2 – Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair (WordPress – Continued)
Measure 1st quartile Median Mean Standard Dev 3rd quartile
relAllP ic 0.00% 0.00% 17.46% 25.18% 33.29%
allPIClines 0.00 0.00 1233.32 3973.24 38.00
relAllPIClines 0.00% 0.00% 10.89% 16.74% 22.57%
deleted (LOC) 15.00 42.00 1338.00 3932.58 182.50
added (LOC) 38.00 117.50 2841.61 7698.90 482.25
Table 7.3 – Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair (MediaWiki)
Measure 1st quartile Median Mean Standard Dev 3rd quartile
PIC Release Pairs (42 / 192)
PICloss (Vera) 0.00 68,108.50 766,078.14 1,828,892.88 831,027.50
relPICloss (Vera) 0.00% 91.15% 64.88% 42.51% 94.04%
PICloss (Verb) 0.00 81,114.00 236,206.57 348,820.08 390,433.00
relPICloss (Verb) 0.00% 17.80% 17.40% 14.87% 34.45%
PICloss,lines (Vera) 0.00 2959.00 7257.07 9181.69 14,438.25
relPICloss,lines (Vera) 0.00% 10.59% 14.83% 13.56% 27.97%
PICloss,lines (Verb) 0.00 4549.50 11,282.86 14,117.74 20,160.25
relPICloss,lines (Verb) 0.00% 6.93% 10.35% 10.55% 18.71%
PICgain (Vera) 0.00 29,434.00 127,190.43 194,685.73 202,035.25
relPICgain (Vera) 0.00% 20.15% 18.46% 18.97% 35.09%
PICgain (Verb) 0.00 150,787.00 1,241,225.79 2,129,286.82 1,448,084.75
relPICgain (Verb) 0.00% 91.33% 62.00% 42.73% 95.42%
PICgain,lines (Vera) 0.00 2892.50 6751.93 8868.15 11,998.50
relPICgain,lines (Vera) 0.00% 5.90% 11.16% 13.13% 23.62%
PICgain,lines (Verb) 0.00 5696.50 11,106.17 14,108.29 18,202.50
relPICgain,lines (Verb) 0.00% 10.44% 13.78% 14.30% 22.10%
PIC (Vera) 6313.25 117,906.00 789,400.86 1,819,781.00 831,249.50
relPIC (Vera) 37.91% 91.15% 72.40% 32.87% 94.18%
PIC (Verb) 64,220.75 541,058.50 1,288,304.21 2,104,996.71 1,448,092.25
relPIC (Verb) 35.18% 91.33% 70.02% 32.08% 95.44%
PIClines (Vera) 256.50 4231.00 8284.79 8816.45 15,216.50
relPIClines (Vera) 6.30% 17.81% 17.64% 12.76% 28.42%
PIClines (Verb) 1434.50 7391.00 12,709.67 13,576.70 20,160.25
relPIClines (Verb) 6.62% 12.86% 16.16% 13.08% 23.50%
allPIC 138,279.25 709,668.50 2,077,705.07 3,063,388.87 2,526,230.25
relAllP ic 45.17% 88.71% 70.26% 28.99% 94.44%
allPIClines 3380.25 13,540.00 20,994.45 21,479.58 37,212.00
relAllPIClines 6.16% 13.85% 15.45% 10.43% 24.34%
deletedEdges 9735.25 278,466.50 894,557.50 1,927,881.29 858,968.75
addedEdges 90,331.25 693,545.50 1,459,471.71 2,166,280.91 1,561,758.00
deleted (LOC) 9609.00 45,120.50 42,694.64 33,808.46 61,079.00
added (LOC) 24,161.00 65,793.50 76,603.57 62,964.74 99,749.75
All Release Pairs (192)
PICloss (Vera) 0.00 0.00 167,579.59 904,889.78 0.00
relPICloss (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 14.19% 33.33% 0.00%
PICloss (Verb) 0.00 0.00 51,670.19 188,954.40 0.00
relPICloss (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 3.81% 9.98% 0.00%
PICloss,lines (Vera) 0.00 0.00 1587.48 5209.99 0.00
relPICloss,lines (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 3.24% 8.79% 0.00%
PICloss,lines (Verb) 0.00 0.00 2468.12 8040.75 0.00
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Table 7.3 – Protection-Impacting Changes Per Release Pair (MediaWiki – Continued)
Measure 1st quartile Median Mean Standard Dev 3rd quartile
relPICloss,lines (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 2.26% 6.50% 0.00%
PICgain (Vera) 0.00 0.00 27,822.91 104,476.38 0.00
relPICgain (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 4.04% 11.65% 0.00%
PICgain (Verb) 0.00 0.00 271,518.14 1,112,613.67 0.00
relPICgain (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 13.56% 32.44% 0.00%
PICgain,lines (Vera) 0.00 0.00 1476.98 4971.27 0.00
relPICgain,lines (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 2.44% 7.64% 0.00%
PICgain,lines (Verb) 0.00 0.00 2429.47 7994.80 0.00
relPICgain,lines (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 3.01% 8.75% 0.00%
PIC (Vera) 0.00 0.00 172,681.44 904,389.96 0.00
relPIC (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 15.84% 33.65% 0.00%
PIC (Verb) 0.00 0.00 281,816.55 1,111,885.51 0.00
relPIC (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 15.32% 32.60% 0.00%
PIClines (Vera) 0.00 0.00 1812.30 5336.38 0.00
relPIClines (Vera) 0.00% 0.00% 3.86% 9.40% 0.00%
PIClines (Verb) 0.00 0.00 2780.24 8204.77 0.00
relPIClines (Verb) 0.00% 0.00% 3.53% 9.03% 0.00%
allPIC 0.00 0.00 454,497.98 1,660,135.18 0.00
relAllP ic 0.00% 0.00% 15.37% 32.07% 0.00%
allPIClines 0.00 0.00 4592.54 13,219.64 0.00
relAllPIClines 0.00% 0.00% 3.38% 8.02% 0.00%
deleted (LOC) 16.25 121.50 15,535.27 64,917.30 7589.75
added (LOC) 37.75 245.50 20,608.67 42,949.09 17,595.25
We show the histogram of protection-impacting changes per release pair for security-impacted
release pairs in Figure 7.15. In these histograms, we report the measures we defined in Section
7.4.1. These metrics’ distributions for WordPress are in Figure 7.15a and in Figure 7.15b
for MediaWiki. We used bins of different widths to better represent the distribution, which
results in a non-linear X axis.
In Figure 7.15, we observe that, among security-impacted release pairs, 50/87 (57%) and 1/42
(2%) release pairs, respectively of WordPress and MediaWiki, have less than 100 lines of code
classified as protection-impacting changes. We also observe that respectively 61/87 (70%)
and 4/42 (10%) security-impacted release pairs have less than 500 protection-impacting lines
of code. Respectively for WordPress and MediaWiki, 26/87 (30%) and 38/42 (90%) release
pairs have 500 or more lines of protection-impacting changes. The distributions are very
different between WordPress and MediaWiki. The WordPress distributions are long-tailed,
with outliers on the right-hand side of the distribution. We found 8/87 (9%) release pairs
for which allPIClines ≥ 10,000. In the case of MediaWiki, the distributions are skewed
towards the right with a few outliers on the left. We find 24/42 (57%) release pairs for which
allPIClines ≥ 10,000. The outliers also explain the gap between the medians and means in
Tables 7.2 and 7.3.
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For both systems, release pairs with a large number of protection impacting changes (allPIC
≥ 10,000) also have a large volume of code changes. For WordPress, these release pairs have
a mean of over 31 KLOC and 16 KLOC added and deleted lines, respectively. The relative
proportion of protection-impacting change in these release pairs is not very high, with a
mean relAllPIC of 38.75%. For MediaWiki, the mean code changes for these release pairs
is about 108 KLOC and 61 KLOC, respectively for added and deleted code. The relative
protection-impacting change measure is relatively small, with a mean relAllPIC of 21.21%.
We also observe that all these release pairs have a minor or major release number (i.e. a .0
release) for Verb. We discuss these observations further in Section 7.6.1
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Figure 7.15 Distribution of Protection-Impacting Lines of Code per Release Pair for Security-
Impacted Release Pairs
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We present an histogram of the relative distributions relPICloss, relPICgain, relPIC and
relAllPIC for security-impacted release pairs in Figure 7.16. The distributions for WordPress
are in Figure 7.16a, and those of MediaWiki are in Figure 7.16b. For WordPress, we first
observe the large spike at zero in the distribution of relPICloss. This is explained by the
presence of 46 release pairs have no loss-affected vertices whatsoever.
We also observe that relAllPIClines is somewhat skewed towards the left, especially for
MediaWiki. We find that protection-impacting changes represent less than 10% of code
changes (relAllPIClines < 0.1) in 16/87 (18%) and 18/42 (43%) release pairs, respectively
of WordPress and MediaWiki. We also observe that respectively 42/87 (48%) and 32/42
(76%) security-impacted release pairs have less than 25% of changed lines of code considered
as protection-impacting (relAllPIClines < 0.25). We also see that the distribution has for
WordPress has 8/87 (9%) security-impacted release pairs above 50%. However, no release
pairs of MediaWiki have relAllPIClines > 0.5. Thus, protection-impacting changes are
generally few compared to the total number of code changes between versions.
For WordPress, two distributions have large outliers, relPICgain and relPIC for Vera. These
occur for release pairs with a small number of changes (<100 LOC) and appear to be very
targeted. The difference in shape between Figures 7.15 and 7.16 is explained by the large
volume of changes. For instance, the releases which have over 5000 protection-impacting
changes (allPIClines > 5000) show a large amount of code changes. In these release pairs,
the largest measure of relAllPIClines is about 54% for WordPress and 20% for MediaWiki.
The median of relAllPIClines (27.41% for WordPress and 13.85% for MediaWiki) is very
encouraging. We discuss this result further in Section 7.6.1.



For WordPress, the median protection-impacting changed lines of code, for security-
impacted release pairs, is 47 LOC. This corresponds to about 27% of total code
changes.
For MediaWiki, the median protection-impacting changed lines of code, for security-
impacted release pairs, is 13,540 LOC. This corresponds to about 14% of total code
changes.
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Figure 7.16 Distribution of Protection-Impacting Lines of Code per Release Pair for Security-
Impacted Release Pairs
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7.5.2 RQ2 : PICs containing all DPD root causes
To answer RQ2 “How often PICs contain all DPD root causes in a release pair?”, we reverted
protection-impacting changes for the security-affected release pairs of our survey. By doing so,
we determine how many release pairs’ definite protection differences is exclusively explained
by DPD root causes whose code changes belong to paths.
Evaluation Using Reversal Strategies
We reverted protection-impacting changes using complete reversal and individual reversal.
We summarize the computation time and the success rate in Table 7.4.
We performed complete reversal, meaning that we reverted all protection-impacting changes
in security-impacted release pairs. We created reverted versions and computed definite priv-
ilege protection for all reverted release pairs for WordPress and MediaWiki. We summarize
our results in Table 7.4a.
  Protection-impacting changes contain all DPDroot causes in 87% to 93% of cases.
In addition, we also performed individual reversal. We reverted all protection-impacting
changes for every definite protection difference in one release pair of each system. To do so,
we computed protection-impacting changes and created a reverted version for each definite
protection difference. Then, we determined if the definite protection difference disappeared.
All reverts were successful. We summarize the details of the release pairs studied, as well as
the processing time, in Table 7.4b. This indicates that our approach is suitable for finding the
root causes of individual definite protection differences as well as those of multiple definite
protection differences.

 

Our approach is suitable for finding the root causes of individual definite protection
differences as well as those of multiple definite protection differences.
These results are encouraging, and we discuss them further in Section 7.6.2.
7.6 Discussion
When definite protection differences are detected and are due to DPD root causes whose
code changes belong to paths, developers take advantage of protection-impacting changes to
focus their review efforts.
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Table 7.4 Results of Reverting Definite Protection Differences
WordPress MediaWiki
Release Pairs 87 42
Total execution
time (hours)
6.63 7.09
Average ex-
ecution time
(minutes)
4.62 10.13
Success rate 76/87 (87%) 39/42 (93%)
(a) Complete Reversals
WordPress MediaWiki
Release Pair 4.7.1 vs 4.7.2 1.28.2 vs 1.29.0
Definite Protec-
tion Differences
87 46
Total execution
time (hours)
11.19 15.06
Average ex-
ecution time
(minutes)
7.72 19.64
Success rate 87/87 (100%) 46/46 (100%)
(b) Individual Reversals
We have seen that protection-impacting changes are a small percentage of code changes
in security-affected release pairs, with a median of 27.41% for WordPress and 13.85% for
MediaWiki. Using reversal, we also determined that 87% to 93% of release pairs are affected
by DPD root causes whose code changes belong to paths. Our approach gives an opportunity
to reduce review efforts, though further research is needed to investigate and confirm the
impact on developers.
We discuss RQ1 in Section 7.6.1 and then RQ2 in Section 7.6.2. Afterwards, in Section 7.6.3,
we discuss the applications as well as further research opportunities.
7.6.1 RQ1: Reduction of Code Changes to Evaluate
Asking our first research question,“Is the size of protection-impacting changes smaller than
the set of code changes?”, we found that protection-impacting changes reduces the number of
code changes to evaluate. For protection-impacted release pairs in WordPress, we found that
protection-impacting changes are a median of 27.41% of code changes per release pair. In
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the case of MediaWiki, the median relative protection-impacting changes per release pairs is
13.85%. When definite protection differences are detected, developers can focus their review
efforts on the 14%-27% of code changes that are protection-impacting. Over the lifetime
of the project, protection-impacting changes are an average of roughly 3% to 11% of code
changes. Considering these results, our approach gives an opportunity to reduce review
efforts, though further research is needed to confirm this.
We observed that 8 release pairs of WordPress and 24 release pairs of MediaWiki had more
than 10,000 protection-impacting changed lines. We also saw that the mean relative measure
of protection-impacting changes for these releases is ranging from about 21% to 39%. We
also saw that this situation occurs only for release pairs leading to new minor and major
(i.e. .0) releases. Even though this large volume of changes is relatively small compared to
the total changes, it is likely that their verification and validation would be time-consuming.
The regular use of our approach during the development of .0 releases would be especially
desirable.
7.6.2 RQ2 : PICs containing all DPD root causes
Our second research question was “How often PICs contain all DPD root causes in a release
pair?”. We evaluated that root causes are a subset of protection-impacting changes in two
different ways. In our first evaluation strategy, we reverted all protection-impacting changes
at the file level for each release pair of our survey. we found that protection-impacting changes
contained DPD root causes in 87% and 93% of release pairs, respectively for WordPress and
MediaWiki.
In our second evaluation strategy, we likewise reverted protection-impacting changes. How-
ever, we computed and reverted protection-impacting changes individually for each definite
protection differences in the latest security-affected release pair of each system. For Word-
Press, the release pair (4.7.1 vs 4.7.2) had 87 definite protection differences. For MediaWiki,
the (1.28.2 vs 1.29.0) release pair had 46 definite protection differences. All individual rever-
sals were successful.
7.6.3 Further Discussions
We focused on DPD root causes whose code changes belong to paths, but also observed
definite protection differences caused by changes that occur somewhere else than paths. For
instance, code changes that affect interprocedural edge resolution causes may cause definite
protection differences.
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We show an example in Figure 7.17 in Unified Diff format. In this case, $a is a known
instance of interface iFace. Please imagine that a call graph construction algorithm creates
an edge between the call site and all implementations of iFace::foo. In this case, the code
change for class B will cause definite protection differences. However, the code change causing
this does not belong to any path between v0 and the definite protection differences.
In addition to the kind of impact based on class hierarchy changes and reflective calls, we
also found definite protection differences caused by conservative approximations in our PTFA
engine. For instance, it treats apparently dead code as unprotected entry points. This
decision has the consequence of injecting unprotected paths that are not DPD root causes
whose code changes belong to paths.
1 function foo(iFace $a){}
2 if (current_user_can(’p’)){
3 $a->foo();
4 }
5 }
6
7 interface iFace{
8 function foo()
9 }
10
11 class A implements iFace{
12 function foo(){echo "Definitely Protected";}
13 }
14
15 //This class now implements iFace
16 - class B {
17 + class B implements iFace{
18 function foo(){echo "Gain -Affected";}
19 }
Figure 7.17 Example of definite protection difference Caused by Interprocedural Edge Reso-
lution. Added and Deleted Code is Respectively Annotated With ’+’ and ’-’
An absence of definite protection differences imply that the privilege protection for that code
is just as valid or invalid for version Ver b as it was for Vera.
While our approach does not require one, it may benefit from an oracle that classifies definite
protection differences as beneficial, harmful or irrelevant. With such an oracle, we could com-
pute protection-impacting changes only for harmful security changes. We could also report
on how many code changes affected security, and on the distribution of protection-impacting
changes populations. Suitable oracles include a formal security specification, a classification
of security-impacted lines by developers, or a vulnerability oracle. Our approach can be
127
used between any two versions of the application, making it suitable as an early warning
system for security issues. For instance, developers could use definite protection difference
analysis after each commit. Or they could integrate our approach in automated build sys-
tems. A build system could treat definite protection differences as regressions and calculate
protection-impacting changes whenever such regressions occur.
Our approach could also be integrated with other formal methods for policy verification.
Furthermore, formal verification methods may generate a counter-example that shows a
path leading to the violations. Protection-impacting changes could be integrated with these
counter-examples, which may make the counter-example more informative. We also envi-
sion integrated development environments (IDE) allowing developers to determine definite
protection differences and protection-impacting changes interactively.
Developers using on-demand analysis may also find it easier to evaluate and fix vulnerabili-
ties. For instance, they could compute protection-impacting changes for the vulnerable code
segment. Then, she may determine which code changes are responsible for the vulnerability
and which correction is needed. Additionally, our approach would allow developers to com-
pare the effective definite protection differences against their expectations, making it useful
for validating security patches. Developers may find useful know whether new code is defi-
nitely protected by a given privilege, or why it is lacking a privilege in its definite protection
set.
Our approach may be suited for selecting regression tests. Ideally, one would only need to
run the tests executing protection-impacting changes when re-validating the RBAC imple-
mentation.
Although our results are promising, further research towards identifying DPD root causes
is desirable. Fine-grained (e.g. commit-level) protection-impacting changes surveys should
also be performed. The psychological acceptability of our results should be confirmed using
human studies.
Further research efforts should also be invested in improving vertexMap construction. Im-
provements may take the form of from a finer-grained (e.g. token-based) or tree-based dif-
ferencing methods. The latter relies on comparing abstract syntax trees [52].
As we mentioned in Section 7.2.2, definite protection differences can disappear by reversal
or by alternative code changes. We would like to investigate automated repair algorithms,
which would generate code changes making definite protection differences disappear.
As we discussed earlier, our approach currently only considers changed path root causes. Our
analysis already detects protection-impacting edges that do not correspond to code changes.
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However, our heuristics dismiss these edges when reporting protection-impacting changes
at the line level. We would like to design additional heuristics in future research. These
heuristics would identify the cause of these dismissed protection-impacting edges.
In addition, we would like to devise a decision support system based on our approach (Figure
7.18). This system would compute protection-impacting changes and perform a reversal. The
latter step would confirm if the protection-impacting changes all belong to changed paths. In
the event of a failed reversal, the PIC Simpliflier would determine the subset of PICloss and
PICgain that do not correspond to code changes (i.e. the PIC Subset). Using such a decision
support system, developers would be informed if the DPD root causes are changed path root
causes. When that is the case, they may restrict their re-validation to protection-impacting
changes. However, whenever the DPD root causes are not changed path root causes, this
decision support system would inform the developer of edges requiring deeper analysis.
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7.7 Related Work
Letarte et al. [112] also surveyed the evolution of RBAC systems using PTFA. Their survey
was over 31 phpBB releases, which only handled a binary distinction between administrator
and unprivileged users. In our study, we detect protection-impacting changes, handle a richer
protection scheme, performed a larger survey and considered DPD root causes.
We previously surveyed WordPress using PTFA. In a first study [101], we defined definite
protection differences and produced counter-examples for loss-affected code. We also pro-
posed a classification of definite protection differences [103] and reported on the demogra-
phy of the classification categories. In contrast, this paper defines and surveys protection-
impacting changes and considers DPD root causes. It is also not aimed a the classification
and distribution of these differences. We previously defined protection-impacting changes
[100] and reported a survey of protection-impacting changes of 210 release pairs of Word-
Press. We also reported a manual evaluation of protection-impacting changes that found
that protection-impacting changes caused real definite protection differences in 75% of cases.
In this study, we survey an additional system for protection-impacting changes. We also
evaluated if protection-impacting changes contains root causes by reverting changes.
Some researchers studied software evolution from the perspective of access control systems.
Montrieux et al. published a position paper [134] showing that general software evolution
approaches, aimed at consistency checking, were not sufficient for the evolution of RBAC.
They do not address code-level RBAC implementation, however.
Hwang et al. published one of the first evolution studies of access control systems [80].
They studied the SELinux policies for the NCSU Virtual Computing Lab. They found that
growth was linear and that the policies were changing frequently. This study did not consider
implementation of a policy in code, however.
Formal methods exists to analyze RBAC policies. Margrave [55] is a tool leveraging
formal methods to support access control evolution. It operates over policies specified using
the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [138]. Margrave translates
XACML policies to decision diagrams and differences the policies. However, Margrave
does not take the implementation of the RBAC policy in consideration.
Other approaches use formal static analysis methods for RBAC systems. One system, Role-
Cast [167], automatically detects privilege protection checks in PHP and JSP applications.
RoleCast uses inferences to identify critical variables controlling the reachability of security
sensitive statements. Then, RoleCast infers roles and determines if checks are performed
consistently. When RoleCast reports a potential vulnerability, it mentions many details,
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including the security sensitive statement, its calling context, and which security variables are
erroneously verified. Our contribution is very different. Our analysis is comparative, meaning
that we report differences in definite privilege protection. Also, we rely on a priori knowl-
edge of code patterns used for RBAC privilege checks. We determine protection-impacting
changes with graph reachability and code differences, thereby connecting definite protection
differences to their potential causes. In addition, our study considers DPD root causes.
An extension tool of RoleCast, is Fix Me Up [168]. It statically finds access-control errors
of omission and proposes candidate repairs. The approach generates an access control tem-
plate, detects deviations from this template and changes them to conform. Their algorithm
relies on slicing, a more complex algorithm than ours, and does not detect definite protection
differences.
Another approach intended to detect violations is XACML2ASP from Ahn et al. [4].
XACML2ASP uses Answer Set Programming (ASP) to verify, compare and query XACML
policies. They leverage ASP solvers to do so. Their method detects policy violations whenever
XACML policies are enriched with constraints such as separation of duty. Their approach
does not consider implementation of the policy in code, however.
Analyzing RBAC policy evolution is also useful for testing. Hwang et al. [81] use semantic
differencing of XACML policies for test selection. This has a dynamic component, as it
requires running the full test suite at least once. Le Traon et al. [108] used testing to detect
hidden and implicit security mechanisms. They override the policy decision point (PDP)
and compare the test results. In comparison, our approach is entirely static and identifies
potential root causes for protection changes.
Huang et al. [76] developed the selective access control regression test tool (SACRT). Their
test selection method also differences XACML policy files. They validated their approach
on four test systems from the financial industry. Our approach is different since we do not
require a formal policy and we consider definite protection differences, protection-impacting
changes and DPD root causes.
It is also possible to generate test cases for systems using RBAC. Pretschner et al. [150]
created a tool that generates test cases for an RBAC policy. They used combinatorial testing
of the roles, permissions, and contexts hierarchies. The tests are refined using constraints and
generate tests in Java. Our approach is different, as we do not consider test generation. Also,
their study does not look into definite protection differences, protection-impacting changes
and DPD root causes.
131
Model checking is also useful to identify candidate causes of errors. Ball et al. [20] proposed
an method which identifies transitions in an error trace that are in no correct trace and injects
halt statements to produce additional error traces. The authors leveraged information from
a model checker to determine the cause of an error. Their approach uses both correct and
incorrect traces and identifies transitions in an error trace that are in no correct trace. Then,
they inject halt statements at each cause’s location and produce additional error traces.
Another model checking approach also informs the user of a small set of candidate causes for
the error [66]. In this study, they used a distance metric that considers causal dependence
to do so. They also express counter-example generation as a minimization problem, on both
the length and semantic axes. While both approaches are also based on model checking, ours
is concerned with privilege protection and depends on code changes.
Bugginings [166] identifies the cause of a bug in the context of software evolution by
differencing dependence graphs. Bugginings did not consider RBAC security. Finally,
Bugginings [166] identifies the cause of a bug in the context of software evolution. It does
not rely on model checking. Their approach relies on differencing dependence graphs and
may investigate multiple versions. In contrast, our approach targets only definite protection
differences, We also determine differences at the CFG level and rely on PTFA backwards
reachability.
7.8 Threats to Validity
Threats to internal validity refer to confounding variables that may influence our results.
Our results depend on the accuracy of the PTFA engine we used. Because PHP applications
like WordPress rely on many dynamic features, the engine relies on sound but conservative
approximations that may lead to spurious paths. In turn, spurious paths may lead to the
identification of spurious protection-impacting changes. As a consequence, the real set of
protection-impacting changes may be even smaller than reported. We did not calculate the
spurious path rate since a previous study reported the spurious path rate for PTFA on
WordPress of 10.96 ± 3.18% (95% confidence level) [101]. Our results also depend on the
differencing algorithm we used. We extracted line-level differences between releases using
GNU diff. Since there may be many CFG vertices (and thus PTFA states) on the same line
of code, we over-estimate addedEdges and deletedEdges. However, this should only affect
our results minimally, since we present our results at a line granularity. Other differencing
algorithms, such as those supplied by versioning systems could also be used and may produce
slightly different results.
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Developers sometimes rely on variables and dynamic expressions to determine which privilege
to verify. Our tool also conservatively approximates privilege names verified, and we may
report definite protection differences where none occurred. Practically, the real rate of definite
protection differences may be to be lower than we report. To counter this, we would like to
improve our tool’s accuracy by leveraging string analysis or use runtime invariants.
Our evaluation depends in part on the method we chose for reverting protection-impacting
changes. We revert at file granularity, which is coarse. Reverting changes at a finer granularity
(e.g. function level) could also be used and may produce slightly different results. Threats to
external validity relate to the generalizability of our results. We did not have a vulnerability
oracle for our study, though our approach may use one. Consequently, we cannot determine a
specific distribution of protection-impacting changes for vulnerabilities. To counter this issue,
studies using a vulnerability oracle (e.g. a testbench with known vulnerabilities) should be
performed.
Another threat to generalizability is that our study is on two open source content management
system implemented in PHP. We may obtain different results when studying other systems,
whether they are written in PHP or other languages. While the PTFA engine we used only
handles PHP at the moment, our approach itself is reproducible and language-independent.
To avoid that our conclusions depend on the change history of this single system, studies
that include other systems should be performed.
7.9 Conclusion and Future Work
Our general objective is to reduce RBAC re-validation effort. We proposed an automated
static analysis over privilege protection.
Our analysis finds definite protection differences and determine the protection-impacting
changes that caused a subset of them. Protection-impacting changes are a subset of the
code changes and contains those DPD root causes whose code changes belong to paths.
We detailed three main contributions. First, we described a method to automatically identify
protection-impacting changes during software evolution. Second, we reported on a longitudi-
nal survey of the prevalence of protection-impacting changes in two popular PHP web-based
content management systems. This survey considered 210 release pairs of WordPress, and
192 release pairs of Mediawiki. Third, we reported on a longitudinal survey of the prevalence
of DPD root causes whose code changes belong to paths in WordPress and MediaWiki.
We have seen that 87/210 (41%) WordPress release pairs and 42/192 (22%) MediaWiki
release pairs were security-impacted. For these release pairs, protection-impacting changes
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are a small percentage of code changes, with a median of about 27% for WordPress and 14%
for MediaWiki. Over all release pairs in our survey, protection-impacting changes are an
even smaller percentage of code changes. While the median is not meaningful, their mean is
about 11% and 3% of code changes respectively for WordPress and MediaWiki.
By reverting protection-impacting changes, we found that DPD root causes whose code
changes belong to paths explain all definite protection differences in 87% of WordPress re-
lease pairs and 93% of MediaWiki release pairs. Our first research question was “Is the
size of protection-impacting changes smaller than the set of code changes?”. We conclude
affirmatively. Using protection-impacting changes, developers would only need to validate
between a median of about 14% to 27% of code changes in security-impacted release pairs.
Our conclusion stands despite outliers pushing the average up somewhat (about 15%) to
26%.




	
RQ1 Is the size of protection-impacting changes smaller than the set of code
changes?
Using protection-impacting changes, developers would only need to validate between
a median of approximatively 14-27% and a mean of about 15-26% of code changes
in security-impacted release pairs.
Our second research question was “How often PICs contain all DPD root causes in a release
pair?”. We conclude that the vast majority of release pairs meet this criteria. Using two
reversal approaches, we confirmed that DPD root causes whose code changes belong to paths
explained all definite protection differences in 87% to 93% of cases.
Our results indicate that developers are likely to benefit from using protection-impacting
change analysis. They shrink the amount of code changes that must be evaluated up to 27%
and could be used in 87% to 93% of the times.
Future research includes the investigation of the distribution of protection-impacting changes
corresponding to vulnerabilities, whenever a security oracle is available. This evaluation
would allow us to quantify how many protection-impacting changes caused or fixed vul-
nerabilities. Further research could also be devoted to investigating the interaction with
developers and the visualization [180] of protection-impacting changes. An approach about
determining explanatory counter-examples [101] could also be used, combined with visualiza-
tion techniques to supply information to developers. As mentioned earlier, further research
may include the assessment of the real impact of the proposed techniques to application se-
curity verification and validation in collaboration with real human developers. Such studies
would measure the developers validation effort during an application evolution and assess
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the advantages of the proposed approach. Finally, we would also like to extend the proposed
analysis to other systems and other programming languages.
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CHAPTER 8 GENERAL DISCUSSION
Through five research objectives, our project found ways to support developers re-validating
their RBAC implementation.
We presented a novel concept, evolutive analysis of RBAC implementations. This approach
assumes that the code is just as valid as it was in the previous version when no definite
protection differences are detected.
Earlier contributions compared stand-alone RBAC policies – potentially, but not explicitly,
of different versions. However, these approaches were not suited for re-validating RBAC
implementations. Other earlier contributions analyzed the RBAC implementation of one
version. Despite these limitations, non-evolutive RBAC analyses may help developers for the
initial validation of their RBAC implementation.
We do not repeat our earlier discussions. However, we summarize important points in relation
to our research objectives in Section 8.1. Then, we discuss the use of vulnerability oracles in
Section 8.2. Afterwards, we consider the industrial applications of our method in Section 8.3,
and its limitations in Section 8.4. We then show a few examples from security vulnerabilities
in Section 8.5. Then, we discuss the implementation of our toolchain, followed with reflection
on language support in Sections 8.6 and 8.7, respectively.
8.1 Discussion on the Research Objectives
Our first research objective was “Determine which parts of the program have different definite
privilege protection, compared to the last version”. To achieve this objective, we defined
definite protection differences. In our survey of WordPress, we found that code changes
between releases have a small impact on definite privilege protection. When a pair of versions
is free of DPDs, there are no regressions in the RBAC implementation, within the limits of
our analysis. When a pair of versions has security-impacted code, our analysis is likely to
focus developers’ efforts, as 99.7% of code is free of DPDs.
Our second research objective was “Determine how the protection differs”. We proposed a set-
theoretic classification over definite privilege protection sets. We designed our classification
to distinguish between different cases of overlap because there might be association between
privileges in symmetric overlaps. Definiting this kind of category up front supports potential
research efforts in determining these associations.
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In our survey of WordPress, we found that complete gains, complete losses and substitu-
tion were the most common categories. The classification of DPDs may help developers
understand the nature of the changes and their security impacts. Additionally, the domi-
nant classification categories are very black-and-white. In the first main categories, definite
protection for a statement changes from unprotected to protected (or vice versa). In the
next main category, a statement’s definite protection changes entirely from one privilege to
another. This kind of straightforward information may be easier to reason about.
Our classification may also help them prioritize review efforts. For instance, depending on the
application’s security policy, a complete loss of privilege protection may be more troublesome
than a monotonic gain. In such a case, developers are likely to investigate the former first.
Our third research objective was “Given a change in definite protection, justify the outcome.”
We achieved this objective by computing explanatory counter-examples for loss-affected code.
In order to facilitate the evaluation of explanatory counter-examples by developers, we addi-
tionally used graph transformations to shorten them. We found that most privilege protection
loss examples are fewer than 100 states long, which is short. We also note that most examples
are contained in the same file, but are not contained in the same function.
We expect that privilege protection loss examples will help developers revalidate their RBAC
implementation. The counter-example is an unprotected path that is responsible for a loss
of protection. There may be other paths that also explain the DPD. However, due to the
universally quantified predicates of definite privilege protection, the existence of a single
unprotected path is sufficient for definite privilege protection to be lost. The path presented
should be straightforward for developers to evaluate. It also hints at corrective actions. Since
this was a preliminary study, we restricted our approach to loss-affected cases. However, the
approach is generalizable and future research should be dedicated to it.
Our fourth research objective was “Determine which code changes are responsible for pro-
tection differences.” To do so, we computed protection-impacting changes. In our survey
of WordPress and MediaWiki, we found that, in security-affected release pairs, a median of
approximately 14% to 27% of code changes are protection-impacting.
When definite protection differences are detected, developers can focus their review efforts
on the code changes that are protection-impacting.
Our last research question was “Investigate the relationship between the code changes iden-
tified in RO4 and root causes of protection differences.” Using reversal, we also determined
that PICs contain all root causes of DPDs in 87% to 93% of release pairs. Since this is a
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preliminary study, we chose to revert DPD root causes at file granularity because the reverted
changes are guaranteed to be syntactically correct and the simplicy of the operation.
Within the limitations we discuss below, these findings guarantee that reviewing PICs are
sufficient to determine the origin of DPDs. In other words, when re-validating their RBAC
implementation, developers only need to review a median of 27% of their code changes, in at
least 87% of the times.
We also reported the successful reversal of protection-impacting changes individually for
each definite protection differences in the latest security-affected release pair of each system.
These reversal results indicate that our approach is suited for analyses of varying degrees of
granularity. In particular, this result demonstrates the viability of on-demand analysis for
specifics DPDs.
We focused on DPD root causes whose code changes belong to paths, but also observed def-
inite protection differences caused by changes that occur somewhere else. For instance, code
changes that affect interprocedural edge resolution may cause definite protection differences.
In addition to the kind of impact due to class hierarchy changes and reflective calls, we also
found definite protection differences caused by conservative approximations in our PTFA en-
gine. For instance, it treats apparently dead code as unprotected entry points. This decision
has the consequence of injecting unprotected paths that do not directly intersect with the
code changes.
8.2 Vulnerability Oracles
Our approach does not require an oracle that classifies definite protection differences as
beneficial, harmful or irrelevant. However, such an oracle would be beneficial. Using it,
we could compute explanatory counter-examples and protection-impacting changes only for
harmful security changes. In addition, this oracle, combined with PICs, would allow us to
report how many code changes were harmful. Finally, we would be able to report on the
differences of populations for DPDs, explanatory counter-examples and PICs.
8.3 Secure Software Development Processes
Our contributions could be integrated in software development processes with relative ease.
One can compute DPDs between any two versions of the application. Consequently, a de-
veloper could also compute explanatory counter-examples and PICs at any granularity. Our
approach is therefore suitable as an early warning system for security issues. For instance,
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developers could detect DPDs after each commit. They could also do so in automated build
systems. A build system could treat definite protection differences as regressions and calcu-
late protection-impacting changes whenever such regressions occur.
Adding our approach to integrated development environments (IDE) would also be very
helpful. This would allow developers to compute DPDs, explanatory counter-examples and
PICs interactively.
Vulnerability reports may be easier to evaluate using on-demand analysis. For instance, they
could compute protection-impacting changes for the vulnerable code segment. Then, they
may determine which code changes are responsible for the vulnerability and which correction
is needed. Thus, our approach may also facilitate the creation of vulnerability patches.
Additionally, our approach may validate security patches, by comparing the effective definite
protection differences against developers’ expectations.
In addition, we earlier suggested a decision support system based on our approach. This
system would automatically determine if the DPD root causes are changed path root causes.
Whenever the DPD root causes are not changed path root causes, this decision support
system would pinpoint edges requiring deeper analysis.
8.4 Limitations of the Proposed Solution
The precision of our analysis is limited by the precision of its inputs, namely of the PTFA
model and the code differences, which we elaborate on in Section 8.4.1. Furthermore, the
results we report are dependent on the program size measure we use, which we discuss in
Section 8.4.2. In addition, our approach is limited in the scope of code we analyze, which we
describe in Section 8.4.3. Finally, our approach is limited by code patterns developers use.
We identified them during our reviews and describe them in Section 8.4.4.
8.4.1 Precision
The PTFA analyzer used throughout this thesis uses conservative approximations of many
PHP features, including polymorphism and reflection [60]. The algorithm we use for back-
wards reachability (c.f. Appendix F) is sound, but may spuriously consider edges in recursive
functions as reachable. This seems not to be a problem in practice, however. If this be-
comes problematic, it may be possible to compute all paths in the problematic region. Since
this analysis is likely to be expensive, future research should consider this, possibly using
a context-sensitive analysis. Nonetheless, program analysis in presence of recursion suffers
from some undecidability and uncomputability constraints [96]. Despite these constraints,
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it is an active area of research (e.g. [17, 42, 110]). Future tools may take advantage of
such improvements, since the definition of protection-impacting changes is independent of
the interprocedural reachability algorithm used.
The code differencing approach we use is based on line-level differences. This reflects the
industry standard, reflected by a widespread use of diff. In addition, version controls
systems such as git use line-level differences by default, even though a finer-grained option
is available (i.e. --word-diff). Even though line-level differencing works well in practice,
we may obtain better results using finer grained differencing (e.g. AST differencing [47, 52]
or clone analysis).
Another limitation on the precision of our results is based on the conservative definition
of PICs, which report all code changes that are on appropriately protected interprocedural
paths to DPDs. Therefore, PIC analysis may identify code changes as protection-impacting,
even though they have no apparent impact to the privilege protection (e.g. many libraries
and included code that do not affect privilege protection). Future research should address
this limitation.
8.4.2 Program Size and Change Size Metrics
In the first article (Chapter 4), we reported a relative measure that was the number of
DPDs over the program size in terms of CFG vertices. This provides an apples-to-apples
comparison, since DPDs are defined over CFG vertices. In the second article (Chapter 5),
we reported counter-example length in terms of PTFA states.
Such measures may be counter-intuitive for developers. As such, we reported Lines of Code
(LOC) metrics in the third article (Chapter 6). For the sake of completeness, we reported
both PTFA-level and line-level metrics in the last article (Chapter 7).
LOC is a simple measure that is strongly correlated with other size measures and many
metrics [63, 117]. As such, a relationship between a variable and LOC should also hold for
other program size metrics. In addition, metrics that are strongly correlated with program
size are more able to predict external features such as failures [63]. Gil and Lalouche even
argue that “code size is the only ‘unique’ valid metric.” [63].
The Number of Tokens (NOT) is considered to be a more robust metric [63] than LOC. How-
ever, the difference in correlation between LOC and other size metrics (such as the number
of tokens [NOT]) is not statistically significant. In addition, LOC is more reproducible. This
factor is relevant when analyzing programs written in programming languages which lack a
formal specification of their grammar, such as PHP. Front-ends may define different tokens,
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yielding variations in NOT measures. We expect that these variations may be minimal.
Nonetheless, we prefer a more reproducible metric and thus opt for LOC.
A measure of program size that excludes comments and empty lines is the Non-Comment
Lines of Code (NCLOC) [54]. The use of NCLOC is however generally discouraged. Since
PICs do not include comments and lines of code, it may nonetheless be more appropriate
to report relative measures (e.g. PIClines) using changed NCLOC instead of changed LOC.
However, obtaining changed NCLOC is likely to require post-processing over the output of
differencing tools. As such, this should be considered in future research. Nonetheless, we
expect that the ratios we report would not vary greatly. In our observations, the code changes
were dominated by non-comment and non-whitespace lines.
8.4.3 Privilege Protection and Code Analyzed
Our approach only considers definite protection. It is possible that our approach is useful for
possible privilege protection as well.
Also, our approach is that it depends on the differences between versions Vera and Verb. As
such, the choice of these versions is very important.
In addition, DPDs are, by definition, only available for code that belongs to both versions.
Intuitively speaking, the privilege protection of new and deleted code may be important to
developers. For instance, they may be interested in the code changes that caused definite
protection (or lack thereof) in new code. Currently, developers only have definite protection
information for new and added code. Protection-impacting changes should be extended to
answer this need.
8.4.4 Complex Code Patterns
Along my predecessors [60], I observed some RBAC patterns in the applications examined.
The use of these patterns may be problematic, as they do not confer definite protection, and
thus no DPDs. These patterns are qualified privilege protection checks, disjunctive checks,
and variable protection checks.
Qualified privilege protection checks depend on other values. Such security checks create
security invariants that developers rely on. We show an example in Figure 8.1a, where the
security of a block relies on the earlier qualified verification of privilege p1.
The other two patterns are similar. Variable protection checks verify the privilege stored
in a variable, which may have many possible values. We show an example in Figure 8.1b,
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where either privilege p1 or p2 is verified. Disjunctive checks, in a similar vein, verify that
at least one privilege is verified. We show an example in Figure 8.1c, where privilege p1 or
p2 is verified, but where it is possible that the user has both. PTFA analysis currently only
tracks constant and conjunctive predicates.
if((’val’ == $status)
&&! isAllowed(’p1’))
return ERROR;
//...
if(’val’ == $status){
// Protected by p1
}
(a) Example of Qualified
Privilege Check
if (...) $cap = ’p1’;
else $cap = ’p2’;
if (isAllowed($cap))
die();
// Protected by p1 OR p2
(b) Example of Variable Privi-
lege Check
if (! isAllowed(’p1’) &&
!isAllowed(’p2’))
die();
// Protected by p1 OR p2
(c) Example of Disjunctive Privi-
lege Check
Figure 8.1 Example of Privilege Checks Which Do Not Confer Definite Privilege Protection
These observations open many research directions. First, what are all the patterns of RBAC
checks in RBAC implementations, and what is their demography? Second, which ones are
RBAC implementation anti-patterns? Third, if they are anti-patterns, how can we automat-
ically transform the code that use RBAC implementation anti-patterns into a form that only
uses good patterns? Fourth, how can we determine definite protection in the presence of
RBAC implementation anti-patterns? Fifth, how can we efficiently do so?
Regarding the fifth question, variations on PTFA are possible for disjunctive predicate checks.
A first option would be to consider them as a new privilege (e.g. priv1 ∨ priv2). Another
option is to record grant edges in these cases as being possible, rather than certain, as was
proposed by Ouellet et al. [141]. This latter option would require expanding our approach
for non-definitive privilege protection.
8.5 Examples
We now consider three examples from vulnerability fixes. We represent the patches in Unified
Diff format and we highlight the changed lines of code that our tool identifies as protection-
impacting in green.
In our first example, we look again at CVE-2015-5623, which we first discussed in Section
1.1.5. In Figure 8.2, we observe that the functional change in line 26 is not protection-
impacting. It is important to note that abrupt termination statements (in this example,
return and exit) are not always protection-impacting. This is because these statements
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create an edge that connects directly to the end of the function. As such, they may not
always belong to the appropriately protected paths between q0 and DPDs.
1 // In wp -admin/includes/dashboard.php
2 wp_network_dashboard_right_now () {
3 function wp_dashboard_quick_press( $error_msg = false ) {
4 global $post_ID;
5
6 + if ( ! current_user_can( ’edit_posts’)){
7 + return;
8 + }
9 // ...
10 //In wp -admin/post.php
11 if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $nonce , ’add -post’ ) )
12 $error_msg = __( ’...’ );
13
14 - if ( ! current_user_can( ’edit_posts’))
15 + if ( ! current_user_can( ’edit_posts’)){
16 - $error_msg = __( ’...’);
17 + exit;
18 + }
19 //...
20 //In wp -includes/capabilities.php
21 case ’edit_post ’:
22 case ’edit_page ’:
23 $post = get_post( $args [0] );
24 - if ( empty( $post ) )
25 + if ( empty( $post ) ) {
26 + $caps [] = ’do_not_allow ’;
27 break;
28 + }
29 //...
Figure 8.2 Reformatted Patch for CVE-2015-5623. Represented in Unified Diff Format.
Protection-Impacting Lines of Code Highlighted in Green.
Our second example involves a complex code pattern. The patch to the vulnerability doc-
umented by CVE-2006-6016 (Figure 8.3). This vulnerability affected WordPress in releases
prior to 2.0.5 and allowed remote authenticated users to access any user’s metadata.
We observe that the vulnerability was caused by improper handling of a lack of privileges.
The developers only recorded error messages to display, but did not prevent the information
to be retrieved and displayed (lines 14 and 21). The patch resolves the issue with calls to
die, which stops the script’s execution (lines 15 and 23). The code elided corresponding to
line 18 is definitely protected with regards to privilege edit_users after the patch is applied.
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In addition, the developer added a parameter validity check (lines 1 to 5). This change does
not appear related to the vulnerability and is plausibly an act of defensive programming.
In this case, the abrupt termination statements (die) are never protection-impacting. This
occurs because these statements create an edge that connects directly to the end of the
program execution. As such, they never belong to an appropriately protected paths between
q0 and DPDs.
1 + $user_id = (int)$user_id;
2 +
3 + if ( $user_id )
4 + die(__(’Invalid␣user␣ID.’));
5 +
6 switch ($action) {
7 case ’switchposts ’:
8 check_admin_referer ();
9 /* TODO: Switch all posts from one user to another user */
10 break;
11 case ’update ’:
12 //...
13 if (! current_user_can(’edit_users ’))
14 - $errors[’head’]=__(’...’);
15 + die(__(’...’));
16 else
17 $errors = edit_user($user_id);
18 //...
19 default:
20 //...
21 - if (! current_user_can(’edit_users ’)) $errors[’head’] = __(’...’);
22 + if (! current_user_can(’edit_users ’))
23 + die__(’...’);
24 ?>
Figure 8.3 Reformatted Security Patch for CVE-2006-6016. Changes represented in Unified
Diff format. Protection-Impacting Lines in Green.
One of the branches of the switch statement (line 7) is a placeholder for a future feature. The
consequence of this code pattern is that the code after the switch statement is not definitely
protected, and thus we would not detect DPDs there. In practice, the code after the patch
is definitely protected with privilege edit_users as long as the $action variable contains a
string other than ’switchposts’. This may be an invariant in that version. Because little
code is gain-affected in this example, the change shown at lines 21 and 23 is not considered
protection-impacting.
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Our third example also includes complex code patterns. It is the patch fixing the vulnerability
documented in CVE-2007-1893 (Figure 8.4). This vulnerability in WordPress versions prior
to 2.1.3 allowed remote a privilege escalation. Users with the contributor role were able to
publish a post, something that was restricted to more privileged users.
All the privilege checks in the patch are either disjunctive or qualified. In addition, the
unqualified privilege check at line 9 was moved and made qualified at line 16. As a result,
the code at lines 12 onwards are loss-affected.
1 + if ( (’publish ’ == $post_status) && !current_user_can(’publish_posts
’) )
2 + return new IXR_Error (401, ’Sorry ,␣you␣do␣not␣have␣the␣right␣to␣
publish␣this␣post.’);
3 +
4 $post_title = xmlrpc_getposttitle($content);
5 $post_category = xmlrpc_getpostcategory($content);
6 $post_content = xmlrpc_removepostdata($content);
7 //...
8 set_current_user (0, $user_login);
9 - if ( !current_user_can(’edit_post’, $post_ID))
10 - return new IXR_Error (401, ’...’);
11 -
12 - $postdata = wp_get_single_post($post_ID, ARRAY_A);
13 - extract($postdata);
14 - $this->escape($postdata);
15 //...
16 + if ( ( ’post’== $post_type )&& !current_user_can(’edit_post’, $post_ID))
17 + return new IXR_Error (401, ’...’);
18 +
19 + $postdata = wp_get_single_post($post_ID, ARRAY_A);
20 + extract($postdata);
21 + $this->escape($postdata);
22 //...
23 + if ( (’publish’== $post_status)){
24 + if ( ( ’page’== $post_type )&& !current_user_can(’publish_pages’))
25 + return new IXR_Error (401, ’...’);
26 + else if ( !current_user_can(’publish_posts’))
27 + return new IXR_Error (401, ’...’);
28 + }
29 //...
30 }
Figure 8.4 Reformatted Security Patch for CVE-2007-1893. Changes represented in Unified
Diff format. Protection-Impacting Lines in Green.
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8.6 Implementation Notes
We summarize the software components described in this thesis in Figure 8.5. The compo-
nent in light grey (the PHP front-end) was originally developed by fellow lab members and
maintained by myself. It was partly described in the literature [60, 61] and we provide more
details in Section 8.6.1. The components in dark grey have been implemented by fellow lab
members and used as-is. One of them (the PTFA engine) was described in the literature
[57, 60] and we provide more details in Sections 8.6.2 and 8.6.3.
What I implemented, the white components, use output of the PTFA analyzer and program
differences to perform additional analyses. Please note that Figure 8.5 does not include all
utilities and scripts that facilitate automation in order to avoid overcrowding. The new Java
source code, without tests, adds to 23 KLOC. The python scripts add up to 4 KLOC.
The components follow the pipes-and-filters architecture, in line with the Unix philosophy.
Thus, each component has a textual output format and dependent components parse them.
This architecture may not offer the best performance, but it facilitates troubleshooting, reuse
of experimental data and enables future research projects.
8.6.1 The PHP Front-End
The PHP front-end is based on an open-source grammar1 and maintained by Thierry Lavoie,
François Gauthier and eventually myself. The front-end also includes visitors that output
ASTs and CFGs. It also integrates with a Datalog engine for propagating access control
checks stored in variables [60, 61].
The grammar handles all PHP versions between 4.0 and 5.6. Please note that the majority of
PHP 7 code is handled. Because the PHP grammar is not formally specified and fluctuates
from one version to the other, our grammar supports a superset of the actual PHP 5.6
language. In other words, it would not be possible to use a recent version of the official PHP
interpreter as a front-end, as old code sometimes violate the current grammar and is thus
rejected by the PHP interpreter.
My maintenance duties mostly consisted at updating the grammar when we found edge cases
that caused compilation errors. These fixes were non-trivial, as it often required a lot of
trial-and-error to reverse-engineer the grammar rule that the PHP interpreter expects. This
sometimes identified a production rule based on an erroneous prior reverse-engineering. In
all cases, it was challenging to modify the grammar without regressions.
1The original grammar is credited to Satyam, but their full name is unknown. There is no apparent
relationship with the IT company Mahindra Satyam, formerly known as Satyam Computer Services.
146
PHP Front End PTFA Analyzer
Code
Differencing
Source
Code
Code
Differences
DPD
Classifier
Classification
CFGs
Definite 
Protection
Version
Pairs
Git
Repository
Version Pair
Extractor
PTFA
Models
Reused
Component
Maintained
Component
New
Component
Reverter
Reverted
Version
Counter-Example
Calculator
Counter-
Examples
PIC Analyzer
PICs
1
1
Legend
DPD Root Cause Detector
Automation 2
2 2
2
2
Figure 8.5 Contributed Software Ecosystem
8.6.2 The ACMA PTFA Analyzer
François Gauthier developed the PTFA engine we used, named ACMA [57]. Mathieu Méri-
neau maintained it and added support tools. ACMA is described in more details in Gauthier’s
PhD thesis [60]. While I have not directly modified ACMA, I added a processing step
over its output files. ACMA outputs reachable PTFA models in a verbose XML format.
Consequently, the output of a single analyzed version requires many gigabytes of storage, up
to about 200 Gb for a recent version of MediaWiki. Out of necessity, I investigated multiple
compression formats (e.g. Zip, BZip2, XZ) and settled on the Efficient XML Interchange
(EXI) format [178]. This XML-specific format provides a higher compression ratio than the
other formats for our data set.
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8.6.3 Line Differences
The code differencing tool, mapdiff, is a Python script developped by Ettore Merlo. This
script extracts line mapping information from diff’s output. I created a driver program to
interface diff and mapdiff and facilitate their use for multiple pairs of versions. Please note
that we use diff with the --ignore-space-change and --minimal flags. These flags allow
to match corresponding lines even if indentation changed, and generally provides a better
mapping between versions.
8.7 Language Support
Multiple factors explain why supporting other programming languages requires significant
development effort. Although the concept of CFG is common, its representation and data
schema varies a lot across different tools [136].
First, the architecture of ACMA integrated call graph construction and PTFA analysis in
one step. This design decision made ACMA PHP-specific, although PTFA is a language-
independent approach. This factor, combined with scalability issues uncovered with recent
versions of Moodle, lead to the decision to implement a new PTFA engine. This new PTFA
engine is currently under development and offers better language-independence.
Second, PTFA analysis requires a CFG with grant edges, a non-standard edge type. As such,
the output of a CFG extractor could not be used as-is, and a post-processing tool would be
required to detect access control verifications and modify edges accordingly.
Third, the computation of a call graph is subject of various reasonable interpretations and
that statically computing a precise call graph is undecidable [136]. The call graph is the
graph which contains the interprocedural edges in the interprocedural CFG. In other words,
different static analysis tools tend to produce different interprocedural CFGs. Since the tools’
design decisions affects the CFG and thus the PTFA analysis, a very careful evaluation is
required before choosing and integrating one.
Finally, a lack of portability in the front-ends’ output mean that no universal importer is
practically feasible. The Graph eXchange Language [70] and ProBe [115] data formats are
intended to overcome this issue, but their adoption has been a limited success so far.
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In our concluding remarks, we summarize our contributions, succinctly state how this thesis
advanced knowledge, and discuss future research.
9.1 Summary of Contributions
We have seen that RBAC is a widespread form of access control, and an important part of
web application security. We have also seen that validating and re-validating RBAC policy
implementation is a difficult process. Every maintenance activity, whether related to security
or not, potentially adds both intentional and unintentional security flaws. As such, developers
need to revalidate their application regularly. Failure to do so may result in access control
vulnerabilities whose impact may range from information leaks (possibly to unauthorized
parties) to privilege escalation allowing all users to use administrative functionalities.
To address this situation, we presented the following thesis:



Thesis
Using static program analysis, we can automatically (1) identify differences in def-
inite privilege protection between two versions of an application, (2) classify these
differences in explanatory categories, (3) compute explanatory counter-examples
justifying the differences, (4) determine which code changes are responsible for these
differences and (5) conservatively identify all root causes for these differences in most
cases.
We demonstrated this thesis with new definitions, program analyses, and empirical results.
Specifically, we examined five research objectives.
Our first research objective was “Determine which parts of the program have different definite
privilege protection, compared to the last version.” To fulfill this objective we defined definite
protection differences (DPDs). This method compares two versions of a program and iden-
tifies a partial one-to-one mapping between their CFG vertices. Using this information and
the vertices definite protection, we compare definite protection and determine which vertices
are security-affected. When surveying 147 release pairs of WordPress, we found that, when a
release pair is security-affected, only 0.30% of the code is security-affected on average. In our
review of the results, we found that roughly 70% of DPDs may violate security assumptions.
Our second research objective was “Determine how the protection differs.” To fulfill this ob-
jective, we defined a set-theoretic classification of DPDs. We proposed 8 categories: complete
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loss, complete gain, monotonic loss, monotonic gain, substitution, symmetric overlap, asym-
metric overlap and disjoint. To do so, we compared definite protection similarly as RO1.
However, instead of performing a per-privilege comparison, we compared definite protection
sets. When surveying 147 release pairs of WordPress, we found that the most prevalent
categories were complete gains (≈ 41%), complete loss (≈ 18%) and substitution (≈ 20%).
Doing a manual review of all ≈ 34k classifications, we found that our classification is about
82% accurate.
Our third research objective was “Given a change in definite protection, justify the outcome.”
To achieve this objective, we computed privilege protection loss examples for them. This
computation involves finding the shortest interprocedural path in PTFA models. In order to
keep the explanatory counter-example short, we proposed a graph transformation that sum-
marizes interprocedural subpaths having no impact on definite protection. When surveying
147 release pairs of WordPress, we found that privilege protection loss examples have median
length of 88 PTFA states. We also found that explanatory counter-examples are fairly local –
the median explanatory counter-example is in a single file and crosses one function boundary.
Our review has shown a spurious path rate of about 11± 3% at a 95% confidence level.
Our fourth research objective was “Determine which code changes are responsible for pro-
tection differences.” To do so, we defined protection-impacting changes (PICs). To compute
PICs, we compare two versions of the program as in RO1. Using a mapping between CFG
vertices, we determined added and deleted edges between PTFA models. We also compute
edge reachability of appropriately protected paths. Combining this information, we obtain
PICs. We also surveyed 210 release pairs of WordPress and 192 release pairs of MediaWiki.
We found that 87/210 (41%) and 42/192 (22%) release pairs, respectively, were security-
affected. Their respective relative median PICs is about 27% and 14% of code changes in
security-affected release pairs. Over all release pairs, about 91% and 97% of their respective
source code changes are not protection-impacting.
Our fifth research objective was “Investigate the relationship between the code changes iden-
tified in RO4 and root causes of protection differences”. To do so, we reverted all PICs in
security-affected release pairs at a file granularity. We found that 87% to 93% of release pairs
had no definite protection differences (DPDs) left after reversal.
Our results indicate that developers are likely to benefit from using our analyses. They shrink
the number of code changes that must be evaluated up to 27% and contain all root causes
in 87% to 93% of the cases. In the event that protection-impacting changes do not contain
the root causes, developers can still use definite protection differences and protection losses
examples to understand why a DPD occurs.
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9.2 Advancement to Knowledge
In this thesis, we introduced a novel concept, an evolutive analysis of RBAC implementations.
We defined many novel analyses: definite protection differences (DPDs), protection-impac-
ting changes (PICs), a classification of DPDs and a method to determine if PICs contains root
causes using reversal. Doing so required creating a series of processing steps and algorithms.
In addition, our surveys of two open-source applications brought novel findings. We dis-
covered how often definite protection changes between versions, how much of the code is
security-affected, how short could explanatory examples get, and how much of the code
changes are protection-impacting. In addition, we discovered one category of root causes of
DPDs, root causes whose code changes belongs to paths. Furthermore, we discovered that
PICs contained these root causes in the vast majority of cases.
9.3 Recommendations for Developers
Our surveys were on open-source systems with no explicit security policy. As such, we could
not tell if a difference in protection violated the policy. This practice is likely to complicate
RBAC implementation validation. An explicit policy would remove confusion at that level,
especially if the policy is specified with semi-formal or formal models.
While reviewing our results, we often observed that developers would verify privileges at the
beginning of the script and abort execution early. While this is likely to improve performance,
it causes a large portion of the script to be definitely protected. In addition, this definite
protection is carried over to all called functions. This code pattern seems to go against the
principle of least privilege, as parts of the program are executing with more privileges than
strictly necessary. We recommend that developers only verify privileges for minimal code
sections that need them.
We also observed many qualified, variable and disjunctive checks. The use of these code
patterns diminish the efficacy of our approach. Using only unqualified and constant privilege
checks would facilitate the use of our tools and possibly facilitate re-validations ipso facto.
Developers should compute and verify PICs often during the project. This would avoid
large revalidation efforts before release. This recommendation is especially important for
large new releases (i.e. .0 releases). Even though the rate of protection-impacting changes
for these releases is relatively small (21% to 39%), it remains that the absolute amount of
protection-impacting changes (> 10,000) is large. The regular use of our approach during
the development of .0 releases would be especially desirable.
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9.4 Future Research
Our approach is promising. In addition to the future research related to the limitations we
mentioned earlier, there are many research opportunities to leverage protection-impacting
changes in other fields.
The concept of protection-impacting change is analogous to that of the fault localization in
automatic software repair (ASR). Fault localization [65, 87] identifies code statements that
introduces bugs. In other words, it determines the core piece of code that introduced a fault.
This important step in ASR results in a smaller search space, which accelerates and increases
the likelihood of successful fault repair. It would be interesting to investigate automatic
software repair for protection-impacting changes in future research.
We surveyed applications at the granularity of release pairs. However, our approach can
work between any two versions. In addition, our methods may be combined using software
repository mining approaches.
Our approach may be suited for selecting regression tests. We could identify a subset of the
tests that execute security-affected code and, when PICs contains all root causes, restrict the
tests to execute based on PICs.
Our approach may be suited for change impact analysis. Given a proposed software changes,
we can determine if any DPD would occur.
Our approach centers on RBAC, but it may be applicable to other forms of access control
as well. In addition, it may also be suited to verify applications that rely on a formal access
control policy such as XACML. This is because PTFA only depends on the predicates that
the front-end can identify. The moment an application uses stereotypical code patterns for
authorization, there is a good chance that PTFA can analyze it. Furthermore, PTFA could
be extended to consider the role hierarchies and constraints between roles that belong to
more complex forms or RBAC.
Our approach has been developed in isolation from developers in the industry, though it has
been guided by our industrial experience. As such, case studies of developers using DPDs,
DPD classification, explanatory counter-examples and PICs should be performed. To obtain
a better response, user-friendly tool support (e.g. visualization, IDE integration) should be
implemented prior to these studies.
We computed the association between CFG vertices between versions (i.e. the vertexMap and
bMap functions) using line-level differences. Differencing code at the line level is a common
practice in the industry, as evidenced by the diff and git utilities. However, it would be
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preferable to use a finer-grained approach. We could do so using AST differencing [47, 52],
graph matching [36] or clone analysis [104, 105, 155].
We have made a first contribution towards the identification of the root causes of DPDs.
Nonetheless, much research is needed to precisely identify root causes.
The PTFA engine should be improved to support complex the code patterns we identified in
Section 8.4.4. In addition, support for additional languages should be added. One interesting
avenue of research would be the handling of aspect-oriented languages in the construction of
PTFA models.
Another interesting avenue of research is integrating dynamic analysis. This could be done
by detecting runtime invariants (e.g. by extending Daikon [50] to PHP). Another option
would be to record dynamic call graphs. It would be possible to use the dynamic call graphs
as-is, but at the risk of introducing false negatives. Alternatively, one could use dynamic call
graph data to rank the DPDs and PICs according to their frequency or execution, similarly
to PatchAdvisor [139]. This latter approach would especially be relevant for industrial
studies.
Finally, protection-impacting changes could be adapted for similar problems. PICs is ulti-
mately a general framework that combines code changes with interprocedural graph reacha-
bility. Other problems that rely on graph reachability, such as taint analysis, are likely to be
easily adapted to this framework.
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APPENDIX A Example
We now provide a fictitious example of definite protection differences in Figure A.1 in Unified
Diff syntax. The access control policy specifies that foo() must always be executed with
privilege ’p’ verified. In the version Vera, the access control policy was implemented correctly.
In version Ver b, a developer implemented a feature which did not require any privileges in
c.php. Unaware of the access control policy, the developer mistakenly adds a call to foo()
from an unprotected context. Another developer modifies a.php in an unrelated manner,
adding a call to bar(). Both developers add their changes to the access control repository
in separate commits.
When comparing Vera with Verb, the code in function foo() is loss-affected (b.php line 1)
and the code in function bar() (b.php line 5) is gain-affected. For foo(), the protection-
impacting changes are lines 1 and 2 in c.php. For bar(), the protection-impacting change
is line 7 in a.php.
We show the changes between the CFGs or Vera and Ver b in Figure A.2. The code added
in c.php results in an added unprotected path, which we show in Figure A.2a. Adding the
call to bar is shown in A.2b. Finally, the deletion of an echo statement in a.php is shown
in Figure A.2c. We have greyed out the CFG vertices that are unchanged. In other words,
the grey vertices belong to vertexMap, whereas the white ones do not. This makes it easier
to visualize the contribution of added and deleted edges.
1 require_once ("b.php");
2
3 if (! current_user_can(’p’))
4 die();
5 - echo "Authorized\n";
6 foo();
7 + bar();
Listing A.1 a.php
1 function foo(){
2 // Assumes privilege p
3 }
4
5 function bar(){
6 //No security assumptions
7 }
Listing A.2 b.php
1 + require_once("b.php");
2 + foo();
3 + //...
Listing A.3 c.php
Figure A.1 Example of Protection-Impacting Changes. + and - Represents Insertions and
Deletions in Ver b
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Please consider the code change shown in Figure A.2c. None of the code is new (all vertices
are grey), however, the edges are different. We notice that the vertex for the echo statement,
and its accompanying edges, is missing. Also, we observe a new edge connecting the if to
the call_begin statement.
call_begin foo
call_end
Entry foo(v1)
. . .
Exit foo(v1)
Vera
cb
call
return
call_begin foo
call_end
Start c.php
require
call_begin foo
call_end
End c.php
cb
Entry foo()
. . .
Exit foo()
Verb
ca
ll
re
tu
rn
cb
call
return
(a) New Path
call_begin foo
call_end
End a.php
Vera
cb
call_begin foo
call_end
call_begin bar
call_end
End a.php
Vera
cb
cb
(b) Addition to Path
if
echo
call_begin foo
call_end
Vera
cb
grant
if
call_begin foo
call_end
Verb
cb
grant
(c) Deletion
Figure A.2 Kinds of Changed Edges – CFG Subsets – Unchanged Vertices Greyed Out
We show the CFGs for our example in Figure A.3. Please note that, in this example,
vertexMap is the identity function.
We show the PTFA models for loss-impacted code in Figure A.4. We do likewise for gain-
impacted code in Figure A.5. We highlight addedEdges and deletedEdges with red arrows.
We drew edges belonging to the set of protection-impacting changes with thicker arrows.
We highlight the applicable definite protection differences using a background pattern in
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v1 – Start a.php
v2 – require
v3 – call_begin current_user_can
v4 – call_end
v5 – if
v7 – echo v6 – die
v8 – call_begin foo
v9 – call_end
v10 – End a.php
v11 – Entry foo(v1)
v12 – . . .
v13 – Exit foo(v1)
v14 – Entry bar()
v15 – . . .
v16 – Exit bar()
cb
cb
grant
call
return
(a) CFG for Vera
v1 – Start a.php
v2 – require
v3 – call_begin current_user_can
v4 – call_end
v5 – if
v8 – call_begin foo
v9 – call_end
v17 – call_begin bar
v18 – call_end
v6 – die
v10 – End a.php
v19 – Start c.php
v20 – require
v21 – call_begin foo
v22 – call_end
v23 – End c.php
cb
11 – Entry foo()
12 – . . .
13 – Exit foo()
14 – Entry bar()
15 – . . .
16 – Exit bar()
ca
ll
re
tu
rn
call
return
cb
cb
cb
grant
call
return
(b) CFG for Verb
Figure A.3 Simplified CFGs of the Example – vertexMap is the identity function
the states. We also coloured states that belong to appropriately protected paths to definite
protection differences in blue. As we mentioned earlier, the i in PTFA state qi,j,k means that
qi,j,k corresponds to CFG vertex vi in Figure A.2.
The DPD root cause for loss-affected code in Figure A.4 is the paths caused by code added in
c.php. The deleted edges in a.php are not DPD root causes, but are identified as protection-
impacting changes. PICloss is thus a superset of the DPD root causes. The DPD root cause
for gain-affected code in Figure A.5 is the added call to bar in a.php. PICgain is a superset
of the DPD root cases in this case as well.
Some edges counter-intuitively belong to addedEdges and deletedEdges. Since CFG vertex v7
has no entry in vertexMap, the edges (q5,0,0 , q7,0,1), and (q7,0,1 , q8,0,1) are deleted. The edge
(q9,0,1, q10,0,1) is deleted because code is inserted between the states. Therefore, the control
flow of q9,0,1 in Verb must go to v17 instead. Similarly, the edge between (q5,0,0 , q8,0,1) is
added because there is no corresponding edge in Verb. Because v7 was removed, the control
flow goes directly from v5 to vertex v8.
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q0
a.php q1,0,0
q2,0,0
q3,0,0
q4,0,0
q5,0,0
q6,0,0
q7,0,1
q8,0,1
q9,0,1
q10,0,1
foo q11,1,1
q12,1,1
q13,1,1
cb
cb
call
return
(a) Vera
q0
a.php q1,0,0
q2,0,0
q3,0,0
q4,0,0
q5,0,0
q6,0,0
q8,0,1
q9,0,1
q17,0,1
q18,0,1
q10,0,1
foo q11,0,0 q11,1,1
q12,0,0 q12,1,1
q13,0,0 q13,1,1
bar q14,1,1
q15,1,1
q16,1,1
c.php q19,0,0
q20,0,0
q21,0,0
q22,0,0
q23,0,0
cb
cb
cb
cb
call
return
call
return
call
return
(b) Verb
Legend
qi,j,k Definite Protection Difference
qi,j,k
States in Appropriately Pro-
tected Path to Loss-AffectedCode
Added or deleted edge
Protection-Impacting Change
Figure A.4 Simplified PTFA Models of Our Example – Protection-Impacting Changes for
Loss-Impacted Vertices Highlighted.
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q0
a.php q1,0,0
q2,0,0
q3,0,0
q4,0,0
q5,0,0
q6,0,0
q7,0,1
q8,0,1
q9,0,1
q10,0,1
foo q11,1,1
q12,1,1
q13,1,1
cb
cb
call
return
(a) Vera
q0
a.php q1,0,0
q2,0,0
q3,0,0
q4,0,0
q5,0,0
q6,0,0
q8,0,1
q9,0,1
q17,0,1
q18,0,1
q10,0,1
foo q11,0,0 q11,1,1
q12,0,0 q12,1,1
q13,0,0 q13,1,1
bar q14,1,1
q15,1,1
q16,1,1
c.php q19,0,0
q20,0,0
q21,0,0
q22,0,0
q23,0,0
cb
cb
cb
cb
call
return
call
return
call
return
(b) Verb
Legend
qi,j,k Definite Protection Difference
qi,j,k
States in Appropriately Pro-
tected Path to Loss-AffectedCode
Added or deleted edge
Protection-Impacting Change
Figure A.5 Simplified PTFA Models of Our Example – Protection-Impacting Changes for
Loss-Impacted Vertices Highlighted.
176
In our example, not all edges in deletedEdges and addedEdges are protection-impacting
changes. For instance, the edge between q9,0,1 and q10,0,1 in Vera and the edge between q10,0,1
and q11,0,1 in Ver b are not protection-impacting changes. However, there may be cases where
protection-impacting changes will be (deletedEdges , addedEdges).
We observe that PICgain and PICloss are disjoint in our example. This occurs because
protection-impacting changes take appropriately protected paths in consideration. Please
consider the case in Figure A.4. The states q11,1,1, q12,1,1 and q13,1,1 are reachable in both
Vera and Verb. Protection-impacting changes consider the edges belong to paths to these
states only in Vera. Consequently, the added edge (q5,0,0 , q8,0,0) does not belong to PICloss.
If we considered all paths to definite protection difference, then (q5,0,0 , q8,0,0) would be
protection-impacting.
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APPENDIX B Obtaining Source Code for the Case Study
We downloaded the releases from WordPress and Mediawiki’s websites [186, 188]. There were
missing releases in the archive of both systems. As such, we had to reconstitute them. We
did so using version control data to generate a patch, which we applied to the release archive
of the earlier release. We confirmed with developers of both systems, on their IRC channels,
that no additional code changes were introduced for these versions.
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APPENDIX C VertexMap Construction Algorithm
In order to determine added and deleted code in CFGs and PTFA models, we create vertex-
Map, an injective function between the CFG vertices of two releases (Va and Vb). To do so,
we use textual differencing and node metadata.
Prior to building vertexMap, we number the nodes in AST order. Since we are comparing
identical lines of code, the order of the identifiers of the CFG vertices remains constant.
After numbering the vertices, we execute BuildVertexMap (Figure C.1). For the sake of
simplicity, we show the algorithm using findOnLine as a function that finds all CFG vertices
on a given file and line. The sortById function sorts the vertices according to the value of
their identifier. Finally, function zip is from functional programming. Given two collections
in input (e.g. x and y), it creates one tuple with one element of each collection (i.e. (xi, yi)
for all positions i in x and y).
function BuildVertexMap(identicalLines, Va, Vb)
vertexMap← ∅
for all (filea, linea, fileb, lineb) ∈ identicalLines
onLinea ← findOnLine(filea, linea, Va)
onLineb ← findOnLine(fileb, lineb, Vb)
onLinea ← sortById(onLinea)
onLineb ← sortById(onLineb)
vertexMap← vertexMap ∪ zip(onLinea, onLineb)
return vertexMap
Figure C.1 vertexMap Construction Algorithm
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APPENDIX D Release Tree Construction Algorithm
We build a tree of release pairs using their semantic versioning [149] and release date infor-
mation. Semantic versioning is a de facto standard for numbering software releases and it is
widely used in open source projects. Releases are tagged in the format x.y.z, where x is a
major version number, y is a minor version number, and z is a patch number. Whenever y or
z are missing, they are assumed to be zero. For instance, version 2 means 2.0.0 and release
2.3 means 2.3.0.
When we build the tree, we group together all releases with the same major and minor
version and connect them with an edge in increasing order of bugfix version. When it comes
to connect edges to .0 minor or major releases, we select a bugfix release in the previous
minor release branch. The bugfix release is the highest numbered version whose release date
is the same or earlier as the .0 release.
This behavior is provided by function BuildReleasePairTree, which returns the edges
of the tree (Figure D.1). The root of the tree is implicit, as it is the only vertex with
no predecessors. We rely on function sortV ersion, which sorts according to the seman-
tic versioning scheme. We also rely on function extractMajorMinor, which extracts the
major and minor version numbers (i.e. it returns x.y for an input of x.y.z). The function
groupByMajorMinor builds a multimap of releases, indexed by the major and minor version
numbers. The releaseDate function returns the release date of a version. Finally, functions
head and last respectively return the first and last element of an ordered data structure.
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function BuildReleasePairTree (releases)
edges← ∅
majorMinorReleasesSorted← versionSort(extractMajorMinor(releases))
releasesInMajorMinor ← groupByMajorMinor(releases)
previousMajorMinor ← Nil
for all majorMinor ∈ majorMinorReleasesSorted
bugfixesSorted← versionSort(releasesInMajorMinor[majorMinor])
previous← Nil
// Create edges for bugfix releases in the same major.minor branch
for all bugfix ∈ bugfixesSorted
if previous 6= Nil
edges = edges ∪ (previous, bugfix)
previous← bugfix
// Create edge from the previous major.minor branch
if previousMajorMinor 6= Nil
dotZero← head(bugfixesSorted)
earlier ←
{
v ∈ releasesInMajorMinor[previousMajorMinor] |
releaseDate(v) ≤ releaseDate(dotZero)
}
earlierSorted← versionSort(earlier)
edges← edges ∪ (last(earlierSorted), dotZero)
previousMajorMinor ← majorMinor
return edges
Figure D.1 Release Tree Construction Algorithm
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APPENDIX E Revert Rules
We summarize the reversal rules and elaborate on their rationale.
In Table E.1, we represent a file present in Vera by fa and a file present in Verb by fb.
Whenever fa and fb are both present in a decision rule, we mean that files fa and fb have
the same relative path from the application’s root directory. A Xin column PIC means that
protection-impacting changes are present in that file
For rule #1, the file fa was deleted and had no protection-impacting changes. We omit this
file from the reverted version.
For rule #2, the file fa was deleted, but it had protection-impacting changes, meaning that
some of its paths were necessary for privilege protection in Vera. Thus, we copy fa to the
reverted version.
For rule #3, the file fb was added and it has no protection-impacting changes. As such, we
copy fb to the reverted version.
For rule #4, the file fb was added and it contains protection-impacting changes. We omit
this file from the reverted version.
For rule #5, the file fa became fb. Neither contain protection-impacting change, so we copy
fb to the reverted version.
For rule #6, the file fa became fb, and only fa has protection-impacting changes. If the files
are identical, picking either fa or fb yields the same result. If the files are different, then
there is a deleted path in fa that was important for privilege protection, and we need to put
this path back in the reverted version. Thus, we copy fa to the reverted version.
For rule #7, the file fa became fb, and only fb has protection-impacting changes. Thus, fb
has added at least one path that affected privilege protection and we must remove this path.
Therefore, we copy fa to the reverted version.
Finally, for rule #8, fa became fb, and both have protection-impacting changes. The rationale
for rules #6 and #7 apply. Thus, we copy fa to the reverted version.
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# Vera Verb File Copied
File PIC File PIC
1 fa – – – –
2 fa X – – fa
3 – – fb – fb
4 – – fb X –
5 fa – fb – fb
6 fa X fb – fa
7 fa – fb X fa
8 fa X fb X fa
Table E.1 Rules for Reverting Files with Protection-Impacting Changes
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APPENDIX F Backwards Reachability Algorithm
We present our linear backwards racheability algorithm (BackwardsReachabilityEdges)
in Figures F.1 and F.2. The first step, Traverse, performs a backwards traversal until it meets
q0. It does so by recording but without entering into called functions. When meeting a function
start vertex, Traverse will continue its backwards analysis to its call sites. The second step,
Fill, is similar to Traverse, but restricts itself to intraprocedural edges and transitively visits
called functions. The inter_pred and intra_pred functions returns the edges. The evaluation of
bReachable is performed when visiting a call_end vertex, and it finds all the interprocedural edges
between the call begin and the call end.
This algorithm is of complexity O(E), where E is the number of edges in the program. In the worst
case, the algorithm will traverse all the edges in the program only once.
The bReachable function (Figure F.3) determines the relationships between call sites and functions
in a reachable PTFA model. It also uses the call_begin function, which returns the CFG state
that corresponds to the call_end state. The entry function returns the entry CFG vertex that
corresponds to a function’s exit state. PTFARevEdges is the set of reversed forward-reachable
PTFA edges. Please note that this function is based the graph rewriting rules in PTFA [111].
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function bPropagatableInterprocEdges (ce ∈ V )
// Return all call and return edges connecting to this
// call end that respects the bPropagatable equation
resultCalls← ∅
resultReturns← ∅
for all (exit, cb) ∈ inter_pred(ce)
for all cb ∈ call_begin(ce)
for all entry ∈ entries(exit)
if bReachable(ce, cb, entry, exit)
resultCalls← resultCalls ∪ {(cb, entry)}
resultReturns← resultReturns ∪ {(exit, ce)}
return (resultCalls, resultReturns)
function Traverse (changedNodeSet ⊆ V )
worklist← changedNodeSet
while worklist 6= ∅
curNode ← pop(worklist)
bReachable← bReachable ∪ {curNode}
switch curNode.type
case call_end //Visit function returning here in the next step
(calls, returns)← bPropagatableInterprocEdges(curNode)
pathEdges← pathEdges ∪ calls ∪ returns
toBeFilledSet← toBeFilledSet ∪ {vfrom | (vfrom, vto) ∈ returns}
theCbs← {vfrom | (vfrom, vto) ∈ calls}
//Create pseudo edges from call begin to call end
for all theCb ∈ theCbs
pathEdges← pathEdges ∪ {(theCb, curNode)}
if theCb /∈ bReachable
push(worklist, theCb)
case entry //Record and visit callers
pathEdges← pathEdges ∪ inter_pred(curNode)
unvisited← {vfrom | (vfrom, vto) ∈ interproc_pred(curNode) ∧ vfrom /∈ bReachable}
pushAll(worklist, unvisited)
default //Record and visit intraprocedural edges
pathEdges← pathEdges ∪ intraproc_pred(curNode)
unvisited← {vfrom | (vfrom, vto) ∈ intra_pred(curNode) ∧ vfrom /∈ bReachable}
pushAll(worklist, unvisited)
Figure F.1 Backwards Reachability Algorithm
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function Fill (toF illNodeSet ⊆ V )
worklist← toF illNodeSet
while worklist 6= ∅
curNode← pop(worklist)
filled← fill ∪ {curNode}
switch curNode.type
case call_end
(calls, returns)← bPropagatableInterprocEdges(curNode)
pathEdges← pathEdges ∪ calls ∪ returns
//Visit function returning here later
unvisited← {vfrom | (vfrom, vto) ∈ returns ∧ vfrom /∈ filled ∪ worklist}
pushAll(worklist, unvisited)
theCbs← {vfrom | (vfrom, vto) ∈ calls}
//Create pseudo edges from call begin to call end
for all theCb ∈ theCbs
pathEdges← pathEdges ∪ {(theCb, curNode)}
if theCb /∈ filled
push(worklist, theCb)
default //Record and visit intraprocedural edges
pathEdges← pathEdges ∪ intraproc_pred(curNode)
unvisited← {vfrom | (vfrom, vto) ∈ intra_pred(curNode) ∧ vfrom /∈ filled}
pushAll(worklist, unvisited)
function BackwardsReachabilityEdges (initNodes ⊆ V )
toBeFilledNodeSet← ∅
pathEdges← ∅
traverse(initNodes)
fill(toBeFilledSet)
return pathEdges
Figure F.2 Backwards Reachability Algorithm (continued)
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((call_end w, 0, 0) ∈ bReachable ∧ (exit z, 0, 0) ∈ Q ∧ (call_begin(w), 0, 0) ∈ Q)
⇒
 (call_begin(w), 0, 0) ∈ bReachable ∧((call_end w, 0, 0), (exit z, 0, 0)) ∈ PTFARevEdges ∧
((entry(z), 0, 0), (call_begin(w), 0, 0)) ∈ PTFARevEdges

( (call_end w, 0, 1) ∈ bReachable ∧ (exit z, 0, 1) ∈ Q ∧ (call_begin(w), 0, 0) ∈ Q)
⇒
 (call_begin(w), 0, 0) ∈ bReachable ∧((call_end w, 0, 1), (exit z, 0, 1) ∈ PTFARevEdges) ∧
((entry(z), 0, 0), (call_begin(w), 0, 0)) ∈ PTFARevEdges

( (call_end w, 0, 0) ∈ bReachable ∧ (exit z, 1, 0) ∈ Q ∧ (call_begin(w), 0, 1) ∈ Q)
⇒
 (call_begin(w), 0, 1) ∈ bReachable ∧((call_end w, 0, 0), (exit z, 1, 0)) ∈ PTFARevEdges ∧
((entry(z), 1, 1), (call_begin(w), 0, 1) ∈ PTFARevEdges)

( (call_end w, 0, 1) ∈ bReachable ∧ (exit z, 1, 1) ∈ Q ∧ (call_begin(w), 0, 1) ∈ Q)
⇒
 (call_begin(w), 0, 1) ∈ bReachable ∧((call_end w, 0, 1), (exit z, 1, 1)) ∈ PTFARevEdges ∧
((entry(z), 1, 1), (call_begin(w), 0, 1)) ∈ PTFARevEdges

( (call_end w, 1, 0) ∈ bReachable ∧ (exit z, 0, 0) ∈ Q ∧ (call_begin(w), 1, 0) ∈ Q)
⇒
 (call_begin(w), 1, 0) ∈ bReachable ∧((call_end w, 1, 0), (exit z, 0, 0)) ∈ PTFARevEdges ∧
((entry(z), 0, 0), (call_begin(w), 1, 0)) ∈ PTFARevEdges

( (call_end w, 1, 1) ∈ bReachable ∧ (exit z, 0, 1) ∈ Q ∧ (call_begin(w), 1, 0) ∈ Q)
⇒
 (call_begin(w), 1, 0) ∈ bReachable ∧((call_end w, 1, 1), (exit z, 0, 1)) ∈ PTFARevEdges ∧
((entry(z), 0, 0), (call_begin(w), 1, 0)) ∈ PTFARevEdges

( (call_end w, 1, 0) ∈ bReachable ∧ (exit z, 1, 0) ∈ Q ∧ (call_begin(w), 1, 1) ∈ Q)
⇒
 (call_begin(w), 1, 1) ∈ bReachable ∧((call_end w, 1, 0), (exit z, 1, 0)) ∈ PTFARevEdges ∧
((entry(z), 1, 1), (call_begin(w), 1, 1)) ∈ PTFARevEdges

( (call_end w, 1, 1) ∈ bReachable ∧ (exit z, 1, 1) ∈ Q ∧ (call_begin(w), 1, 1) ∈ Q)
⇒
 (call_begin(w), 1, 1) ∈ bReachable ∧((call_end w, 1, 1), (exit z, 1, 1)) ∈ PTFARevEdges ∧
((entry(z), 1, 1), (call_begin(w), 1, 1)) ∈ PTFARevEdges

Figure F.3 Definitions for bReachable
